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International
Peace and
Security

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# The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution

The Guide 1989

*THE GUIDE*
**TO CANADIAN POLICIES ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**
**1989**


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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Page

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I : ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. Nuclear and Space Arms: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 1
2. Nuclear and Space Arms: Defence and Space Arms Talks (DST) 7
3. Chemical and Biological Weapons 15
4. Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones 29
5. Nuclear Testing 35
6. Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) 43
7. Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 51
8. Nuclear Non-Proliferation 59
9. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 65
10. Uranium and Tritium Exports 73
11. Verification 80
12. Arms Transfers 85

SECTION II : DEFENCE

13. Arctic Sovereignty and Security 93
14. Cruise Missile Testing 105
15. North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) 111
16. The Defence Budget 117
17. Major Equipment Acquisitions 123
18. The Defence Industry 131
19. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 135
20. Peacekeeping and Observation 149

## SECTION III : CONFLICT RESOLUTION


21. Central America 161

22. The Middle East 167

23. North Africa 181

24. Sub-Saharan Africa 185

25. Southern Asia 199

26. East Asia and the Pacific 209

27. Human Rights 217

28. International Terrorism 231

**Appendix 1.** Canadian Treaty Obligations 237

**Appendix 2.** Canadian Armed Forces Order of Battle 241

**Appendix 3.** Canadian Contributions to Peacekeeping 247

**Appendix 4.** Public Opinion 251

**Appendix 5.** Strategic Nuclear Balance 255

**Appendix 6.** Canada and Security at the United Nations 257

**Appendix 7.** Recent Political Disturbances in China 267

*The Guide* is a survey of major developments in international peace and security over the past year, and of Canadian policy statements and Parliamentary debates in that field. I believe it provides an invaluable tool for all Canadians who wish to keep abreast of the many events and changes going on in today's world. It also serves as a compendium and reference volume for speakers, researchers and others who need accessible, reliable information on Canada's contributions to global affairs.

This fourth edition of *The Guide* covers the year 1988-1989, focussing on areas specified in the mandate of the Institute. It deals first with such questions as the continuing arms control and disarmament efforts between East and West, the impact of the federal budget on defence spending and planning, and developments in various regional conflicts in the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere. All the points examined relate to important items on international or Canadian peace and security agendas.

*The Guide* helps its users keep track of critical developments in the search for nuclear arms control and conventional force reductions in Europe. It follows the prospects for new agreements on chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and explains the threats to international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. It provides a record of recent developments in conflicts in Lebanon, South East Asia and elsewhere.

In many sections, the record surveys international developments before concentrating on Canadian Government policies and Parliamentary exchanges. In other cases, the spotlight is primarily on Canada, focussing on questions like sovereignty in the Arctic, the defence and surveillance of North American airspace, defence equipment programmes, and peacekeeping.

For those readers in this country and elsewhere who wish to trace the development of Canadian policies on international peace and security last year, and to judge Canada's performance over that time, I trust that you will find this fourth annual edition to be as useful as the preceding ones.

Bernard Wood
Chief Executive Officer

*The Guide* is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between mid-July 1988 and mid-July 1989, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

*The Guide* is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category--conflict resolution--has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings, as follows:

***Background*** provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1988 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary for an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

***Current Canadian Position*** is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

***Parliamentary Comment*** is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

***Current References*** is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

***Further Reading*** contains a limited number of earlier references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

Developments on the national and international scene have led to a number of changes in this year's *Guide*. The number of main entries has been reduced from 31 to 28, by dropping the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces basket of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (due to ratification of the INF Treaty in June 1988); "Disarmament and Development" (marking the 1987 UN conference on this subject); "The Third UN Special Session on Disarmament" (which ended in June 1988); and "Canada-US: Space Station" (given the conclusion of the relevant negotiations on this subject). A new entry on "The Canadian Defence Industry" (focussing on defence industrial preparedness) appears in the Defence Section, while the entry on "Arms Transfers," previously found in the Defence Section, has been shifted to the Arms Control and Disarmament Section. Finally, the inauguration in Vienna in March 1989 of two new sets of negotiations concerning European arms control has brought a change in the titles of two entries: "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE)" becomes "Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)," and "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)" becomes "Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)."

The individual entries were researched and written by Johanne Di Donato, Peter-Gizewski, and Michael Holmes, all of the Institute's Research Division. Ms. Di Donato was responsible for entry numbers 12 and 20-27; Mr. Gizewski for numbers 3, 5, 8-11, 13-14, and 19; and Mr. Holmes for numbers 1-2, 4, 6-7, and 15-18. In addition, Nancy Smyth, a student intern from Carleton University, contributed entry number 28 on "International Terrorism."

Two new appendices have been added to this year's *Guide*. The first, on "Canada's Role in the UN," includes a brief explanation of the UN structure dealing with security issues, together with Canada's record in voting on resolutions of the General Assembly's First Committee and the Security Council. The second new appendix, "Recent Political Disturbances in China," summarizes Canadian responses to the troubles arising from the Chinese Government's crackdown on the democracy movement in early June 1989. The other appendices have been updated from last year's versions. Michael Holmes was responsible for Appendices 1, 4, and 6: Peter Gizewski for numbers 2 and 5; and Johanne Di Donato for numbers 3 and 7.

Eva Bild of the Institute's Public Programmes Division copy-edited the manuscript and managed the publication of *The Guide*. Doina Cioiu, Administrative Assistant of the Research Division, continued in her role as "midwife" of *The Guide*, providing invaluable editorial and technical assistance. Thanks are also due to Roger Hill, Director of Research, for his comments on the manuscript; to Denis Bastien of Sogestran Inc., for the translation; to the staff of the Institute Library, and to Sylvain Lemieux, computer systems expert, for their indefatigable and creative support.

We welcome comments on *The Guide*'s utility and format, as well as suggestions for improvement. All such communications should be addressed to me at the Institute.

Ron Purver
Editor

## 1. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

*BACKGROUND*

On 8 January 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), the discussions were divided into three distinct negotiations, involving: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

Significant progress was made in the NST with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington on 8 December 1987. The Treaty banned all US and Soviet land-based INF missiles (those with ranges of between 1000 and 5500 km). For the Soviet Union this meant the destruction of 1846 missiles; for the United States, 846. Short-range INF, namely SS-12/22 and SS-12/23 missiles on the Soviet side and Pershing 1A missiles on the American, were to be destroyed within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty. Long-range INF, including SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles (stored, but never deployed) on the Soviet side and Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on the American, were to be destroyed within three years of ratification. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit on 1 June 1988.

Both sides began inspecting each other's bases and factories to verify the information contained in the Treaty in July 1988. On 1 August the Soviet Union destroyed the first of its missiles, four SS-12s, while the US began destruction of its Pershing IIs on 8 September. By mid-June 1989 the Soviet Union had destroyed 977 missiles and the US, 320. Generally speaking, both the US and the Soviet Union were satisfied with each other's record of compliance with the Agreement.

Success in the remaining two areas covered by the NST has been more difficult to achieve. No official name has been selected for the group dealing with strategic nuclear arms, though it is often referred to by the name of the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START, which ended without agreement in December 1983, was preceded by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I (1969-1972) and II (1972-1979). Each of these negotiations dealt with intercontinental, strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are generally defined as those weapons capable of reaching the territory of one superpower from that of the other (specified in SALT II as those with a range in excess of 5500 km).

When the new START negotiations began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the previous talks. By the end of the first round of the new negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze on the nuclear arsenals of both sides, a reduction of strategic

offensive arms by one-quarter as an opening move leading to deeper mutual cuts, and a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. The United States had suggested limits of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, 400 heavy bombers, and 850 ballistic missile launchers.

At their 19 to 21 November 1985 Summit in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to fifty percent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, together with effective measures of verification.

On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again.

At the second Summit meeting between the two leaders, in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11 and 12 October 1986, the Soviet Union proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a ten-year period. The United States proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. There was agreement that in the first five years each side would reduce to 6000 their strategic warheads and to 1600 their strategic launchers. The summit talks broke down, however, over the issue of strategic defence, which the Soviets linked to any possible accord on offensive arms.

Some limited progress on the strategic forces issue was made at the 7 to 10 December 1987 Washington Summit. At its close, the superpowers agreed on the following points: a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive arms; a 6000-warhead ceiling with no more than 1600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers; a sub-ceiling of 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads; a fifty percent cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs to 154, with ten warheads each; a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs at fifty percent of the Soviet level current at that time; a separate ceiling (outside the 6000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and certain methods of verification of an accord. In addition, the two sides agreed on the "counting rules" for determining how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each type of ballistic missile.

Some hope existed that an accord could be reached in 1988, though many officials were pessimistic. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow in late May for their fourth summit, but it was clear some time in advance that a START agreement would not be reached at the meeting. Verification, counting rules and sub-limits continued to be major stumbling blocks on the way to an accord.

The tenth round of the talks began on 12 July 1988 and closed on 16 November. Little progress was reported and a number of critical issues remained in dispute, including:

- the numerical limits on SLCMs, as well as their verification, given the difficulty in differentiating between nuclear and conventionally armed missiles;

- the question of warhead sublimits, with the Soviets willing to agree to the US proposal for an ICBM warhead sub-limit of 3300 only if a sublimit of 3300 also applies to SLBM warheads;

- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing ten per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft is capable of carrying, and the Soviets wanting to count the maximum number each type of bomber is equipped to carry;

- the US demand for a ban on mobile ICBMs, unless adequate ways of verifying their numbers can be found;

- the US proposal not to count ALCMs with ranges of under 1500 km (while the Soviets insist on using the SALT II definition for long-range ALCMs of 600 km);

- the question of heavy ICBM modernization, which the US wants banned; and

- the Soviet insistence on making conclusion of a START agreement contingent upon a Defence and Space Arms agreement, while the US argues against such linkage.

The two sides have agreed that the reductions will take place over seven years. The US has called for cuts to be carried out in a phased manner with intermediate ceilings by agreed dates, while the Soviet Union has supported cuts in two phases, with agreement to hold subsequent negotiations for additional reductions as a condition for signing an accord.

Initially, the talks were set to begin again in mid-February 1989. In December 1988, however, President-elect Bush stated that the negotiations needed to be postponed while his new Administration developed its arms control policies and directions. During this review, a number of decisions were made that would affect the negotiations. In February President Bush named Richard Burt as his chief arms control negotiator for the START talks. This was followed by Mr. Bush's plan to pursue development of both the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles. While this plan faces considerable Congressional opposition, the Bush Administration believes it may strengthen the United States' position at START for limiting mobile missiles. Finally, shortly before the beginning of the new round of talks, the US announced that it would seek to negotiate and implement verification measures for an agreement before completing a new strategic arms treaty.

The superpowers agreed in May to resume negotiations in June. On 19 June the eleventh round began. In early July, US scientists sponsored by the Natural Resources Defense Council, inspected a Soviet warship to demonstrate that the presence of nuclear-armed cruise missiles could be verified. The United States Government was invited to participate in a similar exercise but declined, contending that the tests proved nothing of significance.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Reduction of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals remains one of the Canadian Government's main arms control priorities. In his opening statement to the United Nations First Committee on 17 October 1988, Ambassador Douglas Roche referred to the issue:

> ...the Washington-Moscow Summits of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have dramatized the progress made by the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in improving their relations, particularly in the area of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. With the INF Treaty, the superpowers are destroying an entire class of nuclear weapons. An agreement to destroy a considerable number of strategic weapons is in sight. Obviously, the two superpowers have a long road still ahead of them. But the point is: they have already travelled a long way. This is the reason there is fresh hope today in the disarmament field.[1]

The next day in a speech delivered at Carleton University in Ottawa, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark referred to specific action the Canadian Government had taken in regard to START:

> In the context of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Canada has advocated the negotiation of effective limits on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, weapons which could increasingly threaten us directly, as intercontinental missiles do now. We are pleased that at the Washington Summit there was agreement to tackle this problem.[2]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 4 May 1989 in the House of Commons, Liberal Member Mr. Joseph Volpe raised the issue of the deployment of US mobile missiles. He stated that about one-half of the 50 MX rail-mobile missiles would be stationed near the Canada-US border. During a crisis, he argued, these missiles might be moved closer to and even into Canada. Mr. Volpe called on the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs to "... seek public assurances from the United States that Canadian territory will not be used for the deployment of this mobile nuclear weapon system. The Canadian Government must not allow the security and sovereignty of its people to be compromised."[3]

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1 Opening Statement by Ambassador Douglas Roche, Chairman First Committee UNGA 43, 17 October 1988, p. 2.

2 "Sovereignty in an Interdependent World," Notes for Remarks by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Carleton University, Ottawa, 18 October 1988, p. 7.

3 *Commons Debates*, 4 May 1989, p. 1304.

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Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Arms (DST)

## 2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (DST)

*BACKGROUND*

The Defense and Space Talks began in Geneva on 27 March 1985, as part of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NST also deals with long-range strategic nuclear weapons control (see the NST:START, Chapter 1 of *The Guide*). The aim of the Defense and Space Talks is to prevent an arms race in outer space and in strategic defences. This issue has drawn considerable attention since the announcement by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or, as it is often referred to, Star Wars).

SDI aims to provide defence against incoming ballistic missiles. At present, it calls for research, development and testing of new weapon technologies, many of which would be based in outer space. These weapons may include "exotic" technologies such as lasers and particle beams, as well as more conventional anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons. Naturally, there is a close link between this project and the status and future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972.

The ABM Treaty was the result of increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence, on the part of both the US and USSR, throughout the 1960s. In the United States, the ABM issue sparked a prolonged public debate, centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that ABM deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, requires that both sides remain vulnerable to attack (thereby preventing aggression by either one).

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide ABM defence and limits each to two ABM deployment areas, later amended on 3 July 1974 to one area. Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with questions of interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1976, the US dismantled the ABM system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviet Union has kept its ABM deployment around Moscow.

In his March 1983 announcement, President Reagan stated that the United States would pursue a new programme, SDI, aimed at providing a defence which would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Although he initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration adopted a "new" interpretation of the Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered prohibited by it.

This new interpretation, also known as the "broad" interpretation, would allow the testing and development of ABM systems based on new physical principles and would

prohibit only their actual deployment. The Reagan Administration stated that it believed this broad interpretation to be legally valid.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has, therefore, become an issue of considerable debate, centring on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty which states that:

> Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the broad interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II, according to this interpretation, means that *only* systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This would mean that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed were not affected.

The narrow interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans *all* sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. The phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed, until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States. The Soviets have stood by this position at the Defense and Space Talks, insisting that the testing of ABM systems and components must be restricted by the traditional interpretation. The general approach of the United States at the Defense and Space Talks consists of discussing the effects of the relationship between offence- and defence-based systems on the strategic balance, negotiating a smooth transition from an offense-dominated to a defence-dominated military structure, and resolving concerns over possible Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Specifically, the United States has stated that it will not conclude any further strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union until the Soviets dismantle a radar site at Krasnoyarsk, which Washington insists is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

Both sides have used the 10 December 1987 Joint Statement from the Washington Summit as the basis for an agreement in negotiations that have taken place since. At Washington, they agreed to have their negotiators work out "...an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time." Intensive discussions on strategic stability were to begin not later than three years before the end of the specified non-withdrawal period. Failing agreement in these discussions, each side would be free to pursue its own course of action once the non-withdrawal period was over. The general wording of the Joint Statement, however, left open the question of the narrow versus the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

At present the United States has not specified a time-period for non-withdrawal, though its proposals from the Reykjavik Summit suggesting that the period last until 1996

coupled with an agreement on START, and its May 1987 proposal suggesting 1994, are still on the table. The Soviet Union has put forward a nine- to ten-year proposal.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the ten-year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have insisted on this as a quid pro quo for any START agreement.

The United States rejected the Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On 22 January 1988, the United States presented a draft treaty intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

On 22 April 1988, during a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, the Soviets presented a new draft agreement. However, they have refused to develop a Joint Draft Treaty text, as proposed by the US.

From 24 to 31 August 1988 the third ABM Treaty Review Conference took place. Prior to the Conference, attention was focussed on whether or not the US would charge the Soviet Union with a "material breach" of the Treaty, as possible justification for an American withdrawal from it. Shortly before the beginning of the Conference, however, the United States announced it would postpone its decision until later. The Review Conference ended, unlike its two predecessors, without a joint statement reaffirming the Treaty's aims and purposes. In a related development, in May 1989 the Soviet Union offered to dismantle its Krasnoyarsk radar installation if the United States agreed to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The offer was refused by the US, however.

The tenth round of the NST ended on 16 November 1988 with no significant progress on the question of defence and space weapons. As a result of its strategic review in early 1989, the Bush Administration declared that it would take a somewhat different approach to the issue of SDI than did the Reagan Administration. This involves a more limited view of what to expect from SDI and lower appropriations for research. In May, the head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Lieutenant General George Monahan Jr., stated that certain parts of the programme, including study of a new tracking satellite, a ground-based interceptor rocket, and an orbiting laser, will be delayed for two years.

The programme is now envisaged to have three phases. Phase one, involving sensors and kinetic energy interceptor technologies, could require a decision on deployment within four years. Phase two would involve directed energy weapons, and phase three would include more advanced weapons. The cost of developing and deploying phase one has been estimated at $69 billion. Since its inception, approximately $17 billion has been spent on SDI.

Funding for SDI has been reduced by President Bush from that planned by the Reagan Administration. For fiscal year 1990, requests for SDI funds were reduced from $5.6 billion to $4.6 billion; funding requests for the next five years were reduced from $41 billion to $33 billion. Priority has shifted within SDIO from developing a system of large satellites from which up to ten interceptor rockets each would be launched against

incoming warheads, to a system called "Brilliant Pebbles," involving thousands of smaller space-based rockets.

The eleventh round of the negotiations began on 19 June 1989.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In the past four years the Government of Canada has declared both that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and that it is not prepared to become involved in government-to-government participation in the SDI programme.

On 26 March 1985, Canada and the other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured the US allies that they were to be included in the benefits the SDI programme may offer and in the decision-making process. He also invited them to become participants in the research stage of the programme, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty.

On 7 September 1985, after internal Government study and a set of public Parliamentary hearings, Canada refused the offer of government-to-government participation in the research programme but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for SDI contracts. Of the allies contacted by the US, five nations--the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan--have signed Memoranda of Understanding involving SDI research participation.

The Canadian Government has repeatedly expressed its belief that while it does not want to get involved directly in SDI research, it is only prudent to have some such research pursued in the West. This view was elaborated by External Affairs Minister Clark on 5 March 1987, following a meeting with Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on arms control issues. Having expressed Canadian support for continued US adherence to the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Mr. Clark stated:

> Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern.

He went on to say:

> Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....[The] SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.[1]

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1 Department of External Affairs *Statement* 87/14, 5 March 1987, p. 2.

Assurances from Mr. Shultz that at that point the US considered premature any decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence were welcomed by the Canadian Government.

In a speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet criteria that had been outlined previously by Mr. Nitze--cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability--along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process...."[2]

By the end of 1988, Canadian industry had received six SDI-related contracts worth about $1.6 million (US dollars).[3]

## *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

During the past few years, questions have been raised in Parliament over Canadian Government involvement in these contracts. In November 1987 the issue of the involvement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation as a prime contractor for an SDI contract was raised in the House. It was argued that the CCC, as a Crown Corporation was an agent of the federal Government, and that its involvement therefore ran counter to the Government's commitment not to participate in SDI projects. The Government responded that the purpose of the CCC was to act as an agent for Canadian companies and that its involvement was limited to this purpose.[4]

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2 Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly," 23 May 1987, p. 3.

3 John G. Roos, "Half of SDIO Contracts Open to Allies; Work Focuses on ATBM Research," *Armed Forces Journal International*, vol.126 no. 7 (February 1989), p. 36.

4 *Commons Debates*, 16 November 1987, p. 10829. See also Chapter 21, "Canada - US: Research on the Strategic Defence Initiative," in: David Cox and Mary Taylor (eds.), *A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1986-87*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987, esp. pp. 140-143.

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## 3. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

*BACKGROUND*

The use of chemical weapons during the First World War led the international community to increase its efforts to eliminate them. Such efforts were also extended to the related problem posed by the prospect of biological agents being used as weapons of warfare. By 1925 these initiatives resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare."

The Protocol's failure to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, however, led to a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive restrictions. This goal has been actively pursued in various United Nations disarmament bodies, particularly during the last twenty years.

By 1971, the difficulties of concluding a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons led to a decision in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider them separately. Progress in the area of biological weapons control soon followed, producing a convention signed in 1972 which came into force three years later. Considered the first international agreement requiring actual disarmament measures, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of bacteriological or poisonous weapons, and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. As of 1 January 1988, the Convention had been signed by 136 states and ratified by 110 of them.

The BWC has been subject to two review conferences aimed at ensuring its effectiveness, in 1980 and 1986. Among the concerns addressed at both conferences were the ability of the Convention to cover potential weapons developments made possible by new technologies, such as recombinant desoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxin agents, together with the possible weapons applications of such research; and problems of verifying compliance with the Convention.

Such issues were highlighted by a stream of allegations beginning in the mid-1970s concerning the development and use of biological and toxin weapons by the superpowers and their Allies. Particularly noteworthy were charges that the Soviet Union and its allies had used toxin weapons in South East Asia (i.e., yellow rain), and the inability to establish the facts conclusively.

In an attempt to strengthen the BWC further, the final declaration of the Second Review Conference included a new arrangement allowing any state to call a meeting of an advisory group of experts, if a problem arises concerning application of the Convention. It also requires the signatories to begin work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts and suspicions concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international cooperation on the peaceful uses of microbiology." Specific measures included the exchange of information concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. In order to elaborate precise procedures for such exchanges, an Ad Hoc Group of scientific and technical experts, from the states parties, met in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987. The 1986 Review Conference had

also requested that states send information to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The second such exchange of information began in the fall of 1988.

A ban on chemical weapons has been on the UN agenda since 1968. Yet progress has materialized only recently. In 1980, the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. By 1983, this Group had developed a consensus document identifying elements of a comprehensive treaty, and had outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

An important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons was taken by the United States in 1984 when it tabled a draft treaty providing for verification by challenge inspections (i.e., short-notice, mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating). That year also saw general agreement that the destruction of existing chemical weapon stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection, although disagreement persisted over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Concern over chemical weapons has been fed by recent allegations of their use. Since 1980, the UN Secretary General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988 Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons--this time against its own Kurdish population. A UN investigation of the alleged attacks was undertaken between 17 March and 4 April 1988. On 26 April, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action.

In the meantime, after a hiatus of eighteen years, the United States renewed its production of chemical weapons in December 1987. Such plans gained momentum in the wake of US statements alleging continued Soviet production of chemical weapons. In the fall of 1987, for instance, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, chief US delegate to the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, cited US estimates indicating that there were fourteen to twenty chemical weapon-production sites on Soviet territory whose whereabouts Moscow refused to disclose. Plans for the production of a chemical weapon deterrent also continued in France.

More recent evidence of the development and production of chemical weapons has surfaced in the Third World. On 25 October 1988, US Director of Central Intelligence William Webster announced that Libya was building a chemical warfare complex at Rabta, forty miles southwest of Tripoli. According to US State Department officials, the plant, once completed, would be capable of producing nerve gas as well as large quantities of mustard gas. While Libya denied the charges, and maintained that the facility was a pharmaceutical plant that it would "open to the world when completed," US accusations and presentation of evidence to the contrary mounted during subsequent months. Such evidence also indicated that the technology used in the development of the Libyan facility was acquired from companies in both West Germany and Japan. West German, US and Indian companies were also linked to the development of a chemical weapons capability by Iran.

In Geneva, negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have moved closer to agreement on the definition of chemical weapons and on procedures for their destruction. Detailed provisions have been elaborated on the verification of declarations of existing stocks and

the closure and elimination of production facilities, while useful work has also been done on the guidelines for an international inspectorate. On 11 August 1987 the USSR tabled a proposal on compulsory on-site inspection which came close to that put forth by the United States in 1984. The Soviet proposal accepted the concept of challenge inspection of all chemical weapon facilities with no right of refusal. It also provided for the entry of inspection teams within forty-eight hours of a challenge (previously the Soviets had insisted on the right to veto requests for challenge inspection and did not require that inspections be so timely).

Additional headway toward a Chemical weapons ban was made in October 1987, when representatives of forty-five nations visited a Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, on the Volga River south of Moscow. The foreign delegations were shown nineteen different types of chemical munitions and a mobile complex used for their destruction. Bilateral talks between the superpowers also resulted in visits by US officials to a Soviet facility for the destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayesk, and by Soviet officials to a US chemical weapon facility at Tooele, Utah, in November 1987. Moreover, in December 1987 the Soviet Union declared that its chemical weapons stockpile consisted of no more than 50,000 tons of poisonous agent, all located on Soviet territory.

From 7 to 11 January 1989, over 140 nations participated in a Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris. The conference was intended to focus attention on the horrors associated with chemical weapons' use, the dangers posed by their existence and proliferation, and the outstanding issues to be addressed in achieving a chemical weapons ban. During the five days of deliberations, the total number of states to have declared non-possession of chemical weapons increased to over sixty, eleven states added their signatures to the Geneva Protocol (increasing the number of signatories from 129 to 140), and three additional states announced their intention to sign in the near future.
The Final Declaration of the Conference stressed four points: 1) the commitment of the participants not to use chemical weapons and to condemn their use (thus reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol); 2) the necessity and urgency of concluding a chemical weapons ban, and for all states to accede to it upon its conclusion; 3) the need for states to exercise self-restraint and act responsibly until such time as a comprehensive ban entered into force; and 4) full support for the UN as a forum for exercising vigilance with regard to the prohibition on chemical weapons use and, in particular, for the role of the Secretary-General in investigating alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Some participants at the Conference charged the Western nations with practicing a double standard by trying to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World while at the same time developing new generations of such weapons themselves. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq and Libya demanded that the conferees recognize their right to possess chemical weapons as long as Israel possessed a presumed nuclear capability. Both superpowers rejected such arguments.

On 8 January 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced at the Paris Conference that the Soviet Union would soon complete work on the Chapayesk facility for the destruction of chemical weapons, and that elimination of Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons would begin immediately thereafter. He added that representatives of interested countries would be invited to visit the facility once it went into operation. US officials welcomed the Soviet move, but added that Moscow was "simply playing catch up"

with the routine US practice of destroying obsolete chemical weapons stocks.[1] Moreover, they stressed that it was unclear whether the Soviet initiative was militarily significant, given the huge chemical weapons arsenal they believe the Soviets to possess.[2]

On 15 February 1989, in response to the involvement of a West German company in construction of the alleged Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabta, the Federal German Cabinet announced approval of revised export controls, more fully to guard against the sale of materials that could be used in the production of chemical weapons capabilities in the future. West German officials also noted that their Government would seek an early meeting of the Australia Group (i.e., nineteen chemical-manufacturing nations--including Canada--who have attempted to strengthen controls on chemical exports) to urge all members to adopt similar measures, and would press for the adoption of similar measures by the European Community.

Recent progress at the CD has been evident in the near doubling of non-member participants involved in the chemical weapons negotiations, and in the submission of reports by more than twenty-eight states, to date, concerning inspections of their respective chemical industries (i.e., National Test Inspections). Nevertheless, several issues require further attention. These include: a definition of chemical weapons; verification difficulties, given the ease with which such weapons can be manufactured; the cost, size and scope of an international monitoring agency; the procedural details for instituting challenge inspection; and the problem of ensuring the broadest possible participation in a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has signed and ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Since the conclusion of the BWC, Canada has shown great interest in the elaboration of verification measures to strengthen its enforcement. Canada was an active participant at the *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts held in Geneva in March and April 1987 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference of the BWC. There, Canada contributed to a better understanding of the utility of adopting criteria relating to disease outbreaks, as well as containment standards for research facilities.[3]

Successive Canadian governments have also sought to help define and promote a chemical weapons convention, as well as to ensure its effective verification. Indeed, the conclusion of such a ban constitutes one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament of the present Canadian Government. Prominent among Canada's initiatives have been its submission to the CD of various working papers relating to a chemical weapons ban.[4]

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1 Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets to Start Trimming Arsenal of Chemical Arms." *New York Times*, 9 January 1989, p. A8.

2 *Ibid.*, p. A1.

3 "Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome." *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 10.

4 See, for instance: Canada and Norway, *Proposal for An Annex to Article IX Concerning Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons*, CD/766 (2 July 1987); and Canada, *Factors Involved in Determining Verification Inspectorate Personnel and*

Canada has also produced a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, in 1985; sponsored three investigations of alleged Soviet use of toxin weapons in South East Asia;[5] and presented to the CD a series of compendia on chemical weapons negotiations comprising documents from its ongoing sessions. On 31 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, presented the latest compendia of such material, comprising documents from the 1987 session, to the CD.[6] Finally, the Canadian Government has actively expressed its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, most recently in the Iran-Iraq War.[7]

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Mr. de Montigny Marchand discussed the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban at the CD on 4 August 1988. Noting that the goal of a chemical weapons ban was clearly in sight, he warned that "recent and repeated use of such weapons increasingly raised the danger that they would appear as effective weapons of war."[8] On the negotiations themselves, Mr. Marchand expressed Canada's satisfaction at the "workmanlike and unpolemical approach" that delegations were pursuing. He went on to state that one of Canada's primary concerns in developing an agreed regime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons was to ensure that the process did not diminish the national security of states, during the ten-year destruction period following the treaty's entry into force. Nevertheless, the Ambassador noted, Canada opposed proposals put forth by nations (such as France) supporting the production of "security stocks" of chemical weapons during the

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*Resource Requirements*, CD/823 (31 March 1988).

5 *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, November 1985; Butler, G. C., *Report on the Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (Memo to External Affairs), 2 December 1981; Shiefer, H. B., *Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (A Report to the Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J., and Purdon, J. J., *Final Summary Report on the Investigation of Yellow Rain Samples from Southeast Asia*, Ottawa, Defence Research Establishment, February 1986; Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1986 Session*, Ottawa, June 1987; and Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons-Final Records (PV), 1986 Session*, Ottawa, June 1987.

6 CD/865, 31 August 1988.

7 Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 068, 25 March 1988.

8 CD/PV 471, 4 August 1988, p. 16.

chemical weapons destruction period.[9] Mr. Marchand added that Canada at present was devoting a major research effort in the area of an international inspectorate and the related national authority for the Convention.[10]

The Ambassador discussed other outstanding issues concerning the provisions of a chemical weapons ban. Canada, he stated, believed that a chemical weapons convention need not include provisions of extraterritoriality regarding chemical industries.[11] Mr. Marchand expressed support for the concept of multilateral exercises for the development and testing of procedures for inspecting chemical industry facilities. However, he referred to preliminary surveys of the chemical industry in Canada indicating that, depending upon the thresholds ultimately to be agreed, Canada might not possess any commercial facilities subject to routine inspection under the convention.[12]

Finally, Mr. Marchand remarked that, while it was for any chemical weapons convention to ensure that the information required for its effective implementation was provided by the chemical industry, parties must take due account of the latter's legitimate concern for the protection of commercially sensitive data. The Ambassador called for closer examination of the actual ways in which such information could be protected, noting that Canada was currently considering various approaches and hoped to present further views on the subject in future discussions.[13]

On 18 October 1988, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Yves Fortier addressed the First Committee of the General Assembly on the issue of a chemical weapons ban:

> For many, including the Canadian Government, the progress in these negotiations must seem frustratingly slow. But in our judgement, this is not because of a lack of serious effort and intent on the part of participants in the negotiations. Rather it reflects the genuinely difficult technical and legal issues involved, particularly in relation to various aspects of the verification provisions of the treaty under negotiation.[14]

The verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention was the topic of a conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Programme of the University of Calgary on 21 to 24 October 1988. Sponsored by the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs, the conference drew together a small number of experts from the US, the UK, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada to consider the lessons that might be learned from the operation of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguard systems for the verification of a chemical weapons ban. In general, it was

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9 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

11 *Ibid.*.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

13 *Ibid.*.

14 Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 42, 18 October 1988, p. 5.

concluded that the IAEA could offer significant and valuable insights for chemical weapons verification. The lessons derived would, however, be limited to issues of general approach rather than detailed application, in large part owing to significant differences between the nuclear and chemical industries.[15]

On 7 December 1988, at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored three resolutions on chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 43/74A called for strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol and a continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of his Group of Experts, to develop further guidelines and procedures for investigations into accusations of use.[16] Resolution 43/74B expressed satisfaction with the adoption of procedures for the exchange of information in accordance with the second review conference of the BWC, and the fact that the second such exchange was currently underway. It also called upon states that had not yet participated in such exchanges to do so, and requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance where required to facilitate implementation of the relevant parts of the final declaration. The Resolution concluded by calling upon all states to ratify or sign the Convention if they had not yet done so.[17] Finally, Resolution 43/74C urged that efforts be intensified and that increased time be devoted to the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention.[18] All three Resolutions were adopted by consensus.

In December 1988, the Government released a report entitled *Research Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence Within The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Written by Mr. William H. Barton, Chairman of the Board of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the study was undertaken in response to concerns raised last summer about nerve gas testing at Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta (for more information, see Chemical and Biological Weapons, Chapter 4 in the 1987-1988 edition of *The Guide*). The report concluded that all research, development and training activities undertaken by the Department of National Defence were for purposes of self-defence, that this constituted the most prudent course for Canada, and that it was consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the Canadian Government. In addition, the study noted that all such activities were conducted in a professional manner, and posed no threat to public safety or to the environment. Nevertheless, it went on to list sixteen recommendations aimed at improving management, control and public understanding of the chemical and biological self-defence programme. These recommendations included: the tightening of safety procedures and physical security arrangements at Defence Research Establishment, Suffield (DRES) and Defence Research Establishment, Ottawa (DREO); reducing the number of outdoor tests at

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15 "University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 5. See also James Keeley, *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Occasional Papers* No.1, September 1988.

16 UNGA Resolution 43/74 (A), 7 December 1988.

17 UNGA Resolution 43/74 (B), 7 December 1988.

18 UNGA Resolution 43/74 (C), 7 December 1988.

the Suffield base; and insuring that all future testing procedures be conducted in accordance with the new Canadian Environmental Protection Act.[19]

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark addressed the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons on 8 January 1989. Noting that a ban on chemical weapons "will not happen overnight" and "will require reliable means of verification," the Minister nonetheless observed that great progress had been made in the negotiation of a global, comprehensive and verifiable agreement.[20] He called upon the conference itself to condemn the use of chemical weapons, reaffirm the Geneva Protocol while calling on additional states to adhere to it, and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use.[21]

Canada, he stated, does not intend to develop, acquire or stockpile such weapons, unless they are used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its Allies. The Minister further observed that Canada was applying its obligations under the Protocol, to parties and non-parties alike, and had adopted a firm policy of non-production to help achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. He added that Canada had already advised other nations of the destruction of the bulk, useable chemical warfare agents it had stockpiled during the Second World War. With regard to the BWC, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's 1970 declaration that it had never had any biological or toxin weapons and did not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future.[22]

Noting that only the United States and the Soviet Union had admitted their production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, Mr. Clark called upon other countries possessing chemical weapons to adopt a similar spirit of openness. Finally, he turned to the subject of the Convention itself. Here, he pointed out that the verification of a chemical weapons ban would be complex, expensive and intrusive. Until such time as a verifiable ban could be achieved, however, there was a need for self-restraint.[23] Mr. Clark concluded:

> ...the elimination of chemical weapons from the face of the earth is not merely a pragmatic necessity. More than a common sense assessment of our security interests is involved. The issue touches on our sense of ourselves as human beings....surely it is the responsibility of governments to seek to limit our capability to inflict abhorrent cruelties and punishments on each other. Chemical weapons use, inevitably involving civilian as well as military victims,

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19 Department of National Defence, *Research Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: A Review by William H. Barton.* Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988.

20 "Banning Chemical Weapons for All Times." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 3.

21 *Ibid.*.

22 *Ibid.*.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

only provokes revulsion. Chemical weapons must be banned. We owe our citizens no less. Let us get on with the task.[24]

On 9 January 1989, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced the appointment of a full-time Defence Science Counsellor for chemical arms control negotiations as part of Canada's Permanent Mission to the CD, in order to "enhance Canada's contribution to concluding an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons."[25]

Later that month, Mr.Beatty announced the Government's response to the Barton Report. On 25 January 1989, he stated that he had accepted all sixteen of the recommendations made in the report and had directed that they be implemented without delay.[26] In addition, the Minister announced that "in the interest of an open disarmament dialogue," he would be inviting officials of the Soviet Union to visit the Defence Research Establishment, Suffield. The purpose of the visit, Mr. Beatty explained, was to allow the Soviets to view the facilities, observe the process Canada used to destroy chemical agents, and share information on related technical issues.[27]

On 7 March 1989, Ambassador to the CD de Montigny Marchand announced that Canada was preparing a working paper examining the cost implications of establishing an international inspectorate for a Chemical Weapons Convention.[28] The Ambassador also announced the distribution to the CD of the latest in Canada's series of compendia on chemical weapons (covering the 1988 CD session), as well as the study prepared by the Department of External Affairs' Verification Research Programme dealing with lessons provided by the IAEA for verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention.[29] Finally, he stated that Canada would soon be joining those member states that had conducted, or planned to conduct, test inspections of their national chemical industries. Results of these tests, he promised, would be provided as soon as they became available.[30]

On 14 July 1989, Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight announced that a delegation from the Soviet Union had accepted the invitation to visit DRES.[31] The

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24 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

25 Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 9 January 1989.

26 Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 25 January 1989, p. 1.

27 *Ibid.*.

28 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament." 7 March 1989, p. 8.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

31 Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 14 July 1989.

delegation, consisting of ten scientists and technical experts from the working levels of the Soviet government and military, arrived for their tour of Suffield on 16 July 1989.[32]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 24 August 1988, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty touched upon the issue of chemical weapons in discussing Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Recalling criticism voiced earlier in the summer regarding Canada's research, development and training in chemical and biological defence, Mr. Beatty stated:

> That work is strictly defensive in nature and we continue to press for a complete ban world-wide on chemical and biological weapons. But until that day arrives, sending Canadian peacekeepers in an area where chemical agents have been used underscores the need for Canadian Forces to be prepared to work in a chemical warfare environment and, in particular, it underscores the need for our research establishments to develop even more effective devices to protect our personnel....if [w]e did not have adequate training for our Canadian Forces personnel, and if we did not have adequate equipment...we would not have been able to deploy our troops to this region. It would not further the cause of peace to have us unable to send Canadian troops to this region. This is why this work is so important for Canada. I can report to the House that we have issued chemical detection devices, gas masks, and protective clothing to our troops.[33]

Throughout September 1988, questions were raised in the House concerning the issue of chemical weapons testing on human subjects at Suffield during the 1960s. While Defence Minister Beatty maintained that there was no indication that participants in the tests had suffered any lasting effects from them, the issue prompted demands in the House for more detailed information concerning the extent of such testing and the individuals involved.[34]

On 22 September 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton discussed the case of an individual who had alledgedly suffered serious medical problems as a result of his participation in nerve gas tests at Suffield.[35] Calls for a public enquiry into the issue of nerve gas testing soon followed.[36] Responding to the criticism, Mr. Beatty pointed to the Barton study on Canada's research and training in chemical and biological defence as evidence of Government initiative on the issue. Moreover, the Minister gave assurances in the House that the Government would conduct follow-up studies of those individuals identified as having participated in such tests, and that additional efforts were being undertaken to

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32 *Ibid.*.

33 *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, p. 18803.

34 *Commons Debates*, 21 September 1988, pp. 19478-19479.

35 *Commons Debates*, 22 September 1988, p. 19530.

36 *Ibid.*. See also: *Commons Debates*, 23 September 1988, p.19575.

identify and locate others who may have been involved.[37] On 27 September 1988, a toll-free telephone service was established by the Department of National Defence to aid in the Government's search for such individuals, and to better enable the public to obtain information about nerve gas testing at Suffield.[38]

On 14 December 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton cited recent statements made by a retired Canadian Army veteran indicating that in 1947, the Canadian Army had dumped shells containing mustard gas in the Pacific Ocean.[39] While Defence Minister Beatty and other DND officials had responded to such claims initially by stating that "no record of such an operation existed," additional evidence had led to admissions by Colonel Conrad Mialkowski, Assistant Director General for Research and Development at National Defence Headquarters, that such dumping did in fact take place about 160 km off the coast of British Columbia.[40] Expressing concern over the Government's handling of the issue, Mr. Fulton stated:

> This is a very serious matter. The Minister of National Defence advised that there were no records. Senior people in his Department advised that there were no records. When they were caught by the media,...ex-servicemen and Members of Parliament, suddenly there are records. Suddenly they claim they know exactly where the mustard gas is located, exactly when it went there and how it got there and so on.[41]

Mr. Beatty replied:

> ... we have been unable to locate anywhere in the Department of National Defence... any record of surplus stocks being dumped over 40 years ago in the Pacific.... I indicated to the Hon. Member's researcher... that if he had any evidence whatever suggesting that this was the case, we would welcome it being brought forward. That continues today.[42]

Mr. Beatty then noted that reports of the dumping had been found in the Victoria *Times-Colonist* newspaper of the period, and that Colonel Mialkowski had made his statement about the incident based on that source.[43]

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37 *Commons Debates*, 21 September 1988, pp.19478-19479; 22 September 1988, p.19530; and 23 September 1988, pp. 19568 and 19572.

38 Department of National Defence *News Release*, 26 September 1988, and *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, p.19776.

39 "Army Dumped Chemical Arms: Report," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December 1988, p. C18.

40 "Forces Admit Mustard Gas Dumped Off B.C.'s Coast," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 December 1988.

41 *Commons Debates*, 14 December 1988, p. 57.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

43 *Ibid.*.

On 25 April 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie emphasized the need for a treaty banning chemical weapons. Referring to an incident in Soviet Georgia in which "poisonous gas" had been used with fatal effect against demonstrators,[44] he told the House:

> Unfortunately, it seems that the world is on a slippery slope to increased tolerance of chemical warfare, as we learned to our horror when Iraq employed chemical warfare on its Kurdish population in surely one of the most desperate acts in recent history. There has been much talk of the need for a treaty to ban all such chemical weapons, as well there should be. It is certainly needed, not just to prevent nations from using chemicals against each other but also to protect their own citizens. We urge the Government to actively promote such a Treaty.[45]

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44 *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1989, p. 914.

45 *Ibid.*.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Verification

## 4. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

### *BACKGROUND*

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZs) consist of defined geographic areas in which the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Various types of NWFZs exist and have been proposed since the 1950s. They have been supported as a means to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a confidence-building measure (CBM) in the pursuit of regional security, as well as constituting steps in a progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Two NWFZs for populated areas have been established by international agreement: the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, establishing Latin America as the first such zone in the world; and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. The latter, negotiated by the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum, bans the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in their area. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. The Treaty has encountered problems, in that only two of the five nuclear weapons states, China and the Soviet Union, have signed the relevant Protocols. France, which maintains an active nuclear testing programme in the region, is opposed to the zone, so are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have both expressed reservations over the Treaty's symbolic importance as a precedent allegedly incongruent with their national interests.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Balkan states, the South Atlantic, the Nordic states, the Mediterranean, and South East Asia. Most of these efforts have been made in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, with interest in them varying over time. Two areas which have received considerable international attention recently include the Arctic--stimulated by the Soviet Union's October 1987 initiative (please see Arctic Sovereignty and Security, Chapter 13 of *The Guide*), and South East Asia--through the efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At their December 1987 summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to intensify efforts for a Southeast Asia NWFZ given the example of New Zealand and improved US-USSR relations. The US has stated its strong opposition to the concept, however.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever they are considered feasible and likely to promote stability in an area. Although the creation of such a zone is not judged a satisfactory alternative to having the countries involved ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can make a significant contribution to preventing the

spread of nuclear arms and increasing regional security in the absence of NPT ratification. At the two special sessions of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, Canada supported the final declarations encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

The Canadian Government's stance remains unchanged. It is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective, any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographic area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most of the countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give an advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and the means to verify that countries abide by their commitments; and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.[1]

At the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in 1988, Canada voted in support of related resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the Middle East (adopted without a vote), Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in South Asia, Denuclearization of Africa (Part A--Implementation of the Declaration), Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (adopted without a vote), and Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic. Canada abstained on Denuclearization of Africa (Part B--Nuclear Capability of South Africa).

As a result of Canada's NATO membership, it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans. The Government believes that the establishment of zones in these areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which, as already indicated, relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone, it is maintained, would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.[2]

Despite this position the local authorities in approximately 170 municipalities across Canada have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories have each declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately sixty percent of the Canadian population resides in locally declared NWFZs.

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. The New Democratic Party (NDP) has been a strong supporter of Bills declaring Canada a NWFZ. In the past it has put forward

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1 Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones," *Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer-Fall 1986, p. 12.

2 *Ibid.*.

motions, for example, calling for a prohibition of "the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada, [and] the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms," while calling on the Government to "encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world to undertake similar action."[3]

On 12 April 1989, NDP Member Svend Robinson introduced Bill C-233, an Act to declare the Canadian Arctic a nuclear weapon-free zone. He stated:

> At a time in which historic breakthroughs are being made in the struggle for peace and disarmament, I believe that this would represent a small step on the course toward disarmament. The Bill would declare the Canadian Arctic to be a nuclear free zone. Hopefully, ... this would be part of a global initiative to declare northern zones in the USSR, in Canada, in Scandinavia, and elsewhere to be nuclear weapons free zones, as the first step on the road toward a nuclear weapons free Canada, and indeed, a nuclear weapons free world.[4]

On 30 May, in recognition of International Disarm the Seas Week, NDP Member Bill Blaikie addressed the issue of military activity in the oceans. As the number and type of exercises and activities increase, he argued, instability and the potential for disaster grows. He stated:

> The Canadian Government has virtually ignored the Pacific in this regard. The French continue nuclear testing in the South Pacific, US led naval exercises such as PACEX in the North Pacific expand, and visits by American warships to British Columbia harbours increase in number and duration.
>
> Canada, as a Pacific nation, must begin addressing the dangers posed by militarization of the Pacific and promote regional co-operation in disarmament.
>
> Indeed, we must act urgently to disarm all our oceans to preserve the integrity of the environment and maintain peace for future generations.[5]

On 8 June NDP Member Lynn Hunter raised the issue of nuclear waste in the Pacific Ocean resulting from the dropping of a nuclear bomb by a US Air Force bomber in 1950. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark replied that the Government was aware of the incident, and remarked that where there were nuclear weapons there were going to be accidents. Canada, he said, had to accept this as a price for deterrence:

> There is also an issue in this country as to whether Canada should continue a practice, in place for some long time, of supporting North Atlantic Treaty Organization arrangements by allowing foreign ships to dock occasionally at Canadian docks. We have decided that it is in the interest of the deterrence

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3 *Commons Debates*, 31 August 1987, p. 8627.

4 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 401.

5 *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2320.

which is at the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to allow that kind of practice.[6]

The Liberal Party at its 1986 Convention declared itself in favour of the establishment of a NWFZ for Canada, but not at the expense of Canada's Alliance obligations.

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*BACKGROUND*

In the 1950s, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban all forms of nuclear testing. While efforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) proved unsuccessful, the negotiations bore some fruit with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. As of January 1988, the Treaty had 116 states parties, although two nuclear weapons states--France and China--have yet to sign.

Further progress on the limitation of nuclear testing came when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in 1976. The former limits underground nuclear testing to 150 kt, while the latter does the same for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." Neither the TTBT or the PNET has, however, been ratified by the US Senate.

Efforts to achieve more ambitious limitations on nuclear testing continued when the Carter Administration reopened trilateral negotiations on a CTB in 1977. Although some headway was made in developing a draft treaty, strong domestic political opposition in the United States ensured that progress was limited. These negotiations ceased with the advent of the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, later extended three times. Yet the Soviet initiative failed to prompt the United States to take similar action, or to resume negotiations on a CTB. Soviet testing resumed on 28 February 1987. The US Congress has put forth proposals seeking a moratorium on nuclear tests above one kiloton, but these have never been accepted by the Administration.

The Reagan Administration maintained that, although it regarded a total ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective, the need to ensure weapon reliability and national security required continued testing. In addition, the Administration contended that progress on a CTB could be achieved only in stages: first, by securing more stringent monitoring provisions for the TTBT and the PNET; then, by negotiating intermediate limitations on testing; and finally by pursuing a total ban as part of a broad, effective disarmament process.

While the Soviets initially opposed the US government's approach to limits on nuclear testing--favouring instead immediate negotiations on a total ban--the prospects for accommodation began to brighten by the summer of 1986. In July of that year, the two sides resumed talks on testing at the expert level in Geneva. By summer 1987, the Soviets had largely acceded to the US position on how negotiations toward a CTB should proceed.

On 17 September 1987, the two sides agreed to begin "full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing" before 1 December 1987. The negotiations would begin by searching for mutually agreeable procedures for verifying the TTBT and the PNET. On 9

December 1987, during the first round of talks, Robert Barker, head of the US negotiating team, announced plans to hold joint nuclear test explosions in order to calibrate equipment to help in verifying any future limits on testing. The Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) would also aid in settling differences between the superpowers regarding their preferred methods for monitoring the size of atomic tests. The Soviets prefer to rely on seismic devices, while the United States prefers the Corrtex system of hydrodynamic measurements. The Soviets have, however, agreed to negotiate on-site hydrodynamic methods as a step toward a CTB.

At the Moscow Summit on 28 May to 1 June 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted that substantial progress had been made on a new protocol to the PNET. They instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously work on this Protocol, as well as to complete a protocol to the TTBT as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment had been conducted and analyzed. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the JVE, and reached an agreement on its conduct, allowing each side to measure the yield of an explosion conducted at the other party's test site using both teleseismic and hydrodynamic yield measurement methods.[1] On 17 August 1988 stage one of the experiment was undertaken at the Nevada site. The experiment was concluded with the detonation of a nuclear device at Semipalatinsk on 14 September 1988. Both US and Soviet officials judged the tests to be successful.

During a meeting in Washington with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 21 and 22 September, US Secretary of State Shultz stated that the Reagan Administration hoped to complete the verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET and submit them to the Senate for ratification before the Administration left office in January 1989. One week later, President Ronald Reagan signed the FY89 military spending bill, which included a directive to the US Department of Energy to undertake a Nuclear Test Ban Readiness Program in order to ensure the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal should nuclear testing become prohibited in future.

By the end of 1988, work on the protocol for a PNET had been substantially completed. Progress on a protocol for the TTBT has been slower, due to the complexity of the negotiations and the US insistence that it be permitted to use Corrtex to monitor all tests above 75 kt. Resumption of the talks is expected following the Bush Administration's review of the negotiations.

Additional efforts to limit nuclear testing have been made in multilateral forums. In 1983, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a CTB working group. Now called the Ad Hoc Committee, the group has been unable to agree on a programme of work and has not met since 1983.

Despite the inability of the CD to agree on a mandate for the CTB working group, the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE)--a CD body charged with developing a global system of seismic monitoring--met in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988. Building on its work of the previous year, the Group continued to develop the conceptual design of a modern, international, seismic data exchange system, and reached agreement on the functional specifications of a global system. In addition, the Group agreed to undertake

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1 "U.S., Soviet Union Sign Joint Verification Experiment Agreement." *Department Of State Bulletin* (August 1988), p. 67.

experiments aimed at evaluating tasks proposed for the data exchange centres. The Group's report was presented to the CD in late August 1988. In the meantime, the large-scale data exchange experiment had commenced. The experiment is directed at refining the design of the seismic data exchange system before it is negotiated and established within the framework of a treaty.

Since 1985, resolutions in the UN General Assembly sponsored by the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) with the support of Eastern bloc countries have called for converting the PTBT into a CTB. On 5 August 1988, this initiative received added impetus when Mexico, Yugoslavia, Peru and Sri Lanka asked the PTBT's Depository States to convene an amending conference. Under Article II of the PTBT, the Depository States are required to call a conference if one-third of the Treaty's signatories so request.

By spring 1989 the proposal had received the requisite support. The Depository States are currently considering the date on which the conference will be convened.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Further limitations on nuclear testing have been a priority item on the Canadian Government's agenda, a CTB remaining one of its six major goals in arms control and disarmament during 1988 and 1989. Canada has contributed to this goal in various ways in the recent past. In 1986, the Government approved the sum of $3.2 million in order to upgrade a seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution toward test ban verification. Modernization of the facility, which may constitute a prototype for other international stations will be completed by September 1989. In 1985, the Government awarded a grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTB. Canada also hosted a technical workshop on seismic verification of a CTB in October 1986. Attended by forty-three representatives from seventeen countries, the workshop produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. The workshop's proceedings were tabled by Canada in the CD on 28 April 1987.[2]

On 23 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, discussed the importance of a CTB in Canadian policy. Noting the progress achieved in the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union on the improvement of the verification measures for the TTBT and PNET, Mr. Marchand remarked that the ratification of these treaties would constitute a useful step toward the widely shared objective of a CTB.[3] As for the ongoing effort to convert the PTBT into a CTBT, he noted that the procedure had little chance of achieving the goals foreseen for it. Consequently, it was Canada's view that direct negotiations were the only practical means of achieving a test ban that was both comprehensive and genuinely verifiable.[4] The Ambassador also expressed Canada's disappointment that an agreement had not been reached on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, and added that work should continue toward its

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2 CD/753, 28 April 1987.

3 Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament, 23 August 1988, pp. 2-3.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

achievement. Finally, Mr. Marchand noted the slow but steady progress made by the Group of Scientific Experts on attaining a worldwide seismological network for verifying an eventual nuclear test ban treaty. Pointing to the Group's appointment of Mr. Peter Basham, a Canadian, as coordinator of the ongoing large-scale data exchange experiment, the Ambassador announced that Canada would further contribute to the project by hosting a technical workshop at Yellowknife in September 1989.[5] The workshop, he continued, would mark the official opening of the modernized seismic centre at Yellowknife, and would provide participants with an opportunity to evaluate the progress made on data exchange and to discuss outstanding problems.[6]

The Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1988 passed three resolutions regarding a CTB. Resolution 43/63 (A) called upon the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a CTB, comprising two Working Groups--one on compliance and verification, and another on content and scope. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 136-4-13, with the United States, Britain, France and Yemen voting against it, and Canada abstaining.[7] Later, however, Yemen advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the Resolution. Resolution 43/63 (B) called for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT by converting it into a CTB. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 127-3-21, with the United States, Britain and France once more voting against the Resolution and Canada again abstaining.[8]

Finally, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 43/64, which called on the CD to initiate substantive work and for the nuclear weapon states to agree to "appropriate verifiable interim measures on nuclear testing." It also called on the CD to set up an international seismic monitoring network, and to investigate other measures to monitor and verify compliance with a CTB. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 146-2-6, with France and the United States in opposition.[9]

In December 1988, a Department of External Affairs briefing note addressed the Canadian Government's position regarding the proposal for converting the PTBT into a CTB. It stated:

> In the Government's view, a PTBT Amendment Conference, instead of focusing on ongoing efforts where real prospects for progress exist, would be a waste of time and resources as well as an irresponsible misuse of multilateral arms control and disarmament (ACD) mechanisms. Its certain failure could undermine confidence in the multilateral ACD process itself. Indeed, the use of the terms of the PTBT to try to achieve a CTBT, a procedure the original parties to the PTBT are not prepared to support, and which was never the intent of the

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5 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

6 *Ibid.*.

7 UNGA Resolution 43/63 (A), 7 December 1988.

8 UNGA Resolution 43/63 (B), 7 December 1988.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

> PTBT, could well lead some nations to be even more sceptical of future multilateral ACD treaties for fear they might be similarly misused.[10]

On 7 March 1989, Ambassador de Montigny Marchand addressed the issue of a nuclear test ban in the CD again, observing that, ultimately, responsibility for "real movement" towards such a ban resided with the nuclear weapons states.[11] These states, he noted, must be persuaded that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was in their national security interest. He also pointed out that they had a key role in determining the possibilities for the creation of verification measures "in which we all can have real confidence." Consequently, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the superpower bilateral dialogue and the JVE continuing and making progress toward further test limitations. In the meantime, he noted that other states strongly in favour of a CTB, such as Canada, "must do what they can to advance this process."[12]

After reviewing past Canadian contributions toward verification of a nuclear test ban, an area where Canada long considered it could make a contribution of "genuine national worth,"[13] the Ambassador discussed the PTBT amendment issue. Recognizing that an amending conference would be convened, Mr. Marchand questioned its value as a means of achieving its intended objective:

> It is evident that amendment of a PTBT as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear states who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come into effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear powers are parties to the treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as CTB verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada... see little benefit in such an exercise.[14]

The Ambassador went on to note that the Canadian Government remained convinced that direct negotiations constituted the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. In addition, he suggested that the CD might make its

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10 "Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference," Department of External Affairs, *Briefing Note*, 22 December 1988.

11 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament," 7 March 1989, p. 3.

12 *Ibid.*.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee.[15] Canada, he added, would welcome the beginning of such work on the basis of the mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in August 1988.[16]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 30 May 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie raised the issue of nuclear testing in a statement marking International Disarm the Seas Week. After criticizing Canada and its allies for failing to address the proliferation of military activity at sea generally, Mr. Blaikie cited the "failure of the Canadian Government to address such activity in the Pacific," including French nuclear testing.[17]

On 7 April 1989, Liberal Member Warren Allmand raised the PTBT amending issue. Noting that the number of states required to convene such a conference had recently been attained, Mr. Allmand stated:

> It is incomprehensible that the Canadian Government remains opposed to this progressive move which would open the doors to further dialogue on the reduction of nuclear arms. To doom negotiations to failure before they have begun is very unwise. We must do all we can to rid the world of life-threatening nuclear arms now, and our Government should encourage and support the amendment conference which would bring us closer to this goal.[18]

NDP Member Bill Blaikie raised the issue again on 25 April 1989. Addressing External Affairs Minister Clark, he stated:

> The Minister will know that a Conference has...been triggered, thanks to the appropriate number of signatures being gathered at the UN, to reopen the whole matter of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Something on which the Government of Canada has also been taking the wrong position. I am asking the Minister today whether his Government is prepared to reconsider the position it has been taking on this and actively promote the arrival at a comprehensive test ban treaty.[19]

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15 *Ibid.*.

16 *Ibid.*. For additional official comment on a nuclear test ban and the issue of a PTBT amending conference see: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs Department of External Affairs, Canada before the Conference on Disarmament," 20 June 1989, pp. 10-11.

17 *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2320.

18 *Commons Debates*, 7 April 1989, pp. 217-218.

19 *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1989, pp. 922-923.

Mr. Clark replied:

> ...agreeing to that particular proposal to the comprehensive test ban negotiations would not in fact move that process forward...it would be another empty gesture .... That is not enough in foreign policy. What one has to do is try to follow concrete proposals, often in alliance with our allies, that will in fact achieve substantial reduction.[20]

On 2 May 1989, Progressive Conservative Member Ross Stevenson discussed Canada's role in promoting a CTBT:

> The Government and the people of Canada support nuclear disarmament, Now Canada is playing a leading role in the study of seismic detection of underground tests of nuclear weapons. Dr. Peter Basham, an Energy, Mines and Resources seismology expert, is chairing a group of international scientists from 25 different nations around the world working on seismic verification and developing a world-wide system of rapid data exchange in support of a test ban. This is one of the significant contributions that Canada is making in increasing the hope and confidence of achieving a workable test ban and nuclear disarmament.[21]

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20 *Ibid.*.

21 *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1195.

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## 6. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CCSBMDE)

*BACKGROUND*

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the European security environment have been negotiated in three main fora: in Helsinki, through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); in Stockholm, through the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE); and currently in Vienna through the Negotiations on CSBMs.

The Helsinki Final Act was negotiated by the thirty-five-nation CSCE between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975. The thirty-five participating nations were roughly divided into three main groupings: the sixteen NATO members, the seven Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries.[1] The Final Act contained three "Baskets" of issues: Basket I--Questions relating to Security in Europe; Basket II--Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment; and Basket III--Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.

In Basket I, the thirty-five participants agreed, among other things, to voluntary observance of limited confidence-building measures, designed to further such objectives as reducing the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures agreed to were: prior notification of major or other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; and prior notification of major military movements.

CSCE Follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), and Vienna (1986-1989). The Madrid Follow-up meeting established the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), also commonly referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which began in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. The aim of this conference was to build upon the CBM process begun in Helsinki and "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." These measures were to be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space", to be militarily significant, politically binding, and adequately verifiable. As the type of CBMs to be negotiated were strengthened from those agreed to in Helsinki, the word "security" was added to describe them.

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1 The nations involved in the CSCE process were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

On 22 September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in Stockholm. The terms of the Accord, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given forty-two days in advance; host states must extend invitations to foreign observers to attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of any military activity raising doubts about compliance with agreed CSBMs, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by the mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and specify the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; and calendars outlining the schedule for military activities subject to prior notification in the following year are to be exchanged by 15 November. Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given by 15 November, one and two years in advance, respectively. Finally, the signatories agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other states in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.[2]

Compliance with the Stockholm Agreement since its establishment has been considered satisfactory by all involved. In the first year of the Agreement's implementation, 1987, NATO gave notice of nineteen exercises and the Warsaw Pact gave notice of twenty-five. Nine of NATO's exercises and eight of the Warsaw Pact's exercises were observed. None of the five NNA exercises notified was observed. Five challenge inspections occurred in 1987, two by NATO and three by the Warsaw Pact.

In 1988 NATO gave notice of thirteen exercises while the Warsaw Pact gave notice of twenty-one. Eight of NATO's and seven of the Warsaw Pact's exercises were observed. NATO conducted seven challenge inspections and the Warsaw Pact conducted six. The NNA gave notice of three exercises, all of which were observed. None of the NNA nations has yet conducted an inspection under the terms of the Stockholm Agreement.

For 1989, NATO forecast eleven exercises, of which seven were planned to be of observable size. The Warsaw Pact forecast seventeen exercises, with seven planned to be of observable size. The NNA forecast three exercises, of which two were planned to be observable.

The question of how to follow up the Stockholm Conference was on the agenda of the third CSCE Follow-up meeting in Vienna, which began on 19 November 1986. The working group on security discussed a proposal for two distinct negotiations on conventional arms control: one, expanding the CSBM regime agreed to in Stockholm; and the second, held within the CSCE framework but being autonomous and involving only the twenty-three nations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, to deal with enhancing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. It was expected that these latter talks would replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (see Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Chapter 7 of *The Guide*).

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2 Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Document of the Stockholm Conference On Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1986, pp. 1-20.

The concept of having two distinct conventional security negotiations had been first outlined in the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1986.

On 17 January 1989, the thirty-five nations involved agreed to establish follow-up talks to the Stockholm Conference. The new Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, related but not linked to the CFE negotiations, began on 9 March 1989. Prior to the start of the negotiations, on 6 March, the Western nations issued their opening proposal. It included twelve specific measures under the following three broad headings:

1) **Transparency about military organization**: three measures under this heading included the regular exchange of military information on forces on land in the negotiation zone and major weapons deployed in the zone. This information would be subject to random evaluation through unannounced visits by participating states.

2) **Transparency and predictability of military activities**: the six measures under this heading basically extended those measures agreed to in Stockholm. They included enhanced information proposals for the annual calendars and notifications, improvements to observation guidelines (that is, more detailed briefings, better maps, etc.), lowering the observation threshold to activities involving 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, improvements to inspection guidelines by increasing the number of inspections allowed and shortening the period between inspection requests and access for the inspectors to the area, among other things, and lowering the thresholds for longer notice of large-scale activities to those involving 50,000 troops.

3) **Contacts and Communication**: three measures under this heading included improved access to government officials for accredited personnel dealing with military matters, development of better communication links for transmitting information related to the Agreement, and encouragement of better treatment and access for media representatives.

In addition, NATO proposed an exchange of views on military policy, ideas, capabilities and doctrine.

The Warsaw Pact made a detailed proposal of thirty-six measures divided into five parts. Part One contained five constraining measures, limiting exercises, redeployments, or concentration of armed forces to 40,000 troops; the number of troops engaged in a series of activities taking place in close proximity to 40,000; the number of notified exercises, involving a maximum of 40,000 troops, to be conducted simultaneously in one state, to three; the number of exercises with more than 25,000 troops to be conducted annually in any participating state, to two; and the duration of notifiable military activities to fifteen days.

Part Two contained sixteen measures addressing air and naval forces. It included, for example, limits on the number of ships involved in naval exercises and the duration of such exercises, as well as notification of naval redeployments of certain sizes (with similar measures applicable to air forces); notification of air exercises involving more than 150 aircraft or 500 sorties; and observation of naval exercises involving more than twenty-five ships or 100 aircraft.

Part Three included three measures to "develop and amplify" the measures agreed to in Stockholm. These involved lowering the thresholds for notifications and observations;

improving observation conditions; and providing better information in the annual calendars.

Part Four proposed sub-regions in which specific CSBMs would apply. Finally, Part Five proposed such measures as the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the danger of war and prevention of surprise attack, and the discussion of military doctrine.

Romania also put forward a set of proposals in the first round of talks.

Following the end of the first round, Western negotiators felt that some positive and common ground existed between the proposals. However, the West maintained its position that exercises involving naval or air forces alone, should not be included in the talks, as they were not included in the mandate. The East's proposals for limiting the numbers and types of exercises were characterized as being unacceptable owing to the East's numerical and geographic advantages. NATO maintains that the large training exercises it conducts and the better training it provides for its troops helps to offset the numerical advantages of the Warsaw Pact. Constraints on this training, without corresponding reductions in force levels, would result in greater advantage to the Warsaw Pact.

Two Working Groups were formed in the second round: the first, to examine information, verification, communications and consultation; and the second, to consider constraining measures, notification, observation and calendar questions. Negotiations are continuing over a Western proposal to establish a third Working Group on developing an independent seminar on military policy and doctrine.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

At the conclusion of the Vienna Follow-up meeting, on 19 January 1989, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark declared:

> The Vienna Concluding Document is a welcome milestone in East/West relations and in the evolution of Europe. It reflects and builds on recent changes. It makes significant strides in all the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada is proud to have played a role in formulating some of its key elements.

In regard to CSBMs particularly, he referred to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement and its effect on the establishment of future negotiations:

> Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress on adherence to both the letter and the spirit of Stockholm. We now have the confidence to believe that we can further increase transparency and predictability in military affairs. We wholeheartedly support the establishment of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference.[3]

At the opening of the new negotiations on 7 March 1989, Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins referred to the effort that had led to the negotiations.

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3 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/03 (19 January 1989), p. 2.

Through this arduous and protracted effort, she stated: "No arms control undertaking has ever started off on a firmer footing than the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures...."[4] She continued by saying that the signs for an agreement were encouraging. The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement and its implementation presented reason for optimism. Regarding the latter she remarked:

> Canadian soldiers are among those who have been inspected and observed, and have themselves participated in observations. These observations have contributed materially to the heightened sense of confidence which now exists; they have helped entrench such important gains as the right to on-site inspection.
>
> The pattern of observation and contacts among military personnel that has been established is unprecedented in both its nature and scope. A great opportunity exists to enhance this new climate for trust and cooperation. We must build carefully and well on this foundation.[5]
>
> Canada has sent observers to every exercise attended by the West.

On 7 June 1989, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Patrick Boyer, told the House of Commons:

> ...this Vienna concluding document represents an historic milestone in the process of the Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe [sic]. The document contains new and expanded commitments in the fields of military security, human rights and contacts, and humanitarian and economic co-operation. Taken together, these Vienna provisions for which Canada negotiated hard, and to which Canada is firmly committed, will help to move the European and North American states toward greater levels of mutual security and co-operation.[6]

The first Canadian challenge inspection of a military exercise was announced on 13 June 1989. The forty-eight-hour inspection was to take place in Czechoslovakia beginning on 14 June. The announcement stated that, given Canada's interest and recognized expertise in the field of verification, NATO Ministers believed Canada could contribute constructively to the CSBM process by conducting such an inspection.[7]

In an issue separate but related to the subject of CSBMs, the Canadian Government reported its involvement with the United States in developing and proposing the "Open Skies" plan made public by President Bush on 11 May 1989. Essentially, a confidence-building measure would allow short-notice overflights of North American and European territory by unarmed aircraft as a means to enhance arms control verification and improve transparency between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Following President Bush's

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4 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/09 (7 March 1989), p. 2.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

6 *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2717.

7 Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 138 (13 June 1989), p. B2.

announcement of the proposal, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that Canada had suggested that the United States consider the plan. He declared: "This concept symbolizes the West's commitment to transparency and serves as a clear reminder of our interest in both arms control and peaceful co-operation with the East."[8] Quoted in an article in the 5 June 1989 *New York Times*, Mr. Clark stated:

> An open skies agreement would be a positive political act of opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring--a symbolic opening of the doors. It could be a clear, unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive.
>
> Open skies would let all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring.[9]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The issue of confidence- and security-building measures was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

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8 Office of the Prime Minister, *News Release*, 12 May 1989, p. 1.

9 Joe Clark, "Don't Dismiss Open Skies." *New York Times*, 5 June 1989, p. 17.

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Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

## 7. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

*BACKGROUND*

Negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe have been conducted in two main fora: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna; and the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The MBFR talks began in 1973. The aim of the talks was to reduce the level of conventional forces in a Central European zone covering the territories of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Direct participants included the eleven NATO and Warsaw Pact nations with troops stationed in these countries--the above seven, plus the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Eight nations, known as "flank states", were indirect participants in the talks. These consisted of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Turkey from NATO; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania from the Warsaw Pact.

The MBFR talks showed some progress through the 1970s, including an agreement in principle in 1977 to reduce each side's forces in the region to 900,000 air and ground personnel with a 700,000 sub-ceiling for ground forces alone. Between 1977 and the conclusion of the talks on 2 February 1989, however, the talks were stalemated largely over the issues of the number of troops each side had stationed in the area and the methods that would be used for verifying any troop reductions.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO's positions centred on achieving parity with the Warsaw Pact in military manpower; agreeing on effective verification measures to ensure Treaty compliance; allowing for geographical asymmetries, given the greater distance to the central front from North America and the UK; and requiring collectivity in force reductions--enabling deployments of troops from one nation to substitute for those of another while remaining under the overall manpower ceiling. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, opposed collectivity and pushed for national sub-ceilings on force levels; equipment, in addition to manpower, reductions; and verification measures less intrusive than those proposed by the West.

A long-standing dispute in the negotiations raged over the size of existing force levels, with the West counting 230,000 more Warsaw Pact troops than officially declared by the East.

The political atmosphere surrounding the talks has changed in recent years for a number of reasons. First, in April 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals." Subsequently, in June 1986, the Warsaw Pact suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over the next two years, with ultimate reductions of 500,000 on each side by the early 1990s. The Soviets suggested that negotiations on these proposals could take place in an expanded MBFR forum (including countries not already involved), a forum related to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) (see Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Chapter 6 of *The Guide*), or a new forum altogether. In May 1986, NATO formed a High

Level Task Force (HLTF) as a steering body for the review and development of Western positions on conventional arms control.

Second, in September 1986, the first stage of the CCSBMDE concluded with an agreement signed in Stockholm. There was hope that the success of these talks in creating a more open and predictable security regime in Europe would carry over to the MBFR negotiations.

Third, the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), in December 1987, signalled a new sense of optimism about European arms control in general.

In December 1986, the North Atlantic Council issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It recommended two distinct negotiations: one, to expand upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security-building measures; and the second, to establish conventional stability at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. The former would be for all CSCE participants while the latter would be restricted to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In February 1987 the Conventional Mandate Talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO began with the aim of drafting a mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. At the time, these negotiations were referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). On 10 January 1989, agreement was reached on the mandate for the new talks, at which point their formal title became Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The mandate stated the following as the objectives of the talks:

> ...to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

It stated that these objectives would be achieved through such militarily significant measures as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions and equal ceilings. Measures would be pursued step by step and for the whole area of application, from the Atlantic to the Urals, allowing for regional differentiation to redress disparities, if necessary.[1]

Following the decision to open the first round of the new negotiations in March, the participants decided to conclude the MBFR talks. On 2 February 1989, the forty-seventh and final round of the latter ended without agreement.

Prior to the agreement on the CFE mandate, a series of significant events established the groundwork upon which the talks began. On 25 November 1989, NATO released a report entitled *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*. The document

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1 United States, Department of State, *"To Strengthen Stability and Security": CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*. Washington: United States Information Agency (March 1989), pp. 4-5.

summarized the conventional forces balance in Europe, demonstrating a Warsaw Pact numerical advantage in each of the categories listed, including: main battle tanks (51,500 vs. 16,424); armoured infantry fighting vehicles (22,400 vs. 4153); artillery (43,400 vs. 14,458); other armoured vehicles (71,000 vs. 35,351); anti-tank weapons (44,200 vs. 18,240); air defence systems (22,400 vs. 10,309); helicopters (3700 vs. 2419); combat aircraft (8250 vs. 3977); armoured vehicle launched bridges (2550 vs. 454); and personnel (3,090,000 vs. 2,213,593). These figures excluded stored equipment.

On 8 December 1988, at the United Nations, General Secretary Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts in the Soviet armed forces of 500,000 troops, 8500 artillery pieces, 800 aircraft, and 10,000 tanks within two years. Fifty thousand troops and 5000 tanks would come out of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany by 1991. Six tank divisions in these countries would be disbanded. Mr. Gorbachev also stated that the remaining forces in Eastern Europe and the Western portion of the Soviet Union would be reorganized into defensive formations.

The following day, NATO issued its own proposal for arms reductions. The tank holdings of each alliance would be limited to 20,000, with no one nation allowed more than 12,000. Equal limits were also proposed on all other weapon categories, at levels slightly below those assessed for Western forces in NATO's November 1988 report. As with tanks, no single country would be permitted more than thirty percent of the total holdings of both alliances in any category of weapons systems. Other elements of the proposal included specific limits on stationed forces, and sub-limits within particular zones to avoid a concentration of forces.

In the two months following Mr. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions, a number of other Warsaw Pact nations made similar moves. East Germany announced cuts of 10,000 troops, including six armoured regiments, 600 tanks, and fifty fighter planes to take place by the end of 1990. Czechoslovakia stated that over the next two years it would reduce army combat units by 12,000 troops, while phasing out 850 tanks, 165 other armoured vehicles, and fifty-one combat aircraft. Poland, which stated it had cut two motorized rifle divisions totalling 15,000 troops in the past two years, announced it would further reduce its forces by 40,000 troops, 850 tanks, 900 artillery pieces, 700 armoured vehicles, and eighty combat aircraft. Hungary planned to cut its forces by 9300 troops, 251 tanks, thirty armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 430 artillery pieces, six missile-launching pads, and nine interceptor aircraft. Finally, Bulgaria announced that by the end of 1990 it would reduce its forces by 10,000 troops, 200 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, twenty planes, and five ships.

On 30 January 1989 the Warsaw Pact, for the first time ever, released its own assessment of the European military balance. In general, it judged that much more parity existed between the two alliances than was indicated by NATO figures. NATO was estimated to have a higher total troop strength than the Warsaw Pact (3,660,200 vs. 3,573,100) and more combat helicopters (5270 vs. 2785), anti-tank misssile launchers (18,070 vs. 11,465), and large surface ships (499 vs. 102). The Warsaw Pact was credited with more tactical combat aircraft (7876 vs. 7130); tactical missile launch systems (1608 vs. 136); tanks (59,470 vs. 30,690); infantry fighting vehicles (70,330 vs. 46,900); artillery pieces (71,560 vs. 57,060); and submarines (228 vs. 200). Different counting rules and definitions were responsible for most of the discrepancies between the two alliances' assessments. For example, NATO figures did not include ship-borne naval aircraft, ships, naval personnel, or stored materiel.

Despite these problems, however, a sense of optimism surrounded the talks as their opening drew nearer. On 6 March the two sides met to outline and add more detail to their initial negotiating positions. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze set out the Warsaw Pact's proposal, consisting of three stages. In the first stage, lasting two to three years, each alliance was to reduce its personnel and conventional arms--including tactical fighter aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, combat helicopters, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars--by ten to fifteen percent below the lowest levels currently held by either side. The second stage, again lasting two to three years, would involve further reductions of twenty-five percent in these categories, as well as cuts in battlefield nuclear arms. In the final stage, each side's forces would be given a strictly defensive character and agreements would be reached limiting all other categories of arms.

British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe presented the West's proposal, adding detail to the plan outlined in December. As noted above, each side would be allowed 20,000 tanks with no single nation having more than 12,000. Ceilings of 16,500 artillery pieces and 28,000 APCs were proposed. Each side could station no more than 3200 tanks, 1700 artillery pieces, and 6000 armoured personnel carriers outside national territory in active units. For example, tank deployments in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland, would be restricted to 8000 by regional sub-limits.

In sum, key areas of agreement between the two sides included the setting of equal limits on critical weapons (tanks, APCs, and artillery), the general size of reductions envisaged, and the need for stringent verification measures. Important differences also existed, however. These included the Soviet proposals for partially demilitarized zones along the East-West border and limits on aircraft; their specification of follow-up reductions in arms and troops; and their view of the relationship of naval forces to the negotiations.

Both alliances tabled their formal proposals on 9 March, the opening day of the negotiations. The first round of talks ended just two weeks later, on 23 March.

The second round of talks began 5 May and ended 13 July. On 25 May the Warsaw Pact, in a major shift, accepted the NATO principles of ceilings on any one country's forces, on foreign deployment, and within three sub-zones. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact proposed reductions in each alliance to 20,000 tanks, 28,000 APCs, 24,000 artillery pieces, and 1,350,000 troops. Strike aircraft would be limited to 1500, and helicopters to 1700. Reductions to these levels would occur over six years, from 1991-1997, after which the alliances would begin a twenty-five percent reduction in remaining forces.

At the NATO Summit on 29 May, President Bush outlined a new four-point proposal: firstly, agreement on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna on tanks, APCs, and artillery, with all withdrawn equipment to be destroyed (recognizing that questions of definition remained to be solved); secondly, fifteen-percent reductions in helicopters and land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone, with withdrawn equipment again being destroyed; thirdly, a twenty-percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces and a ceiling on US and Soviet air force and ground personnel stationed outside national territory within the zone of approximately 275,000, with all withdrawn forces being demobilized; and fourthly, negotiation of such an agreement in six to twelve months, aiming to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Most important was the Western acceptance of reductions in air forces and troop strength. At the NATO Summit

it was agreed that a draft agreement based on this proposal would be tabled by the third round of the talks, scheduled to begin 7 September.

The Warsaw Pact characterized the Bush proposal as positive, and agreed that a treaty was possible as early as 1990.

On 12 July, ahead of schedule, NATO announced further details of the Bush proposals dealing with aircraft. These included limiting each side to 5700 combat aircraft and 1900 combat helicopters. The former category would include those designed primarily for air-to-ground bombing and air-to-air fighting operations. NATO indicated it had about 6700 such aircraft while the Warsaw Pact possessed approximately 9600. Major differences between the two alliances on defining the types of aircraft to be included in any agreement remained, however.

The next rounds of the talks were scheduled for 7 September to 10 October, and 10 November to 21 December.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

The Government of Canada, with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional force reduction to the lowest levels commensurate with security and stability. At the time of the release of NATO's basic opening position for the talks on 8 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark observed that:

> ...taken together with President Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviet conventional forces, the Statement by Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance indicates that both sides are moving with dispatch toward serious negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. I think the conditions for productive negotiations toward maintaining stability at lower levels of conventional forces have never been better.[2]

Despite Mr. Clark's apparent optimism, however, in a speech delivered on 13 January 1989 he firmly supported the need for Canada and its allies to maintain their vigilance in dealing with the Soviet Union and its allies: "One lesson which history has taught us on numerous occasions is that negotiation based on mutual respect for each other's strength often succeeds. Negotiation from weakness cannot." He emphasized this point further by stating:

> Prudence demands that we examine each new Soviet proposal with a careful eye to see how it affects our own vital interests. Prudence requires that we in the West remain clear-headed about what our most cherished ideals of peace, political freedom and respect for human rights really mean. Prudence demands that we maintain a credible military and political defence of these values.

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2 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 245 (8 December 1988), p. 1.

> Canada, as an ally, must continue to honour its obligation to make a contribution to the defence of the West. This will require active participation in NATO forces.[3]

At the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna on 19 January, Mr. Clark pledged that Canada would play a full role in the conventional arms control negotiating process, seeking imaginative solutions to complex problems. He also mentioned briefly the valuable role the MBFR talks had played in preparation for the upcoming discussions:

> The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe. Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations.[4]

In her speech to mark the opening of the new negotiations on 7 March 1989, Associate Defence Minister Mary Collins suggested that the new Soviet concept of "reasonable sufficiency" intimated a shift in Eastern strategy and a growing appreciation for the West's defensive military approach. Ms. Collins placed particular emphasis on verification measures, noting:

> It will not be sufficient to work toward agreement on reduction measures and subsequently to attempt to devise verification measures. It will be necessary to examine closely the verification implications of all proposals under negotiation to ensure that compliance with agreements *can* be verified.

She continued:

> In Canada, we will devote considerable resources to this aspect of the negotiations; we have in the past shared the results of our research with the international community. We hope that other nations will devote similar efforts to these important issues. In both negotiations, Canada will be active in devising means to ensure the reliable verification of any agreement.[5]

Following President Bush's proposal of 29 May 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney indicated his approval: "I think it is an impressive proposal worthy of serious consideration."[6]

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3 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/02 (13 January 1989), p.5.

4 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/03 (19 January 1989), p. 2.

5 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/09 (7 March 1989), pp. 4-6.

6 Patrick Doyle, "Canadians Claim Credit for Selling U.S. Arms Plan." *The Toronto Star*, 30 May 1989, p. 14.

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**The issue of conventional arms control in Europe was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.**

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Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

## 8. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

*BACKGROUND*

International efforts to control nuclear proliferation date back to the mid-1940s, during the initial stages of the development of the first atomic bomb. In 1943, allied governments, including the United States and Britain, met in Quebec and concluded agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear technologies to states other than the US and the UK. In 1945, the United States, Britain, and Canada signed an Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy which foresaw the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

While more ambitious international efforts aimed at preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons were initially frustrated, some success was eventually achieved with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1956. Under the aegis of the UN, the IAEA's function, as defined in the Agency's statute of 1957, is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity," as well as "ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its operation and control is not used to further any military purpose." Although not exclusively devoted to the task of curbing proliferation, the IAEA has contributed significantly to this goal through the application of safeguards and inspections to ensure that states not divert nuclear energy, material and facilities used for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons. At the end of 1986, the Agency had concluded 164 safeguards agreements with ninety-four states.

Chief among existing international non-proliferation measures is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Evolving out of a 1961 UN General Assembly Resolution, the Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. It contains provisions for quinquennial reviews of its operation, and is due for renewal in 1995.

The NPT contains provisions to be followed both by existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Thus, Article I of the Treaty declares that each NWS "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In turn, under Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree not to receive and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives or other nuclear explosive devices; and agree to accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Nuclear weapons states parties agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information and assistance to their non-nuclear counterparts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, all states party undertake not to provide fissile material, or equipment used for processing or producing it, unless under IAEA safeguards.

Finally, under Article VI, nuclear weapon states party to the NPT agree to undertake to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict, effective international control."

Although viewed by some as an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, only three of the states possessing these weapons--the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union--have actually signed the NPT. France and China--as well as suspected or "near" nuclear weapon states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa--have all yet to accede to the Treaty. So far, however, India is the only non-signatory NNWS known to have exploded a nuclear device. The explosion took place in 1974, and was described by the Indian Government as intended "for peaceful purposes only." On 3 October 1988, Saudi Arabia became the latest state to accede to the Treaty.

One obstacle to further accession to the NPT has been the long-held view among some states that it is discriminatory. Not only does it allow nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others, but it requires the latter to open their facilities to the IAEA while the former are not required to do so. Nevertheless, as of June 19[illegible], 141 states were party to the Treaty.

Three review conferences have thus far been held on the operation of the NPT. At the first review, in 1975, expressions of concern were voiced by the neutral and non-aligned nations regarding the failure of the NWS to halt the arms race. These states called for an end to underground nuclear testing, large reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear counterparts. Agreement by the NWS to make a greater effort to address these concerns was reflected in the Final Document.

The second review conference in 1980 was less successful than its predecessor. This was in large part due to the fact that since 1975, none of the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states had been met. Although some agreement was reached on safeguards for peaceful nuclear programmes, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals ("vertical" proliferation). In fact, no final declaration, nor any reaffirmation of support for the Treaty, was issued from the review's proceedings.

The failure of the NWS to make substantive progress in the area of vertical proliferation resurfaced as the key issue at the most recent review in 1985. Indeed, in the five years separating the third review from the second, no major arms control measure of any kind had been achieved. A Final Declaration was, however, adopted by consensus. In it, the participants expressed the conviction that the NPT was essential for international peace and security, and reaffirmed their support for the Treaty and its objectives.

The Declaration also expressed the deep regret of all but some participants (i.e., the United States and Britain) over the failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban, and called on nuclear weapon states parties to resume trilateral negotiations, as well as to participate actively in the CD, to achieve it.

On 25 October 1988, informal meetings by parties to the NPT during the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly led to a decision to hold the fourth review conference in July and August 1990. The meetings also resulted in the establishment of a preparatory committee for the conference. The committee, of which Canada is a member, began preparations for the review from 1 to 5 May 1989 in New York. During the first meeting, it was decided that the Review would be held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. Two additional preparatory committee meetings (11 to 18 September, 1989

and 23 April to 4 May 1990), are scheduled to be held prior to the Review Conference.

Canada has always played a leading role in the quest for strict non-proliferation measures. While Canada assisted the US in the development of the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II, it was also the first nation to forego the option of developing them despite possession of the capacity to do so. One of the three states participating in the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy in 1945, Canada also took part in the negotiation of the IAEA, its statute, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been articulated as one of the six specific arms control goals of the Canadian Government.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Present Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation is based on changes introduced by Ottawa in 1974 and 1976, imposing tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Under this policy, nuclear cooperation will be allowed only with those non-nuclear weapon states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either ratifying the NPT, or accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Moreover, Canada will export nuclear materials only to those states (both nuclear and non-nuclear) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize proliferation risks. Such states must assure that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (e.g., nuclear material, heavy water, nuclear equipment, and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices. In addition, they must be willing to accept fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. These fallback safeguards include controls over the re-transfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items, and the reprocessing of spent fuel of Canadian origin.[1] Since 1976, these requirements have been negotiated with the United States, Euratom, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In 1978 Canada also began work on an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the NPT. This initiative, known as the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme, was designed to assist the IAEA in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. Work under this programme, which received a five-year budget of approximately $11 million, is reported to be well-advanced.[2]

On 28 July 1988, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark strongly reaffirmed Canada's support for the NPT. Recalling that July marked the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty, Mr. Clark noted that it continued to be of major importance, providing for legally binding commitments to prevent nuclear proliferation and the facilitation of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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1 Department of External Affairs, "Canada's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," 1985, p. 13.

2 "Canada's Role in Verification," *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987), p. 3.

Moreover, the Minister noted, the NPT set out a guiding framework for the reduction of nuclear arsenals.[3]

Mr. Clark emphasized that Canada was not only an early party to the Treaty but also an advocate of universal adherence to it. Expressing concern over the fact that a number of states with advanced nuclear capabilities had declined to accede to the NPT, the Minister pointed out that in June he had instructed Canadian embassies to inform those states who had not yet ratified the Treaty of the importance Canada attached to all states becoming full parties to it.[4] Mr. Clark also expressed satisfaction with super-power developments in the area of nuclear arms control and disarmament; developments in conformity with the objectives of the NPT. Recognizing that deep reductions in nuclear arsenals constituted a central Canadian objective, the Minister stated that efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons were equally important. Expressing the hope that significant progress toward both goals would materialize before the 1990 Review Conference, Mr. Clark concluded by praising the past contributions of the NPT to non-proliferation, and noting that it would continue to represent a vital factor strengthening international security in future.[5]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 7 June 1989, Liberal Member Sheila Copps raised questions pertaining to Canada's export of nuclear technology and its obligations under the NPT. Referring to remarks made by the Minister of Energy in *Science and Government Bulletin* concerning the sale of CANDU reactors, Ms. Copps stated:

> ... the Minister of Energy said that in his attempt to sell the CANDU reactor he was going to review all the regulations regarding the sale of nuclear elements out of Canada, including a review of Canada's position in the 1970 (NPT) treaty.... To quote the Minister he said...."Some people are putting China forward as a potential area for sales. Obviously the NPT becomes an issue."[6]

Ms. Copps then asked the Minister if he would renounce the "dangerous policy review" he had undertaken, particularly in light of the recent political turmoil in China.[7] Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Jake Epp replied:

> ... the article to which the Hon. Member referred and subsequent articles which have been written deal with the examination of the AECL's work. The regulations refer to the joint partnerships that the AECL at the present time has difficulty entering into. At no time did I refer to the NPT to say that I

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3 Department of External Affairs *Communique* No. 160 (28 July 1988), p. 1.

4 *Ibid.*.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

6 *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2710.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 2711.

am reviewing it, or that we will lessen it. When I referred to Canada and the NPT, obviously until China signs the NPT specifically for CANDU reactors or any other nuclear technology Canada could not co-operate.[8]

In a supplementary question, Ms. Copps asked:

[w]ill the Minister not categorically reject any review of Canada's participation in the NPT? Does he not understand that the sale of nuclear reactors should...depend on the economic and political stability of the countries involved? How could he make a statement like this?[9]

The Minister replied:

Obviously in view of what has happened in China, before there would be any decision taken on the AECL or CANDU reactor whether it is the present situation or China's adherence to the NPT, I raised the NPT for exactly that reason. Until the Chinese will conform to the NPT, obviously, Canada with its policy would not be able, and should not be able, to sell AECL or nuclear technology.... In terms of review, I said it is with respect to the manner in which AECL functions, not review of the NPT, Canada's adherence to the NPT, or that Canada will force anyone who buys nuclear technology from Canada to conform to the NPT.[10]

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8 *Ibid.*.

9 *Ibid.*.

10 *Ibid.*.

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## 9. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

*BACKGROUND*

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. Two years later, one hundred and twenty-five countries, including the US and the Soviet Union, signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in space, and also prohibits military bases, installations, or fortifications; weapons testing of any kind; and military manoeuvres on the moon and other celestial bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars. Under Article V of the Treaty, the parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, *space-based*, or mobile land-based" [emphasis added]. The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 urged that further agreements be developed to reserve outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, as well as the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons. Repeated calls by the Soviet Union for a renewal of negotiations proved unsuccessful. Then, in 1983, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally halting all ASAT testing. Two years later, the US Congress imposed a moratorium on tests in space of the F-15 ASAT, and in late 1987, funding for the weapon was cancelled by the US Air Force, in large part due to its high costs and limited capability. In 1988, an effort to impose a more permanent ban on ASAT testing was launched by some members of Congress. Congressional supporters of ASAT succeeded not only in blocking a ban, but also in ending the moratorium imposed in 1985. Recent budget statements by the Pentagon call for increases in spending on ASAT research and development for FY 1990, and each of the armed services is currently considering different systems developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space" has also been on the agenda of the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. It was not until 1985, however, that the forty nations represented on the Conference were able to reach a consensus on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the subject. It was agreed that in addition to

studying the issues involved in such a ban, the Committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue. During 1986 the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its examination of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1986 mandate has been continually re-established ever since.

In April 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD, concluding that "the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space." The report also recognized the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime in order to enhance its effectiveness. Finally, it called for strict compliance with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.[1]

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems":

> I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.[2]

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper in the CD outlining the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.[3] The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

In 1985 the Canadian delegation at the CD tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."[4] This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, Canada has been conducting a research project on verification called "PAXSAT A," studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying arms control agreements in outer space. "PAXSAT A" involves space-to-space remote sensing, with satellites used to identify the purpose and

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1 Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/833, 25 April 1988.

2 Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, "Technological Momentum the Fuel That Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race: An Address...to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 18, 1982," DEA *Statements and Speeches* No. 82/10, p. 5.

3 CD/320, 26 August 1982.

4 CD/618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July 1985.

function of other space objects. A second project, "PAXSAT B," is a feasibility study of the use of satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional forces. Canada presented its analysis of PAXSAT to the CD in April 1987.

In May 1987, Canada held a workshop at the McGill Centre for Research of Air and Space Law in Montreal. A cooperative effort between the Centre and the Department of External Affairs, the workshop was to "provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space." Thirty-nine officials, including eleven ambassadors representing thirty-five nations, were present. In 1988, Canada presented three working papers at the CD dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The papers dealt with terminology; a proposal for the strengthening of state practice under the 1975 UN Registration Convention (which requires, among other things, that parties to it furnish information to the Secretary General concerning the general function of space objects launched); and a retrospective review of recent significant political, technical and military developments in outer space.[5]

On 13 June 1988 at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

> The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.[6]

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 26 July 1988, Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand addressed the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Mr. Marchand noted the Government's recognition of the increasing importance of the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space, and the need for the CD to play a greater role in this area.[7] He then outlined four guidelines for such a role: efforts at the CD must enhance stability rather

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5 See Canada: *Working Paper on the Use of Certain Terms Relating to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/OS/WP.27 (8 August 1988); Australia and Canada, *Strengthening State Practice Under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of satellites, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission*, CD/OS/WP.25 (18 August 1988); and Canada, *Arms Control and Outer Space: A Retrospective Review: 1982-1987*, CD/OS/WP.26 (8 August 1988).

6 "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to UNSSOD III," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer 1988, p. 6.

7 "Ambassador Marchand Addresses CD on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer 1988, p. 14.

than detract from it; should be based on existing arms control measures for outer space; and should be considered with a view to maintaining the division of labour between the CD and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). Moreover, negotiations in the CD must complement superpower talks on space issues.[8]

Mr. Marchand went on to emphasize the importance of defining the types of military activities that might be legitimately conducted in space.[9] In addition, he identified the use of multilateral data exchanges on the military functions of space objects as one area in which practical progress could be made to increase the transparency of space activities. In this regard, the Ambassador suggested that efforts be made to strengthen the 1975 UN Registration Convention for space objects:

> What we are suggesting...is that states party to the registration convention examine the possibility of taking their reporting responsibilities much more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the 'general function of space objects' to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening, for arms control purposes of the application of the Convention.[10]

Mr. Marchand added that assuming states parties to the Convention could reach an understanding and agree in future to provide information on the military or civilian nature of space objects at the time of registration, this would enable those space powers that are not parties to the Convention to accept General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which called on all states to provide information on their space objects. He also noted that strengthening the Convention might even pave the way for the preparation of a code of conduct in outer space as advocated by France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany in the CD in 1985.[11]

On 29 September 1988 Canada, along with Japan and the European Space Agency (ESA), signed agreements in Washington to participate in the US piloted-space station. Canada's contribution to the station includes a mobile servicing centre to cost an estimated $1.2 billion. Deployment of the station is scheduled for 1995. The "Intergovernmental Agreement" signed on 29 September gives each member state the right to decide on the military uses of its own contribution to the station.[12]

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8 *Ibid.*.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

11 *Ibid.*.

12 "Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station," Article 9, paragraph 8, p. 9, in : Ministry of State for Science and Technology, *Space Station Documents*, 29 September 1988.

On 18 October 1988, in a statement before the First Committee at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier discussed Canadian policy on the prevention of an arms race in outer space:

> Canada has made major contibutions to those discussions, which we think have contributed usefully to clarification of the issues involved. We will continue to do so. Clearly, the negotiations between the USA and USSR in this area are of crucial importance and should be supported. Continued strict compliance with existing relevant treaties, including the ABM Treaty, remains critically important. Equally clearly, this is a subject area of legitimate multilateral concern and decisions on whether additional legal measures may be required are of broad international interest.[13]

On 7 December 1988, the General Assembly passed Resolution 43/70, calling on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this question. It also called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this issue. The Resolution passed by a vote of 154-1-0, with Canada voting in favor of the motion and only the US opposed.[14]

In January 1989, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs released its latest compendium of final records and working papers from the CD. The volume includes all such materials on the outer space question for the sessions of the CD held in 1988.[15]

Ambassador de Montigny Marchand discussed the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the CD again on 7 March 1989. Suggesting that the Committee might have been "overly selective" in its focus on this issue in the past, he noted that the terms "international security" and "uses of space" were of particular importance and worthy of "greater conceptual thought--as was the relationship between them."[16]

In this regard, he explained that international security related not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space, but also to the maintenance of a stable, controlled relationship between the two major space powers. Work in the CD aimed at enhancing rather than detracting from stability, and complemented the bilateral negotiations between the two major space powers. At the same time, while space activities in the past had been dominated by the two major space powers, the situation was changing rapidly. One challenge facing the "multilateral disarmament world," he continued, would

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13 Department of External Affairs, *Press Release* No. 42, 18 November 1988, pp. 5-6.

14 UNGA Resolution 43/70, 7 December 1988.

15 Department of External Affairs, *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space - Final Records and Working Papers 1988*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, January 1989.

16 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament," 7 March 1989. p. 6.

be not only to put technological developments in space to good use, but more important, to arrive at a common understanding of what "good use" in fact is.[17]

Such issues, Mr. Marchand observed, underlined the need for the Ad Hoc Committee (once established) to devote much greater attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current regime, to agree on definitions of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and thus set up a solid foundation to guide work in the future. Specifically, the Ambassador reiterated Canada's previous suggestions for the improvement of state practice under the 1975 UN Registration Convention as "a helpful confidence-building measure (CBM)."[18]

Concluding, Mr. Marchand expressed disappointment at the failure of the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. Nevertheless, he observed that Canada regarded the attention given the issue as a hopeful indication of a shared desire to seriously examine what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and to work together in pursuit of that objective. Finally, he announced the completion and distribution to the CD of Canada's latest Outer Space compendium, adding his hope that it would serve as a useful working tool and point of reference for future use.[19]

## *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In a statement in the House on 29 September 1988, Mrs. Suzanne Duplessis, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of State (Science and Technology), announced the Government's intention to sign the agreement formalizing Canada's participation in the space station. Mrs. Duplessis added:

> For Canadians this project will create spinoffs totalling $5 billion, create 80,000 person-years and provide a unique opportunity to participate in a project with some of the most daring technology in the world.[20]

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17 *Ibid.*.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

19 *Ibid.*.

20 *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, p. 19767.

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## 10. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

*BACKGROUND*

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. During World War II it was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. Canada continued to provide uranium and plutonium for the weapons programmes of the United States and Britain for twenty years, although it renounced any intention of developing its own atomic weapons. In 1965, Canada's uranium export policy was altered when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced that, henceforth, Canadian uranium exports would be used for peaceful purposes only.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ushered in greater restrictions on the uses of nuclear material internationally. In addition to agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, are required to submit to full safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over their nuclear programmes. In turn, those nuclear-weapon states, party to the Treaty, agree to work toward halting the proliferation of their own arsenals ("vertical" proliferation), and are required to co-operate with their non-nuclear counterparts in the development of the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

India's explosion of its "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 served as the harbinger of change in Canadian policy on the export of nuclear material and equipment. After the Indian Government admitted that the plutonium used in its "device" had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, Canada suspended all nuclear cooperation with India, and later that year announced more stringent safeguards on its nuclear exports.

Natural uranium is not classified as a strategic material. A blend of uranium 235 (U235) and uranium 238 (U238), natural uranium contains less than one percent U235--a quantity too low to generate a nuclear explosion.

Approximately eighty percent of the uranium exported from Canada goes to the United States, Great Britain and France. There it is enriched for use in light-water nuclear reactors. Because these reactors require uranium with a three-percent concentration of U235, the natural uranium must be enriched to this level by increasing the percentage of U235 isotope. Elaborate and expensive, the enrichment process was, until recently, confined to those countries possessing nuclear weapons programmes, as only they could afford the cost of such large operations.

The Canada-United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1955 and most recently renewed in 1980, stipulates that uranium of Canadian origin cannot be used for military purposes. Similar conditions govern uranium exports to Britain and France under the Canada-Euratom Agreement (1978).

Since enrichment plants have both civilian and military uses, the separation of materials for either application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large "pot" and is not kept separate according to the country of origin or its intended use. In a letter to NDP Leader Ed Broadbent in October 1985, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

> It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants .... However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the enrichment plant, the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally - accepted notion of fungibility.[1]

After the uranium is enriched to the required three-percent concentration of U235, the depleted uranium (which still contains small amounts of U235) is stored. Depleted U238 can be used in military reactors to breed plutonium--a substance which itself can be used to make nuclear weapons. U238 also constitutes an important element of hydrogen bombs, providing fifty percent of their explosive power.

Following the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the Canadian Government announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without Canada's prior consent. In January 1977, Canada halted uranium shipments to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan after two years of negotiation failed to produce their agreement to the Canadian stipulations. Although Japan consented to abide by the clause soon afterwards, the EEC remained intransigent. It was not until 1980 that an agreement was signed allowing sales to the EEC, with consultation on a case-by-case basis.

Western European countries purchasing uranium from Canada occasionally have arranged for both its enrichment, and its subsequent retransfer to one of Canada's nuclear partners, by the Soviet Union. This practice has been taking place for several years with the complete knowledge and prior consent of the Canadian Government, which has judged it to be fully consistent with Canadian nuclear export and non-proliferation policy.

Greater formalization of this arrangement was established with the signing of the Canada-USSR Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on 14 October 1988. The Agreement stipulates that Canadian uranium shipped to the USSR "... shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device or other military purpose."[2] It also provides for the direct exchange of information between the parties on the transfer of Canadian uranium into and out of the Soviet Union.[3] The Agreement reflects the desire on the part of both governments to ensure a thorough non-proliferation regime.

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, constitutes another key component of nuclear weapons. It is generally found as tritiated water. Its importance is based on its high rate of fusion with deuterium and the large quantity of high-energy neutrons released as a result. The fusion of the two elements produces ten times as many neutrons

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1 Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

2 "Canada/USSR Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," DEA *News Release* No. 223 (14 October 1988).

3 *Ibid.*.

as fission for the same amount of energy release. Tritium is thus crucial for boosting the energy released in nuclear explosions, allowing designers to build smaller and lighter weapons. In fact, boosting--and therefore tritium--is now considered an essential aspect of most US nuclear weapons.

Each year, approximately 0.5 kg of tritium is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent lights and fusion experiments, while approximately 11 kg are used for military purposes. Tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year. With regard to nuclear weapons, this requires that their tritium supply be replaced from time to time.

Continued production of the tritium required for the US nuclear stockpile, however, has become an issue of increasing concern. In August 1988, the sole tritium-producing facility in the US--the thirty-eight-year-old Savannah River plant in South Carolina--was closed due to safety and management problems. The costs associated with repairing the facility are estimated at close to $1 billion over a ten-year period. Even if repaired, however, the plant is not expected to operate with the power required to produce the tritium necessary for US needs.

Canadian CANDU reactors use heavy water to control the nuclear reaction. The heavy water--containing deuterium--captures neutrons from the main reaction chamber, converting deuterium to tritium. This process is peculiar to CANDU reactors, and therefore more tritium is produced as a by-product by the CANDU reactors than by any other type of reactor.

For health and safety reasons, the tritium by-products of CANDU reactors require removal. Ontario Hydro has constructed a tritium recovery facility at Darlington, Ontario. The facility, which opened in October 1988, is capable of producing an estimated 2.5 kg of tritium per year. However, technical problems have precluded regular operation of the facility, and the plant was shut down for repair in late February 1989. Resumption of operations is not expected before the fall of 1989.

Ontario Hydro is currently considering whether to market the tritium that will eventually be recovered at the Darlington facility. Tritium sells for approximately $15 million per kilogram on the international market. In September 1988, a report produced by the Ontario Premier's Council on Technology urged this course as one way of making Ontario Hydro more profitable.[4]

Plans announced by the Federal Government in October 1988 for Canada's participation in an international research project aimed at building a fusion reactor for the production of nuclear energy have sparked additional interest in tritium production. The reactor--called ITER--will involve the cooperative efforts of the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European Community, and will take approximately ten years to build. Ottawa is considering the possibility of having the facility built in Canada. Once built, ITER will require an estimated 30 to 75 kg of tritium--an amount which could be supplied in full by the Darlington facility.

Tritium is not classified as a nuclear material by the IAEA, and is therefore not subject to international safeguards. It possesses a relatively short half-life and thus

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4 Robert Sheppard, "Canada to Join Nuclear Fusion Project," *Globe and Mail*, 1 October 1988.

would create problems for IAEA monitoring. Given its use for weapons purposes, and the potential dangers associated with its transport, the possibility of Ontario Hydro marketing the material has sparked considerable concern, from both peace activists and environmentalists.

At present, Ontario Hydro has yet to make a final decision on the sale of tritium. Nevertheless, Provincial Energy Minister Bob Wong remarked on 14 February 1989 that any such exports would have to be contingent on guarantees that the tritium sold would not be put to military use.[5] Nor, he added, would sales be allowed without securing assurances that Canadian tritium would not be acquired in order to free other sources for military use.[6]

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada continues to require that its uranium exports be used for non-explosive purposes, pursuant to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and in keeping with its nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Canada's policy on the sale of tritium and tritium-related technology is governed by a set of guidelines issued on 14 March 1986. The guidelines reflect Canada's policy that tritium exports "not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."[7] Tritium exports are permitted only to states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or to states which have undertaken equivalent non-proliferation obligations acceptable to Canada and for the specified end-uses elaborated in Canada's guidelines.[8]

In November 1988, at the UN General Assembly, Canada once again introduced a resolution (43/75K) entitled "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes." The Resolution noted that such a prohibition would be an important step in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as halting and reversing the arms race. It therefore requested that the CD pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verifiable cessation and prohibition, and that it keep the General Assembly informed of that consideration. The Resolution passed by a vote of 144-1-7, with only France in opposition.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Neither the issue of uranium exports nor that of the export of tritium has been raised in the Commons this year.

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5 "Critics Alarmed Over Possible Sale of Tritium," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 February 1989, p. A16.

6 *Ibid.*.

7 "Tritium-Related Exports," Atomic Energy Control Board, *Notice 86-5*, 14 March 1986. p. 1.

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## 11. VERIFICATION

*BACKGROUND*

Verification is now recognized as a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreements in any of these sectors. However, two important developments have occurred since the end of summer 1987: talks have resumed on verification of nuclear testing after an eight-year hiatus, and the Soviet Union and the United States have signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF). The INF Treaty contains certain innovative provisions on verification that could set a precedent for future disarmament and arms control agreements.

Over the years, Canada has acquired solid expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. Following the United Nations' First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which stressed the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in disarmament agreements, the Canadian Government announced in 1983 the launching of an Arms Control Research Programme, which now has an annual budget of $1 million. This Department of External Affairs programme involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector and includes such projects as studies of problems that arise in international negotiations, creation of specialized technical training programmes and organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Programme focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities include a $3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station in Yellowknife, to be completed by September 1989; two studies given to the UN Secretary-General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the verification of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons. Canada has also undertaken a feasibility study of two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to the verification of multilateral arms control agreements, known as PAXSAT. PAXSAT 'A' investigated the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control in outer space, while PAXSAT 'B' was concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

In 1985, at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's UN delegation initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 "on all aspects of verification," which was passed by consensus. The Resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them "to communicate to the Secretary-General [...] their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques [...] and on the role of the United Nations in the field of

verification." The Resolution was called "a historic breakthrough," since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.[1]

Carrying out the requirements of this Resolution, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General, and subsequently published, *A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification.* This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact that bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will likely continue to be of paramount importance in this context.

In 1987 and 1988, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document containing sixteen principles on verificatio. The Group also held discussions on procedures and techniques and on the role the United Nations might play in verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. This last point was the subject of a speech by Mr. Roche on 12 May 1988, in which he listed certain roles the UN could play with regard to verification:

- development of internationally recognized standards on arms control and disarmament verification;
- creation of a verification data base, especially to assist negotiators;
- provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to regional arms control negotiators, on request;
- research into structures, procedures and techniques for verification; and
- on a responsive basis and with the consent of the parties to an arms control or disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential involvement in the formulation and execution of verification provisions of specific agreements.[2]

At the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, Canada and the Netherlands submitted a paper on the role the United Nations might play in verification. The two countries proposed in particular that a UN Group of Experts conduct a thorough study of this subject, to serve as a key international document on future UN activities in this field.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 3 May 1988, at the UN Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Roche made reference to recent progress in, and the importance of, verification in arms control and disarmament. He stated:

> Since last year there have been major developments with respect to the issue of verification, both in a bilateral framework and a multilateral one. The

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1 Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, *News Release*, No. 62, 22 November 1985.

2 *Intervention on the Role of the United Nations in Verification by Canadian Representative at UNDC, Verification Working Group*, United Nations, 12 May 1988.

> innovative verification provisions of the INF Agreement, the continuing discussions between the USA and USSR on verifying a nuclear test ban, and the challenge inspections conducted pursuant to the Stockholm Document, are all examples of such developments. Verification remains at the very heart of the arms control and disarmament process: for without agreement on effective verification measures there can be no meaningful arms control or disarmament.[3]

On 23 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), announced that Canada would be hosting a technical workshop on seismic data exchange for verification of a nuclear test ban.[4] The workshop, to be held at Yellowknife in September 1989, will focus on remaining obstacles to a worldwide seismological network for verifying such a ban.

On 18 October 1988, in a speech to the First Committee at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier addressed the possible role of the UN in verification:

> The Canadian Government...firmly believes that the United Nations can have a significant role in promoting and facilitating effective verification. We have therefore examined closely and in a positive spirit various proposals which have been made for a UN role in verification.... Our central concern is to ensure that the UN can acquire an appropriate role in verification which will strengthen the arms control and disarmament process by facilitating the conclusion and implementation of agreements and will enhance the authority and credibility of the United Nations system.[5]

In October 1988, the Strategic Studies Programme of the University of Calgary hosted a conference on verification of a chemical weapons ban. Sponsored by the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs, the conference examined the extent to which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards could serve as a model for the verification of chemical weapons.[6]

On 7 December 1988, at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 43/81B calling upon the UN Secretary-General to initiate

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3 Speech by the Ambassador for Disarmament to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, 3 May 1989.

4 Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament, 23 August 1988, p. 3.

5 "Ambassador Fortier Stresses Hope", *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Fall-Winter 1988, p. 11.

6 "University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Fall-Winter 1988, p. 5. See also: James Keeley, *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Occasional Papers* No. 1, September 1988.

a Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification. The study would identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament; assess the need for improvements in existing activities; explore and identify other possible activities; and provide specific recommendations for future actions by the United Nations in this regard. The Group's report would be submitted to the Forty-fifth Session of the General Assembly in 1990.[7] The Resolution passed by a vote of 150-1-0, with the United States opposing the motion.

That same month, a Department of External Affairs briefing note addressed the Canadian Government's position regarding the notion of an international verification organization (IVO) and the link between such a body and the UN. It stated:

> Canada advocates a realistic and step-by-step approach to the establishment of IVOs, including those that would employ the UN. Costly schemes to create verification bodies with all-encompassing responsibilities, some of which go beyond the limited function of verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, are inappropriate. Verification should be primarily a treaty-specific activity. While useful work may be done to study verification as a general process and to discuss general principles, the implementation of verification is fundamentally dependent on the specifics of a treaty context. For the foreseeable future, the most effective way of organizing the specialized expertise necessary for verification will be through treaty-specific organizations. Under current international conditions an IVO with responsibilities for several ACD agreements is unlikely to [be] a realistic possibility.[8]

The opening session of the Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification was held from 13 to 17 February 1989. Composed of authorities from over twenty countries, including Canada, the Group dedicated its first session primarily to organizational matters and the preparation of a draft outline of the Group's report. Fred Bild, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for Political and International Security Affairs, was elected chairman. Three more sessions were scheduled, with the fourth to end with the completion of the report.[9]

Speaking to the CD on 20 June 1989, Mr. Bild discussed the importance of verification in Canadian arms control policy:

> ...verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in building confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise... that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its verification research programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the

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7 UNGA Resolution 43/81B, 7 December 1988.

8 "Establishment of a UN Verification Organization," Department of External Affairs, *Briefing Note*, 22 December 1988, p. 3.

9 "Work Begins on S. G. Studies," *Disarmament Times* (April 1989), p. 1.

> conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified.[10]

Turning to work in progress on the UN's role in verification, Mr. Bild welcomed the fact that the Group of Experts had accepted the sixteen verification principles agreed to by consensus at the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1988, as the foundation of its work. He went on to state:

> As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.[11]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The subject of verification was not raised in the Commons this year.

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*BACKGROUND*

A previous steady decline in the global arms trade was reversed by an increase of nine percent in 1987. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global trade in major weapons was valued at approximately US $35.1 billion (all figures are in 1985 US dollars), up from US $32.3 billion in 1986.[1] The Institute attributes the 1987 increase to "sudden" US and Soviet deliveries of fighter aircraft ordered in the early 1980s. However, it also predicts that with a scarcity of new orders, future deliveries will decline.[2]

There was also a marked increase in the value of arms sales to Third World countries; these countries continue to be the biggest recipients of conventional arms. In 1986, the value of weapons delivered to developing countries was US $21.3 billion. By comparison, in 1987 the value increased to US $24.7 billion--accounting for seventy percent of the total global market of arms imports.[3] The leading importer of major weapons in the Third World is the Middle East, with 1987 transfers estimated at US $11.5 billion. It is followed by South Asia (US $6.1 billion), the Far East (US $2.4 billion), South America (US $1.9 billion), Sub-Saharan Africa (US $1.8 billion), North Africa (US $479 million), Central America (US $316 million) and South Africa (US $8 million).[4] Among individual countries, India ranked as the world's leading arms importer in 1987 with purchases estimated at US $5.2 billion. It was followed by Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and Angola.[5]

The largest exporters of major weapons to the developing countries are the USSR (US $9.7 billion), the USA (US $5.9 billion), France (US $3.2 billion), the UK (US $1.65 billion) and China (US $1.04 billion). These leading exporters together account for over eighty percent of all global deliveries.[6] For China, it was the first time that it was one of the world's five largest arms exporters to developing countries.[7]

The Soviet Union (US $12.3 billion), the US (US $11.5 billion) and three NATO countries--France (US $3.6 billion), the UK (US $1.8 billion) and West Germany (US $1.4

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1 *SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, 1988*. London: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 176.

2 *Ibid*..

3 *Ibid*..

4 *Ibid*., pp. 202-203.

5 *Ibid*., p. 178.

6 *Ibid*., p. 177.

7 *Ibid*..

billion)--were the world's top exporters of major weapons to all countries.[8] China followed West Germany with 1987 transfers valued at US $1.04 billion. However, China's sales were made exclusively to the Third World. The Soviet Union continued to lead as the main exporter of major arms to the Third World, while US arms transfers were divided almost equally between the developing countries (US $5.8 billion) and the industrialized world (US $5.7 billion).[9] In 1987, the US ranked first among exporters of major weapons to industrialized countries. The remaining market was divided among a large number of smaller suppliers, including increasingly large numbers of Third World manufacturers.[10]

Significant growth occurred in 1987 in the "gray" and "black" markets in weapons, marked publicly by the US "Iran-Contra" affair and the Swedish "Bofors" arms sales to Iran. "Gray market" sales, defined as "officially approved exports from governments which do not want to be associated with their actions," were approximately US $2 billion in 1987.[11] In the smaller area of illegally acquired arms technology, the "black market," "consisting mostly of small transactions that violate the laws of the nation from which they originate," has begun to thrive in the Third World.[12]

Arms transfer controls by exporters, whether through regulation, creation of a world arms register, or any other means, have often been considered but never effectively enacted by members of the United Nations. In 1977, US President Carter imposed unilateral restrictions on American arms exports. This action was followed by the Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union. These talks, however, soon broke down.[13]

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada continues to be a minor player in the global conventional arms market. In 1987, Canada ranked fifteenth as a major weapons exporter with global deliveries valued at US $139 million. The greater portion (US $102 million) of these deliveries was made to the industrialized world. In the same year, Canada imported weapons from industrialized countries in the amount of US $677 million.[14]

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8 *Ibid.*.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 177.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 190. See also: pp. 175 and 190-95.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 192.

13 Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 28 (March 1988), pp. 7-8.

14 SIPRI, *supra* note 1, pp. 177 and 179.

However, the value of military goods produced by Canada in 1987 was approximately CDN $2 billion, of which about CDN $1.3 billion was sold to the United States and about CDN $530 million went to all other countries.[15]

Canadian military exports are primarily in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Since Canadian firms manufacture few complete weapons systems, most exports consist of components, despite Ottawa's continued efforts to develop a more broadly-based domestic defence industry. Canada's policy on military exports has not changed since Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced revised guidelines on 10 September 1986, aimed at regulating Canadian exports.[16] This policy prohibits military exports to countries that seriously or persistently violate human rights, "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population," to countries under UN Security Council sanctions, and countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities. Restrictions also apply to exports of civilian strategic equipment to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be re-routed to these destinations.

The biggest recipient of Canadian defence and defence-related goods is the United States, with whom Canada has had a Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) since 1959 that gives Canadian firms privileged access to the US military market.[17] (Canada and the US also have a Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA)). However, protectionists in the US Congress have tabled trade bills in the Senate and House of Representatives that would place restrictions on purchases of foreign defence goods in order to promote US products. Despite the free trade agreement, these measures may well affect existing Canada-US agreements on military trade, such as the DPSA and the DDSA.

The idea of developing an international arms trade register under the auspices of the United Nations surfaced once again in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Foreign Relations (the Simard-Hockin Report) of June 1986. The Report recommended that Canada should strive to convince other nations to support the proposals for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions.[18] On 21 October 1987, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs James Taylor told a conference in Hull that Canada supports the idea of an arms register. His address included the following statement:

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15 John Kohut, "Overseas markets are not easy targets." *Globe and Mail*, 10 October 1988, pp. B13 and B17.

16 For a full overview of the new policy, see: "Export Controls Policy." Department of External Affairs *Communiqué* No. 155 (10 September 1986).

17 Krause, *supra* note 13, pp. 6-7.

18 Hockin, Tom (MP) and Senator Jean-Maurice Simard, *Independence and Internationalism*. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, June 1986, p. 145.

> It is perhaps instructive in this regard to note that despite repeated UN resolutions scarcely more than 20 states register with the UN their levels of military expenditure. Canada is one of the few countries that does so.[19]

Mr. Taylor also listed the current obstacles to such a measure, especially the type of information to be provided and the range of goods to be declared. He pointed out that some countries might refuse to be included on such a register for security reasons, since this register would contain virtually all information on a country's military strength, and might be used by a potential enemy. Finally, he explained that the problem of the arms trade could not be solved until the insecurity of some countries, which is often the result of flawed international security mechanisms, has been addressed.[20]

Begun in 1983, the biennial Armed Forces Training Technology Exhibition (ARMX) held its 1989 exhibition in Ottawa from 23 to 25 May. The exhibition featured the latest military technology products of approximately 450 corporations from sixteen countries, including Canada. The sponsor of the event was the Toronto-based Baxter Publishing Co., publisher of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins explained the role of ARMX-1989 to the House of Commons as follows:

> ...[T]he primary purpose of ARMX is to provide a forum in which training and technology needs of the Department of National Defence can be offered and shown.... The Government of Canada has identified its equipment needs from trucks to communications equipment, and ARMX provides the various companies with an opportunity to show their products and share their ideas.... ARMX gives Canadian companies...the opportunity to show what they have to offer to both exhibitors and to the Canadian Government.... Visitors from NATO countries are encouraged to look at Canadian capabilities to help them meet their NATO commitments.... We all know that the defence industry is a relatively small part of our national economy.... However, it certainly represents some of the most technologically sophisticated industries that we have. The high-tech industry is one of the ways for Canada to maintain a competitive position internationally.... The defence business is important to the economic viability of many of our high-tech communities.[21]

About 2000 demonstrators protested outside the grounds where ARMX-1989 was being held. A total of 145 people were arrested and charged with mischief when they staged a sit-down strike in an attempt to prevent the exhibition from opening. Ottawa's City Council voted to stop renting any municipally-owned property for future ARMX shows. It is widely anticipated that the 1991 exhibition will find a site elsewhere in Canada (for an explanation of the protests, see "Parliamentary Comment" below).

Canadian Government regulations require an export permit for the sale of military

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19 Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Policy on Arms Control and Disarmament-Excerpts from Official Statements and Communication*, August 1988, p. 1.

20 Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Conference Report No.6 (October 1987), pp. 28-29.

21 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1981-82.

commodities to any country other than the United States. However, this permit does not cover subsequent sales or inclusion of the commodity in another product sold to a third party. There is no official Government reporting of either direct or indirect military commodity sales. Nevertheless, allegations surfaced in 1988-1989 that the Canadian Government was involved in the granting of export permits for sales of military commodities to governments involved in conflicts or known systematically to violate human rights. It was reported on 7 February 1989 that Zimbabwean Foreign Affairs Minister Nathan Shamayurira had claimed to have "hard information" concerning Canadian manufacturers violating the international arms embargo against South Africa by shipping arms to South Africa from third countries. The following day Shamayurira issued a statement denying he had made such an allegation.[22] Regarding indirect military sales, it was alleged in the December 1988 issue of *The Ploughshares Monitor* that $150-200 million worth of Canadian military commodities, or products that have military application, find their way each year into the hands of governments who are at war or who are severe human rights violators.[23]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

A lengthy debate took place in the House of Commons on 19 May 1989 concerning Canadian Government involvement in the ARMX-1989 exhibition. After the Associate Minister of Defence Mary Collins explained the purpose of ARMX-1989, NDP MP Dan Heap commented:

> The Minister wants us to believe that they will not be dealing with weapons here. She also wants us to believe that Third World countries outside NATO will not be making purchases.... In that case, I wish she would explain why the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. Clark] has said that South Africa is welcome to come, a country which we are supposedly trying to discourage from murdering its own inhabitants. Yet we want them to come out and look at weapons with which they can kill their own inhabitants or maybe the people of Namibia.[24]

Ms. Collins responded in part:

> Less than 10 per cent of the exhibits at ARMX will focus on weapons or weapons related systems.... The remaining 90 per cent is goods and services for a whole variety of activities. Exhibits include such things as rubber life rafts and computer systems.... Let me deal finally with Third World countries. The

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22 Patrick Nagle, "Canadian Firm Linked to S. African Arms Sale." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 February 1989; Patrick Nagle, "Zimbabwe Minister Says Canada Not Selling Arms to South Africa." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 1989; and Mary Nemeth, *et al.*, "Canada in a Hot Seat: Joe Clark Has a Showdown in Harare." *Maclean's*, vol. 102 no. 8 (20 February 1989), p. 21.

23 "Indirect Military Sales to the Third World: Hidden Road to the Arms Market." *The Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 9 no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 13-15; and "Stricter Control Urged on Arms Components." *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 January 1989.

24 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1983.

> Hon. Member's statement is absclute nonsense.... I am advised by the Minister [for External Affairs] that the organizers have assured us they have invited no South Africans to attend ARMX, including South African diplomats in Canada.[25]

Later in the debate, Minister of State (Privatization and Regulatory Affairs) John McDermid stated:

> A close examination of Canada's defence industry will reveal that we produce very little bellicose equipment. Those defence goods that we do produce have earned us an enviable reputation around the world for civil applications. One need only cite simulator technology, short take-off and landing aircraft, navigation systems and communication technology.[26]

Liberal MP André Ouellet rose in the House to voice his concerns about ARMX-1989:

> ...[W]e clearly distinguish between the requirements and commitments of our Armed Forces within such organizations as NATO and NORAD on the one hand, and this profitable and scandalous effort to sell weapons to Third World countries. Therefore, I just cannot condone what has become of this arms bazaar, a private concern, and a very big one at that, for the promotion of those who want to make big bucks with the sale of military equipment.[27]

Following an explanation of the Canadian Government position on export control policies, MP Dan Heap queried:

> ...[W]hen we sell goods to the United States...we do not know whether they will wind up sold or given by the United States to the Contras in Nicaragua, or to the Salvadoran army in El Salvador to strafe and bomb civilians.... It appears quite legal for those countries to do this because we have not required any statement from them about end use.... When the Minister talked about the restriction on exports to certain countries in certain categories, and spoke about countries with a persistent record of violence against their citizens,...he did not mention that the Government has refused to identify which countries are currently under that restriction. Therefore, it is impossible for us to evaluate how subjective or accurate the Government's identification may be.[28]

Mr. McDermid replied:

> ...We have verification procedures.... [I]n a large number of cases the export permit must be reviewed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself. Once a permit is issued trained officials seek assurances that goods

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25 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1983-84.

26 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1991.

27 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1988.

28 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1992-1993.

> are destined to bona fide clients and verify the veracity of those transactions. There is a follow-up, and we do keep an eye on those things.... It is not our intention to publish a list of countries which are affected by this policy. Such a list would be a cabinet confidence. I believe the identity of some countries is self-evident. Others may be of a more sensitive nature, and therefore it must remain within cabinet confidentiality.[29]

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## 13. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

*BACKGROUND*

Successive Canadian Governments have attributed great economic and political value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, a line of early-warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was initiated primarily by the United States, cooperative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed when a privately owned oil tanker, the *Manhattan*, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned with the threat to sovereignty and a possible increase in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, 1970, which established Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. As late as 1969 considerable confusion seemed to characterize the Canadian Government's position on the precise nature of Canadian claims to the Arctic waters. After 1973, however, Canadian Governments were consistently claiming the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal, with no right of innocent passage through them.

At the Quebec Summit, in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW Line. Unlike the earlier system, which was largely manned and operated by US personnel, the NWS will be manned and controlled entirely by Canadians. (For more information, see NORAD, Chapter 15 of *The Guide*.)

Although the first nuclear-powered submarine operated under the Arctic icecap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is comparatively recently that both superpowers are believed to have initiated regular submarine patrols under the ice. This development has raised the prospect of the Arctic becoming an area of growing strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created dilemmas for the Canadian Government. As nuclear-powered submarines are particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively under the ice, their operation in the Arctic poses a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region.

In August 1985, a more visible threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself with the voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the *Polar Sea*, through the Northwest Passage. The declared purpose of the voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska. The US Government failed, however, to request the Canadian Government's permission to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with

Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it nevertheless proposed that the voyage be made on a cooperative basis. To this end, the US Coast Guard provided information to its Canadian counterpart and took Canadian observers on board the vessel. Moreover, the US Government stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.[1]

The Canadian Government responded to the *Polar Sea* incident with a firm assertion of Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. On 10 September 1985, in a statement before the House of Commons, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said:

> Only with full sovereignty can we protect the entire range of Canadian interests. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity. The policy of this Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic archipelago and this applies to the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitutes.[2]

Mr. Clark announced several measures to better ensure the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These included: an Order in Council establishing straight baselines (enclosing Canada's internal waters) around the outer perimeter of the Archipelago; the introduction of measures to extend the application of Canadian civil and criminal law to all offshore zones, including the Arctic (Bill C-104); an increase in the number of surveillance flights and in the level of naval activity in eastern Arctic waters; and the construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Government also indicated its willingness to have the sovereignty question referred to the World Court, by withdrawing its earlier reservations in this regard. Finally, it called for immediate discussions with the United States on all means of cooperation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty. Negotiations between Canada and the United States began soon afterwards.

In June 1987, Canada's Defence White Paper listed a number of additional sovereignty-related defence initiatives that the Government planned to undertake. These included: the ongoing modernization of the DEW Line radars; the upgrading of five northern airfields to accommodate fighter interceptors; an increase in the number of Aurora Long-range Patrol Aircraft; the modernization of the Tracker medium-range aircraft; an expansion of the Canadian Ranger force; the establishment of a Northern Training Centre for the Canadian Forces; and the planned deployment of fixed sonar systems for submarine detection in the Arctic passages. In addition, recognizing the Archipelago's potential as a viable passageway for submarines between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines of its own, partly because of their under-ice capability.

In a speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a zone of peace. Specifically, the Soviet leader called for negotiations aimed at scaling down militarization and naval activity in the Baltic,

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1 This was made clear in a State Department Press Guidance released on 14 June 1985, the day after the Canadian public was made aware of the impending transit.

2 *Commons Debates*, 10 September 1985, p. 6463.

Northern, Greenland and Norwegian Seas (later extended to include the Barents Sea as well). Limitations on anti-submarine weapons, advance notification of major military exercises, and the banning of naval activity in international straits and shipping lanes were all proposed. President Gorbachev also called for multilateral cooperation in the development of Arctic resources, in scientific research, and in environmental protection. Finally, he raised the possibility of the Soviet Union opening to other nations the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Far East.

On 6 October 1987, the Soviet draft text of a Soviet-Canadian agreement on Arctic cooperation was released by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. First proposed by the Soviets in early 1987, the provisions of the draft included: recognition of the rights of both countries to control pollution and govern navigation in the Arctic waters adjacent to their territories, provision for information exchanges on environmental, natural resource and navigation safety issues, and the extension of existing scientific and technical coope ation between the two countries.

On 9 December 1987, at a Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromso, Norway, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark indicated the Government's desire to develop a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. He stated the elements of this policy as follows: 1) affirming Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernizing Canada's northern defences; 3) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation. Enhanced security in the Arctic, according to Clark, would come from a step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Finally, he noted that Canada's Arctic security was a direct function of Alliance solidarity and cohesion, the climate of East-West relations, and progress toward balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.[3]

On 11 January 1988, after two years of discussion, Canada and the United States signed a Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement (the "Icebreaker" Agreement). This Agreement seeks to facilitate navigation by the icebreakers of the two nations, and to develop cooperative procedures for this purpose. Under its terms, the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers in waters claimed by Canada to be internal, will be undertaken with the consent of the Canadian Government.[4] It goes on to state that nothing in the Agreement nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the two governments on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas, or their positions regarding third parties.[5]

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3 "Speech by the Right Honorable Joe Clark to the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromso, Norway, December 9, 1987." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 87/72.

4 "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation." Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 010 (11 January 1988).

5 *Ibid.*.

Describing the Agreement as "an important step for Canada in the North," Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated:

> While we and the United States have not changed our legal positions we have come to a practical agreement that is fully consistent with the requirements of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. It is an improvement over the situation which prevailed previously. What we have now significantly advanced Canadian interests.[6]

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 11 October 1988, Mr. Clark announced that the Canadian Government had given its consent to a US request under the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, to have the US Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Star* transit the Northwest Passage. The *Polar Star* had sustained damage while assisting two Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers in US waters. Unable to continue on its westward journey from its location off the Alaskan coast due to extremely heavy ice conditions, the US vessel entered Canadian waters to refuel and effect repairs to its turbines.[7] It then proceeded eastward through the Northwest Passage to exit the Arctic, as did the two Canadian icebreakers. The incident marked the first test of the "Icebreaker Agreement," and was viewed as a success by Government officials.[8] During its voyage, the *Polar Star* operated in a manner consistent with the pollution control standards and other provisions of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant Canadian laws and regulations. US officials also assumed responsibility for costs incurred as a result of any pollution caused by the vessel during its transit.[9]

On 18 October 1988, in a speech at Carleton University, Mr. Clark reviewed Canadian Government actions in the North as well as "what we have done to reinforce our sovereignty in the North." He stated that the two issues were linked because the resolution of any competing claims would come in time through negotiations and international law.[10] As such, he observed that Canada's claims would be judged by the actual things it has done to demonstrate use and control of its own North.[11]

After outlining the steps Canada had taken over the years to strengthen its sovereignty claims in the North, Mr. Clark turned to the issue of northern cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Minister announced that in November 1988, a Canadian

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6 *Ibid.*.

7 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.220 (11 October 1988).

8 "US Ship Allowed in Canadian Arctic," *Vancouver Sun*, 7 October 1988, p. A6.

9 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.220 (11 October 1988).

10 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (18 October 1988), p.1.

11 *Ibid.*.

delegation would travel to Moscow for negotiations on an Arctic Cooperation Agreement.[12] This accord, he remarked, would provide for a broad range of exchanges in the scientific and environmental fields.[13] He also acknowledged Mr. Gorbachev's publicly expressed concerns about air pollution in the Arctic, and noted that such concern should open doors for multilateral discussions on the problem of Arctic haze--a subject of great importance to Canada.[14]

The Minister also addressed the issue of President Gorbachev's security proposals for the Arctic region. Here, he stressed the importance of judging "what the Soviets are doing as well as what they are saying." In this regard, Mr. Clark observed:

> The Soviet Union is the only Northern nation with an extensive and permanent deployment of nuclear weapons in the Arctic. In the North-Western quadrant of the Soviet Union, the Kola Peninsula boasts a military arsenal that is enormous... Even if the Soviet Union were to withdraw [its] armies, dismantle [its northern] fleet and destroy its ballistic missiles and bomber squadrons in the Arctic, that would not remove the threat to Canada. This would be one axis of attack but it is not of course, the only one given the threat from other Soviet bases, aircraft and naval forces. That threat can come from any direction--on, over or beneath the waters, including those of the Arctic Ocean.[15]

The Minister went on to comment that it would be a "great myth" to think that reductions of armaments in the Arctic would make North America or even the Canadian North safe. Rather, "...the threat to Western security is global." The reduction of Canada's northern defences, therefore, would do nothing to reduce the threat from global strategic weapons, and would in fact be destabilizing in that it could weaken deterrence.[16] Mr. Clark concluded by stating that the place to address global problems of armaments was in the negotiations on arms control and disarmament underway in Geneva and Vienna. He also remarked that NATO Allies including Denmark and Norway agreed that Arctic security could not be dealt with in isolation; it was a NATO rather than a northern issue.[17]

In February 1989, the Government announced that negotiations with the Soviet Union on non-military cooperation had resulted in the initialling of an agreement. Designed to increase cooperation in the areas of scientific research, northern development, the environment and native people, it was expected that the agreement would be

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12 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

13 *Ibid.*.

14 *Ibid.*.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

16 *Ibid.*.

17 *Ibid.*.

signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and Soviet President Gorbachev during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, scheduled for November 1989.[18]

The release of a new budget by the Government in late April 1989 brought with it the cancellation or curtailment of a number of programmes envisaged in the Defence White Paper as contributing to sovereignty protection in the Arctic. Cancelled were: 1) plans to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines; 2) the purchase of six additional Aurora long-range patrol aircraft; 3) plans to modernize two squadrons of older Tracker patrol planes; and 4) the purchase of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18 jet fighters. In addition, the planned purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles designed to operate in the Arctic was cut by over fifty percent (to 400), and was expected to be delayed until at least 1995-1996.

In an interview, on 27 April 1989, Defence Minister Bill McKnight remarked that as a result of the budget cuts, Canada might in future be forced to place greater reliance on cooperation with its allies (i.e., the United States and Britain) for the protection of sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic.[19] Commenting that "[t]here are better ways of defending northern sovereignty," the Minister added: "unfortunately we cannot afford those ways."[20]

On June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance Aircraft for the Canadian Forces. To be called the Arcturus, the aircraft will be used primarily for military, environmental, maritime and Arctic surveillance, as well as for fisheries patrols.[21] In addition, they will serve as a back-up for search and rescue. The aircraft are to be built to Canadian military specifications and share the same airframe and engines as the Aurora aircraft (although unlike the Aurora they will not be equipped with submarine-detection equipment), thus allowing significant savings in maintenance and training costs for both. Mr. McKnight described the purchase as "a cost-effective measure to address the need to effectively patrol Canada's coastline and enforce Canadian sovereignty."[22]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 16 September 1988, NDP Member Margaret Mitchell raised questions concerning the Government's plan to construct the Polar 8 Icebreaker. Speaking in the House, Ms. Mitchell noted:

> In 1985 the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that a Polar 8 ice-breaker would be constructed to protect our Arctic sovereignty. Since then,

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18 "PM to Visit Soviet Union in Late Fall," *Globe and Mail*, 18 April 1989, p. A1.

19 Paul Koring, "Defence of Arctic Left to Allies by Budget Cuts," *Globe and Mail*, 28 April 1989, p. A2.

20 *Ibid.*.

21 Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 30 June 1989, p. 1.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

> British Columbia Members of Parliament and a number of Cabinet Ministers repeatedly have promised that the ice-breaker would be built equally in Vancouver and Victoria, a measure which is desperately needed to save our shipbuilding industry. Since the Deputy Prime Minister has been actively interested in this, can he tell us when construction of the Polar 8 ice-breaker will begin as promised repeatedly for the last three years?[23]

In response, the then Minister of Supply and Services Otto Jelinek stated:

> ...the Hon. Member should know that the Polar 8 [is] in its definition phase. There have been...some ownership problems with the company. The program and the plan is to continue to look forward to the Polar 8 icebreaker being built both in Vancouver and Victoria shipyards and I believe that everything is going according to plan at this point in time.[24]

After charging that problems with the Polar 8 were the result of underfunding by the Government, Ms. Mitchell reiterated the demand that the icebreaker be built equally in Vancouver and Victoria.[25] She then asked:

> If there is a financial problem why does the Government not increase the subsidy? It really was underfunded as I understand it. Does the Minister not agree that a world class icebreaker which will do many practical things in our Arctic waters as well as deal with the sovereignty issue is far more important than wasting money on expensive nuclear subs?[26]

The Minister replied:

> ...we do not need the Hon. Member to tell us that an ice-breaker is very important for our sovereignty. It is this Government which initiated that program.[27]

The status of the Polar 8 was again raised in the House on 9 May 1989 by NDP Member Audrey McLaughlin. Recalling Government promises to begin construction of the vessel by Spring 1989, Ms. McLaughlin asked when, in fact, construction would commence.[28] Minister of Transport Benoit Bouchard replied that the Government was proceeding with the Polar 8 operation. He then added:

> However there are two issues.... The first is the shipyard which is being processed at the present time. The other one is the problem of the design. A proposal has to

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23 *Commons Debates*, 16 September 1988, p. 19332.

24 *Ibid.*.

25 *Ibid.*.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 19332-19333.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 19333.

28 *Commons Debates*, 8 May 1989, p. 1434.

be made to the Government which will be made. It is within...the first phase where we look at the design and the shipyard. After that we will go into the construction phase...logically...we are operating with the first phase and the second phase after.[29]

In a supplementary question, Ms. McLaughlin referred to statements made by the Defence Minister to the effect that recent budget cuts might require Canada to depend on its Allies to help defend the Arctic. Commenting that the United States did not accept Canadian claims to sovereignty in that area, the Member asked:

Will the Minister confirm that what is really happening with the Polar 8 is that this Government is prepared to put our sovereignty in the hands of foreign interests?[30]

Mr. Clark replied:

...that is absolutely false. I know that in order to be a candidate for the leadership of the New Democratic Party one has to go to the furthest edges of extremism. The Hon. Member should resist that temptation.[31]

That same day, Liberal Member Brian Tobin also questioned the Government's commitment to the construction of the icebreaker, asking the Prime Minister:

...what has changed in the Arctic that suddenly you can walk away from your pre-election promises?[32]

Mr. Mulroney replied:

The Government indicated that this was a very important instrument for the assertion of sovereignty in northern Canada which had been lacking for many years.[33]

On 16 December 1988, in a statement before the House, NDP Member Audrey McLaughlin raised the issue of pollution of the Arctic environment and the need for the negotiation of a treaty on Arctic pollution. She stated:

...uncontrolled use of pesticides, chemicals and toxic substances in the Soviet Union and Europe has brought pollution to the Arctic which threatens the food supply of the Inuit. Action is needed now. Canada must show leadership.... The source of

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29 *Ibid.*.

30 *Ibid.*.

31 *Ibid.*.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 1435.

33 *Ibid.*.

pollution must be determined and removed. I call upon the Government to fulfill its commitment immediately to constitute the Canadian Polar Research Commission and to commence circumpolar negotiations for an Arctic Pollution Treaty.[34]

On 21 April 1989, Liberal Member Joseph Volpe pointed to the importance of initiating discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting military activities in the Arctic. Recalling Mr. Gorbachev's October 1987 call for an Arctic zone of peace, as well as more recent statements to that effect by "a Soviet official in charge of disarmament,"[35] Mr. Volpe suggested that Canada consider exploring the prospects for Arctic arms control "...[d]uring upcoming talks between the Soviet Union and other nations."[36] He remarked:

> Since the Government was foolish enough to allow the testing of sophisticated American cruise missiles and is even contemplating the purchase of nuclear submarines, Canada would be well advised to take part in those talks. Otherwise, the Soviets would be forced to intensify their military presence in the Arctic, thereby increasing the number of cruise missiles and Soviet nuclear submarines in that area. During the upcoming talks between the Soviet Union and other nations, the Canadian Government should strive to conclude agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.[37]

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34 *Commons Debates*, 16 December 1988, p. 138.

35 The official to whom Mr. Volpe was referring was Mr. Yevgeni Golovko, Soviet deputy disarmament negotiator. On 4 April 1989 at a seminar held at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Golovko indicated Moscow's willingness to include the subject of Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula in discussions on an Arctic peace treaty with Canada. See Jonathan Manthorpe, "Soviet Official Offers to Discuss Kola Bases in Arctic Peace Bid." *Toronto Star*, 5 April 1989, p.A18.

36 *Commons Debates*, 21 April 1989, p. 785.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

## 14. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

*BACKGROUND*

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement establishing a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. Known as the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Programme", the agreement is valid for five years, and was renewed automatically for an additional five-year period on 28 February 1987.

Covering only the testing of US systems in Canada, the agreement is not reciprocal. Under its terms, the United States can request testing of various systems, including: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may, however, refuse any project, and no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country. Furthermore, the agreement can be terminated on twelve months' notice.[1]

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the programme. A steering group, charged with exercising authority over the programme itself, makes recommendations concerning which projects are acceptable to Canada. In addition, a coordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. At the beginning of each year, the United States submits a thirty-month forecast to DND, outlining the projects it wishes to see implemented in Canada. After review and ministerial approval, the Government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed, and when the proper authority is granted, a project arrangement is jointly developed. Signature of the latter, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may, however, be required for specific projects.

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to be conducted in Canada. The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. It can be sea-, ground-, or air-launched.

The Government's rationale for agreeing to the US request was that testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD, and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament." Canadian territory was particularly suitable for such testing because it offered extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. The tests generally take place during the first three months of the year in order to ensure that proper weather conditions exist. The Government made clear, however, that its agreement to allow such testing "...in no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces."

The extension of cruise missile testing for a five-year period beyond the initial five-year term of the umbrella testing agreement was confirmed in 1987 when the Government did not give twelve months' advance notice of its intention to withdraw. The

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1 Department of External Affairs, "Testing of Defence Systems in Canada." *Background Notes*, 1983.

renewal, and the terms surrounding it, were made clear on 6 March 1987 in a statement to the House by the Associate Minister of National Defence:

> The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice.... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under the agreement - for example, cruise missile testing - at any time on one day's notice should imperative circumstances so warrant.... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.[2]

The first term of the umbrella testing agreement officially ended on 28 February 1988. Its renewal now extends the agreement to 1993.

Agreement to test the cruise missile has generated considerable public debate. Some Canadians have felt that it has compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and has contributed to the arms race. Concern has also been voiced regarding the potential harm which such tests could have on Canadian citizens and the environment, if anything went wrong. In announcing individual tests, however, the Canadian Government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise missile will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area."

To date, twelve tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile have been carried out. These include one in 1984, three in 1985, two in 1986, three in 1987, and two in 1988. One test has thus far been carried out in 1989. Following several delays, due to unfavourable weather conditions, the test occurred on 30 January 1989. The missile was released over the Beaufort Sea by a US B-52 bomber, and later intercepted by Canadian CF-18 and US F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. The test was considered by military authorities to have been successful.

Criticism of the test was registered at a news conference held in Toronto, by members of Greenpeace, and federal Opposition parties. There, participants urged the Canadian Government to cancel the bilateral testing agreement in a gesture of support for improved superpower relations.[3]

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 13 January 1989, in a speech at the University of Calgary, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark discussed the Government's rationale for permitting cruise missile testing over Canadian territory. Mr. Clark stated:

> Canada, as an ally, must continue to honour its obligation to make a contribution to the defence of the West. This will require active participation in NATO forces. It will require that we support the viability of the American strategic deterrent which underpins NATO's security. For example, we cannot shirk our responsibility to permit the continued testing of air launched cruise missiles

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2 *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1987, p. 3918..

3 Richard Hoffman, "Peace Movement Quiet as Cruise Tests Resume." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 January 1989, p. A5.

over Canada. These constitute an important part of that strategic deterrent, the part that assures that no attack could go unpunished.[4]

On 17 January 1989 Canada received a formal request from US authorities to amend the 1983 testing agreement in order to permit testing of an advanced version of the cruise missile in Canada. The Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM)--called the AGM 129A--is somewhat faster than the previous model tested in Canada, it incorporates "STEALTH" technology (i.e., reducing its radar signature), and possesses a longer range than its predecessor. Its possession of more advanced guidance technology also gives the missile greater accuracy.

News of the US request prompted considerable opposition from arms control analysts as well as peace and disarmament groups, many of whom expressed concern about the possible first-strike implications of the ACM. Such critics viewed approval of ACM testing as "a dangerous escalation of the arms race."[5]

On 1 February 1989, Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight announced Canada's agreement to allow the US to test the unarmed advanced cruise missile over Canadian territory. In making the announcement, the Minister remarked that cruise missile testing constituted "an important Canadian contribution to the effectiveness of NATO's strategic deterrent."[6] Observing that Canada supported the pursuit of mutual arms reduction, Mr. McKnight went on to state that this process could only move ahead effectively if both sides were dealing from equivalent positions. He added that the Warsaw Pact already had a significant and impressive cruise missile capability, and that both superpowers were agreed that under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), improved cruise missiles would continue to form part of their future strategic inventories.[7]

Echoing Mr. McKnight's remarks, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark added that cruise missile testing would contribute to a climate "that will lead to balanced arms control."[8] He also denied allegations that the Stealth cruise missile constituted a first-strike weapon capable of being used in a sudden attack on the Soviet Union. In this regard, Mr. Clark noted that the advanced cruise would require "something like six hours to reach Moscow from North America," and that it "would be visible" on Soviet radar screens.[9]

That same day, a Department of External Affairs publication stated that substantial improvements were taking place in Soviet cruise missile capabilities. Noting that many of

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4 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 13 January 1989, p. 5.

5 Tim Harper, "New Cruise Missile Tests Fuel the Arms Race Critics Say." *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1989, p. A2.

6 DND *News Release*, 06/89, 1 February 1989, p. 1.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

8 *Supra* note 5, p. A2.

9 Iain Hunter, "Disarmament Groups Condemn 'Stealth' Cruise Missile Testing." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 February 1989.

these developments were "revolutionary," it went on to state that the Soviets had begun testing a number of supersonic (MACH 3) cruise missiles which were larger than currently existing US and Soviet ALCMs[10]The document also observed that the Soviet AS-19 cruise missile currently in production was supersonic and equipped with state-of-the-art Stealth technology.[11]

Following a twenty-four-hour delay, due to poor weather conditions, the first test over Canada of the advanced cruise missile proceeded on 2 March 1989. In a "captive carry" test, the missile remained attached to a US B-52 bomber during its flight from the Beaufort Sea, down the Mackenzie River valley to Primrose Lake weapons testing range near the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake, Alberta. The test was successfully completed in a time of just under five hours.

Criticism of the testing of the ACM was heard from several quarters. Responding to the Government's decision in favour of the tests, Liberal External Affairs critic André Ouellet commented on 1 February 1989 that "Brian Mulroney has now replaced Margaret Thatcher as the most hawkish ally of the United States."[12] He added that "Canada should come forward, within NATO, and play a positive role in disarmament, not constantly being a carbon copy and convenient ally to the Americans."[13] Similarly, NDP MP Dan Heap registered his party's opposition to testing of the ACM by noting: "[w]e can only lose by escalating the arms race."[14] That same day, a coalition of peace groups organized by the Toronto Disarmament Network delivered an open letter opposing the tests to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Finally, in early March 1989, a series of anti-cruise demonstrations took place in cities across the country, in response to the first test of the ACM.

In mid-March 1989, documents were released under access to information legislation revealing that the Canadian Government had accepted liability ranging from twenty-five to 100 percent for accidents resulting from cruise missile tests in Canada as part of the 1983 umbrella testing agreement. A standard NATO arrangement, the documents called for Canada to pay twenty-five percent of damages, if the US was to blame for an accident, and an even splitting of damage costs if Canada shared some responsibility. In addition, Canada could claim damages against the US for damage of Canadian military property and, in the event that other federal property was damaged, would be required to agree with the US on an outside arbiter to divide damage costs[15]. The documents also revealed

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10 Department of External Affairs "Canada, Security Policy and Cruise Missile Testing." *Backgrounder*, 1 February 1989, p. 8.

11 *Ibid.*.

12 *Supra* note 5, p. A2.

13 *Ibid.*.

14 *Ibid.*.

15 Peter Calamai, "Canada Liable If Cruise Crashes." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1989, p. A1.

that officials from at least four Department of National Defence directorates (finance, legal, air plans and military plans coordination) strongly opposed adoption of the liability arrangements.[16]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 13 April 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie made reference to the testing of the advanced cruise missile in a statement in the House criticizing the Canadian Government's foreign and defence policy:

> The Government is in danger...of being to the right of Thatcher and to the right of Reagan in the last few months of his presidency. One wonders, are we simply waiting for Bush to make up his mind so that Canadians will know where they stand in respect of east-west relations. Or is this an opportunity for us to show some leadership in relationship with our allies instead of merely assenting to whatever way the United States and NATO wants to use us, whether in Forward Armed Forces attack strategy...or testing the advance to Stealth Cruise missiles which many people contend could be used as a form of first strike weapon and therefore is destabilizing? Why do we have to be such uncritical participants in all of this?[17]

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## 15. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND (NORAD)

*BACKGROUND*

On 7 August 1957 the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis between Canada and the United States. It began operations on 12 September 1957, and was established formally by the two governments on 12 May 1958.

NORAD was the result of many years of continental defence cooperation between Canada and the United States, following the Second World War. Its purpose was to defend against air attack on North America, particularly by the Soviet bomber force. For Canada, a major concern from NORAD's conception was the effect it would have on Canadian sovereignty. NORAD's commander is an American, while a Canadian officer holds the Deputy Commander position.

The NORAD agreement, initially to last ten years, established an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over the forces of both nations and dedicated to continental defence. At the outset, the Command included both active and passive defence systems, with a joint fighter-interceptor force and a series of radar nets across the continent. These nets included the Pinetree Line, built in 1951, at $50^{O}$ North latitude; the Mid-Canada Line, completed in 1954, at $55^{O}$ North latitude; and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957, at $70^{O}$ North latitude.

As the assessment of the threat evolved, NORAD's resources also changed. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in particular, lessened the need for bomber defence. By 1965, the ninety-eight detection stations of the Mid-Canada Line--the only system built, designed and financed solely by Canada--were deactivated. The number of DEW Line and Pinetree Line installations was reduced from seventy-eight to thirty-one and from thirty-nine to fifteen, respectively. From its height between 1958 and 1962 of nearly 250,000 (including 17,000 Canadians), the manpower available to NORAD had decreased to approximately 64,000 (including 6700 Canadians) in 1985. Canadian financial contributions have traditionally been about ten percent of the annual total of $6.8 billion (in 1985 dollars).

The NORAD Agreement was first renewed in May 1968 for a period of five years. The renewed agreement included two changes: first, clarification that either party could nullify the agreement after review and one year's notice; and second, the insertion of a clause stating that the NORAD agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The 1973 renewal of the agreement was for two years only, to allow for re-evaluation of the strategic situation, in light of Soviet ICBM developments and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I).

The 1975 renewal recognized the changed strategic circumstances, namely a higher degree of mutual and stable deterrence and a less significant long-range bomber threat. The bomber early-warning function, together with some limited defence, nonetheless remained. In addition, to reflect the increased emphasis on ICBMs, NORAD was charged with providing space surveillance, as well as warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack, to ensure an effective response, should deterrence fail. These new tasks involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems, including the Ballistic

Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS), although Canada's involvement was quite minimal.

As a result of a continuing debate in Canada on NORAD and an impending election, the 1980 renewal was for a single year. In March 1981 the Agreement was renewed for five years with two important changes for Canada. First, in recognition of the changing nature of the arrangement and the threat it was meant to answer, the title was changed to North American *Aerospace* Defence Command [emphasis added]. Second, the 1981 Agreement also removed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) clause which had been inserted in 1968. Officials attributed this change to the fact that the United States did not have an ABM system at the time, as well as to the desire to avoid any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would breach the ABM Treaty. Some analysts have argued that the change was made so as not to preclude any future ABM possibilities.

In August 1984, with the coming into operation of two Canadian Region Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) at North Bay, Ontario, Canada took over full command and control of NORAD operations within its own airspace. Previously, a significant amount of Canadian airspace had been under the command and control of US facilities.

At the Quebec City Summit on 18 March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on an extensive modernization of NORAD's assets, known as the North American Aerospace Modernization Programme (NAAMP).

This includes the following:

- a system of four very-long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars (one in Alaska and three in the continental United States) to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to North America;

- a North Warning System (NWS), consisting of thirteen long-range (eleven in Canada) and thirty-nine short-range (thirty-six in Canada) radars located along the northern periphery of the continent, to replace the DEW Line;

- use of USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to supplement the NWS at times of alert;

- upgrading of forward operating locations (FOLs) and dispersed operating bases (DOBs) to accommodate fighter and AWACS aircraft; and

- improvements to the command, control and communications (C3) elements of the system.

The modernization programme will cost over $7 billion, of which Canada will contribute twelve percent (about $860 million). The programme is scheduled to be fully completed by 1994.

The Canadian commitment to the programme includes: meeting all the communication needs of the North Warning System; the integration of the radars with the ROCCs in North Bay, Ontario; the design and building of any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada; forty percent financing of the $1.3 billion NWS system (a sixty/forty cost-

sharing ratio also applies to its operational and maintenance costs); managing the final stages of the programme after 1989; and complete operational control of the NWS in Canada upon its completion. Canada will also be involved, to a limited extent, in the manning of the OTH-B radars and the AWACS aircraft.

On 19 March 1986, Canada and the United States renewed the NORAD Agreement for a further five years, without any changes.

In March 1987, Canada announced five forward operating locations for NORAD fighter-interceptors : Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and Kuujjuaq in Quebec. Canada and the US will share, equally, the cost of developing these sites, which will be fully operational by the end of 1993.

The first five long-range radars of the NWS, the westernmost of the Canadian-based ones, became operational in November 1987. Construction of the remaining six Canadian NWS long-range radars in the Eastern Arctic, Labrador and Baffin Island, was completed in November 1988. The first OTH-B radar, on the east coast of the United States, began to be tested in mid-1988 and is due to be operational by 1991. The west coast site is under construction, while planning and design continues on the mid-west and northern sites. Design of the thirty-nine short-range NWS radars of Phase II of the NWS is complete, and construction of this system is scheduled to begin in 1990. Installation of the first radar is to take place in 1991, with the entire system to be completed a year later than planned, by late 1993.

As revealed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada has also agreed to participate in the United States' Air Defense Initiative (ADI). This is currently a relatively small programme (US$250 million spent from 1987 to 1989) concentrating on research into air defence technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection, tracking, and engagement of bombers and cruise missiles, particularly in light of the development of Stealth characteristics. Canada is also pursuing a $50-million research and development programme of its own on space-based surveillance systems for the future. This project began in 1987 and will run for approximately seven years. Current studies aim at determining the feasibility of space-based radar with "look-down" capability for detecting low-flying objects. Canada and the United States are also negotiating an agreement for project definition of a cooperative, space-based surveillance system.

Finally, consideration is being given to the establishment of a Canadian Coastal Radar (CCR) system to complement the NWS and to fill in gaps on the east and west coasts which the OTH-B radars cannot cover. Deployment of this system will probably begin in the early 1990s.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

The Government remains fully committed to its membership in, and support for, NORAD. On 29 November 1988, on the occasion of the completion of phase I of the NWS, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated: "This latest milestone in the North Warning

System project offers Canada and the United States a much improved air defence capability and provides state-of-the-art equipment to assist in the protection of each nation's sovereignty."[1]

One of the few areas in the Department of National Defence left untouched by cuts in the April 1989 budget was the NAADMP programme.
The NDP has long held a policy that it would cancel the NORAD Agreement if elected. This position was reaffirmed in its international security policy paper, *Canada's Stake in Common Security*, released in April 1988. The Liberal Party remains committed to maintaining the agreement.

## *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The NORAD issue was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

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1 Department of National Defence *News Release*, 29 November 1988, p. 1.

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Arctic Sovereignty and Security

*BACKGROUND*

On 5 June 1987 the Government tabled the Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, in the House of Commons. The White Paper was intended to provide a new defence strategy for the Canadian Forces for the ensuing fifteen years. It stated that significant changes had occurred in the international environment since the previous White Paper on National Defence had been released in 1971. However, East-West rivalry remained the predominant feature of international affairs. Accordingly, one of the White Paper's main premises was the need to maintain Canada's support for the West and its contributions to the NATO and NORAD alliances.

The White Paper stated, however, that a "significant commitment-capability gap" existed in the structure of the Canadian Forces, the result of long-term inadequacy in defence spending. The Government decided that through consolidation of some of its commitments--namely Canada's forces earmarked for Europe--and an established long-term funding programme, the gap could be closed.

To accomplish this, the White Paper announced a new method for establishing the defence budget, based on annual increases of two percent real growth with additional funding to be determined in annual Cabinet reviews. The declared purpose was to allow for long-term planning, particularly with major equipment procurement in mind.

The White Paper listed a number of major equipment purchases planned for the fifteen-year period, including new tanks, nuclear-powered submarines, patrol aircraft, and communications systems. Most observers agreed that increases in the budget closer to five percent annual real growth were necessary to implement the procurement programmes.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

The 1989-1990 Canadian budget represented a watershed for the Department of National Defence (DND). The Canadian Government's overall fiscal restraint plan caused the planned budget for DND to be cut back severely. Total planned budgetary expenditures for the Canadian Government in 1989-1990 are $142.90 billion. Of this, it is estimated that $11.34 billion, or 7.94 percent, will be spent by DND. This is an increase of 0.9 percent over the 1988-1989 planned expenditures of $11.24 billion.

The Department's share of the Government's deficit reduction programme for 1989-1990 is $575 million, representing 37.2 percent of the total expenditure restraint measures of $1.545 billion. For 1990-1991, DND's share of the restraint measures is estimated to be $611 million, or 29.4 percent of the $2.079 billion total. Over the next five years, it is expected that a total of $2.7 billion will be saved through cuts to planned defence expenditures.

Much of the savings in the next five years is expected to come from cutbacks in capital acquisitions. This year's budget initiated this process by cancelling plans for Canada to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines (see Major Equipment

Acquisitions, Chapter 17 of *The Guide*). In addition, DND has declared its intention to reduce its operating expenditures by closing seven military bases in Canada, and reducing operations in seven others.[1] Initial DND figures estimate the cost of closing and reducing the bases to be $153.5 million, compared to savings of $3.3 billion over fifteen years. Reductions in the overall size of the Armed Forces have not been ruled out, while the revitalization and restructuring of the Reserves has been slowed down.

Although cuts to 1989-1990 DND programmes, as a result of the budget, have not been allocated definitively, it is estimated that outlays for personnel will be $25 million less than expected, for operations $100 million less, and for capital projects $450 million less.

Personnel costs represent the largest component of the defence budget, at approximately forty-five percent. The next largest component--about twenty-four percent of the estimates--is capital expenditures. Five major equipment acquisition programmes--the Canadian Patrol Frigate (Phases I and II), the Low-level Air Defence system, the Tribal Class Update and Modernization and the Heavy Logistics Vehicle project--account for about sixty percent of capital expenditures.

The first five-year plan of the funding system established in the 1987 White Paper has also been altered. This plan was to provide $1.4 billion for the patrol frigate programme, with $60 million allocated for 1988-1989 and $175 million for 1989-1990. The 1989-1990 Estimates, however, reduced this combined amount of $235 million by $60 million.

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In his Budget Speech, Finance Minister Michael Wilson stated: "The basic parameters of the White Paper remain the defence policy of the government. In the current fiscal context, however, that policy will need to be implemented more slowly."[2] With the Budget's release, however, analysts and Parliamentarians alike questioned the credibility and future of the White Paper. NDP Member Derek Blackburn raised the issue in the House of Commons:

> The Defence White Paper is in disgrace. The Defence Department is without direction. It is time to reassess all our priorities and ensure that our Armed Forces have the opportunity they need to properly serve the country and to protect its sovereignty. We owe it to those in our Armed Forces to produce a new White Paper.[3]

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1 The bases slated for closure include: CFB Sydney, Portage La Prairie, Holberg, Mont Apica, Barrington, Summerside, and London. The bases slated for reduction include: CFB Ottawa (North), Chatham, Penhold, Gander, Winnipeg, Moncton, and North Bay.

2 Michael H. Wilson, *The Budget Speech: Delivered in the House of Commons by the Honourable Michael H. Wilson Minister of Finance, April 27, 1989.* Ottawa: Department of Finance, April 1989, p. 6.

3 *Commons Debates*, 1 May 1989, p. 1127.

The Government continued to maintain that its defence policy was intact. Defence Minister Bill McKnight reiterated Mr. Wilson's sentiment:

> Obviously the goals in the White Paper will be achieved more slowly and, in some cases, less fully. We will keep our present forces in Europe. We will continue to provide the North American defence role in which we have been involved and we will continue to stand ready for peace-keeping missions around the world.[4]

The Defence Minister also declared that the financial means left to DND enabled it to continue modernizing the Canadian Forces: "...even if the rate of progress is slowed, the continued expenditure of over $2 billion annually on capital equipment will continue to rebuild our Canadian forces."[5]

The Government was pressed to explain the overall approach chosen to implement the planned cutbacks. Questions of priorities, where the Government was going to decrease funding, and what effect that would have on DND functions, were raised. Reflecting their Party's support for Canadian withdrawal from the NATO Alliance, members of the NDP felt the Government should reduce its commitment to Europe. In the words of NDP Member Bill Blaikie:

> Instead of working toward saving money by making Canadian troop reductions in Europe in the near future, preferably as part of a negotiated reduction in conventional forces by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Government has chosen to sabotage the economies of many Canadian communities like Portage La Prairie, Manitoba, which stands to be devastated by the elimination of its base.[6]

The Defence Minister maintained that Canada's contributions to peace and security were best made by concentrating on collective security within the Alliance. By closing uneconomical bases, Canada could maintain these commitments and properly equip its forces. In regard to reserves and personnel he stated:

> We will continue to increase our reserves. It will be at a slower rate than identified, but with the commitment to using a total force concept it will be necessary to continue to create reserves around this country.
>
> What has happened is that financial constraint will require us to find some personnel savings so that we have room for other expenditures.... There will be a slight reduction in our civilian and military personnel over the next five years.[7]

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4 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

5 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

6 *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1192.

7 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1584.

The issue receiving the most attention, as a result of the defence budget, was the closing and reduction of bases in Canada. Members from both opposition parties questioned the rationale and need for these measures, especially in regard to the bases in Summerside, PEI and Portage La Prairie, Manitoba. Liberal Member Bob Kaplan raised the issue of whether various alternatives to closing bases in economically needy areas were considered.

It was noted that the closure of CFB Summerside represented a reduction of 3034 jobs, or 5.39 percent of total jobs in PEI.[8]

Members referred to statements in the 1987 Defence White Paper that defence spending was an important method of enhancing regional economic development. In light of these statements, both the fairness and the rationale of the base closures were questioned. In response, Mr. McKnight stated:

> The people who have the ability and the requirement of the service and a commitment to this country, the men and women who serve in the military today...deserve more from the people of Canada than to be located in regions for economic development. What they deserve is the ability as Canadians to share the load in getting the debt down.
>
> By restructuring the military, we hope to be able to bring into proportion the Operations and Maintenance and the personnel in order that we can provide the equipment necessary for the men and women who serve all Canadians.[9]

On another occasion Mr. McKnight explained that many bases in Canada existed because the size of the Canadian Forces used to be larger. As fewer military personnel are now in the Canadian Forces, fewer facilities are needed: "The simple fact is that those bases were opened when they were needed. When they are no longer needed because of changes in technology, resources and priorities, then the need to close them is as apparent as the need was to open them."[10]

Liberal Member Joe McGuire questioned the Government over a commitment made in 1980 by Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne, that each province in Canada would have at least one regular forces base. As CFB Summerside is the only military base in PEI, he asked what had happened to that commitment. Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, replied:

> Most of Canada's fleet of Tracker aircraft operate out of CFB Summerside along with a search and rescue squadron. The Trackers are now over 30 years old. Maintenance has become extremely costly and difficult.
>
> By 1992...these aircraft will need to be re-engined to keep them flying. As well, the fuel they require aircraft will be obsolete.

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8 *Commons Debates*, 16 May 1989, p. 1835.

9 *Commons Debates*, 5 May 1989, p. 1368.

10 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

> For these reasons, along with fiscal restraints, the decision was made to retire the Trackers, which meant that there was no further purpose for CFB Summerside but to close it.[11]

On another point, Liberal Leader John Turner indicated that nine of fourteen base reductions were occurring in ridings held by the Liberal Party. He asked: "Are we supposed to believe that this is a coincidence...? Are Canada's military needs now being based on partisan considerations with no military rationale at all?" Ms. Collins responded: "...those decisions are made on the basis of the advice from the military on how we can meet our defence objectives most effectively with the greatest degree of cost efficiency...."[12]

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12 *Commons Debates*, 15 May 1989, pp. 1720-1721.

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Major Equipment Acquisitions

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

## *BACKGROUND*

The austerity measures instituted by the Canadian Government in the 1989-1990 budget had a significant effect on both planned and ongoing defence equipment acquisition programmes. The need for the Department of National Defence (DND) to reduce planned expenditures by $575 million resulted in the scaling back, rescheduling, postponement, or cancellation of a number of capital projects.

### *Projects Cancelled*

*Nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)*: Perhaps most significant was the decision to cancel the ten to twelve SSNs called for in the 1987 Defence White Paper. The Government's cost estimate for this project was $8 billion, to be spread over twenty-seven years. Two classes of submarines were being considered for the purchase: the British Trafalgar-class SSN, designed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.; and the French Rubis/Amethyste-class SSN, designed by Société de Navigation Atomique (SNA).

The decision on which SSN to purchase was originally set to be made in early 1988. This would have led to the first vessel coming into service in 1996 to begin replacing Canada's three Oberon-class submarines. Analysis is now being undertaken to determine the best possible fleet mix that could be acquired within current budget restrictions. This may include the purchase of conventionally powered diesel electric submarines or possibly a hybrid design submarine.

*Long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA)*: The White Paper commitment to purchase at least six new Aurora LRPA to supplement Canada's current fleet of 18 Auroras was cancelled. This purchase was estimated to cost $450 million. On 30 June 1989, however, Defence Minister McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and maritime surveillance aircraft. These aircraft, to be called "Arcturus," share the same airframe and engines as the Aurora and will supplement the current Aurora fleet's duties. The total cost of the project will be $260 million. The Arcturus differ from the Aurora in that they will not be equipped with submarine-detection equipment. They will have radar and long-range communication capabilities for surveillance, patrol, and search-and-rescue duties.

*Tracker aircraft update*: The planned $300 million upgrading of the nineteen Tracker medium-range patrol aircraft in current service will not go ahead. These planes operate out of Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Summerside in surveillance and search-and-rescue roles. They will be retired by 1992.

*CF-18A aircraft replacement*: The planned acquisition of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18A fighter aircraft to replace those lost through peacetime attrition was cancelled. DND was reportedly looking to purchase the aircraft from Australia to take advantage of its current F-18A production line. The F-18A is no longer produced in the United States, as it has been outdated by the F-18C/D models. Delivery of the last of Canada's original purchase of 138 F-18As took place in September 1988.

*Unmanned airborne surveillance and target acquisition systems*: This project for remotely piloted vehicle technology for land forces was cancelled. Less capable helicopters and ground observers will be used instead.

***Projects scaled back***

*Night observation device--long-range*: The purchase of 197 night surveillance devices, in addition to the 233 already planned, was cancelled.

*CF-5 avionics update*: The planned upgrade of fifty-six CF-5 aircraft to provide the Canadian Forces with a fully effective lead-in trainer for the CF-18 has been reduced. Essential flight safety avionics will be replaced, but head-up display systems will not be added to the aircraft.

*Main battle tanks*: White Paper plans to acquire up to 250 tanks were scaled back and delayed. Only those tanks currently in Europe, fifty-nine Leopard C1s, will now be replaced. Moreover, the project is on hold pending a decision to proceed with project definition at a later date. The main contenders for the tank replacement programme, originally estimated to cost $2.4 billion, include the American M1A1, the German Leopard II, the British Challenger II, the French LeClerc and the Italian Ariete C1. Procurement of the new tanks was to have begun in about three years.

*Northern terrain vehicles*: A planned total of 820 new northern terrain vehicles for both NATO and northern territorial defence use, announced in mid-July 1988, was reduced to approximately 400. The project was originally to cost $420 million and to last from 1988-1998. Implementation of this project now will not occur before 1995-1996. The northern terrain vehicles--Hagglunds BV 206--are to be built by Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary in a joint venture with Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden.

*Electronic support and training systems*: The planned number of new Challenger aircraft outfitted with systems for electronic warfare training was reduced from seven to a maximum of three.

*Tactical command, control, and communications system (TCCCS)*: Plans to replace both combat radios and area communication systems were scaled back to include only radios and only for forces committed to the NATO European theatre. The project, announced 15 September 1988, was originally to cost $81.7 million for project definition over its first five years. It was divided into three phases, including: radio systems, area communications systems, and automation systems. The radio system phase was estimated to cost $1.3 billion for the purchase of 18,000 portable and vehicle radios. About thirty percent of the new radios were supposed to be assigned to the militia. The entire project, estimated to cost $2.3 billion, was to be implemented over fifteen years. The contract for the radios is expected to be awarded in 1991.

***Projects Rescheduled***

*Militia light armoured vehicles (LAVs)*: The project to acquire approximately 199 LAVs and twenty-two tracked vehicles for the militia has been delayed. Acquisition will not begin before FY 1990-1991.

***Other***

A number of other equipment acquisition programmes have been put on hold, as well, including the $670 million light observation helicopter project--to replace Canada's current force of sixty-six CH-136 Kiowa helicopters--and the ERYX short-range anti-armour weapon programme, which was to cost approximately $200 million over the next ten years.

***Continuing Projects***

The Government stated it will go ahead with purchases of Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs), shipborne aircraft to replace Sea-King helicopters, the Tribal [class destroyers] Update and Modernization Programme (TRUMP), patrol frigates, and its North American Aerospace Defence Modernization Programme (NAADMP). The Air Defence Anti-Tank system (ADATs) and the heavy logistics vehicle purchase are also being implemented as planned.

*Mine counter-measures vessels*: A programme to acquire twelve MCM vessels to be operated by the Reserves is underway. Total cost of the project is expected to be approximately $750 million. Construction is to begin in 1992, with initial delivery about one year later. All twelve ships are expected to be completed by 1998. Currently, project definition is taking place. In June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight selected two prime contractors, Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. of St. Catherines and Fenco Engineers Inc.of Toronto, to conduct a one-year competitive contract definition for the vessels' construction. Each contractor received $4.5 million. The ships will provide patrol and surveillance capabilities in addition to their mine counter-measure function.

*Shipborne aircraft*: In August 1986, the Government granted approval for DND to enter into the project definition stage for a new shipborne aircraft (NSA). The NSA would replace Canada's current fleet of thirty-five Sea King helicopters, which entered service in 1963. Two helicopters were in contention for the project: the Anglo-Italian EH-101, and the French Aerospatiale As-332 Super Puma. On 5 August 1987, DND announced its choice of the EH-101 helicopter. The project definition phase is now proceeding. This involves settling contractual arrangements and determining whether or not the helicopter can meet Canadian requirements. Between twenty-eight and forty-five aircraft are to be purchased, at an estimated cost of $2.5 to 3.0 billion.

E.H. Industries (Canada) Inc. is owned jointly by Westland Helicopter of Britain and the Agusta Group of Italy. A team formed by EHI consisting of Bell Helicopter Textron of Mirabel, Quebec, Paramax Electronics and Canadian Marconi of Montreal, IMP Group of Halifax, and Sikorsky Aircraft of Stratford, Connecticut is handling the project. The NSA's primary functions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship surveillance and targeting. Its secondary roles consist of search-and-rescue, medical evacuation, troop transport and communications.

Only about one-quarter of the cost of the project is destined for the actual aircraft and its engines. The remaining three-quarters of the cost are earmarked for mission suite avionics, logistics support, training, and project management, etc.. EHI was supposed to have completed project definition, including its choice of engines the Canadian EH-101 would carry, by April 1989. It was unable to meet this deadline, however. Initial delivery of the aircraft was planned for 1994, though this may now be pushed back.

*Tribal Update Modernization Programme*: TRUMP, announced prior to the 1987 White Paper, consists of a mid-life update for Canada's four DDH 280 destroyers, which entered service in 1972-1973. The destroyers will receive new command, control, communication, and combat systems. The new combat systems will provide defence against air and anti-ship missile attack as well as the ability to defend other ships. The total estimated cost of the TRUMP is $1.7 billion. Work on the first destroyer, the HMCS Algonquin, began in November 1987 and is scheduled for completion by spring 1990. The modernization of the HMCS Iroquois is well underway and is expected to be completed by fall 1990. The completion date has been extended to the high end of the eighteen to twenty-five-month range envisaged by DND for the Iroquois. This work is being done by Marine Industries Limited (MIL) of Montreal at their Davie Shipyard in Lauzon, Quebec. In Spring 1989, Litton Systems Canada Ltd., the prime contractor, awarded the sub-contract for modernizing the second batch of two ships, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Huron, to the MIL Davie Shipyard. These modernizations are to be completed by fall 1991 and late summer 1992, respectively.

*Patrol frigates*: The Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programme was initiated in 1983 for the procurement of six ships. Total estimated cost of the programme, including a second batch of six additional ships ordered in December 1987, is $8 billion. St. John Shipbuilding Limited and Marine Industries Ltd. of Montreal are building three frigates each (HMCS Halifax, Vancouver, Toronto and Ville de Québec, Regina, and Calgary, respectively) in the first batch. The first of the new ships, HMCS Halifax, was launched in May 1988. Work began on the second, third and fourth ships, the HMCS Ville de Québec, HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Toronto in May 1987, December 1987, and January 1988, respectively. Final delivery schedules for the six ships has slipped, resulting in a delivery date for the HMCS Halifax in spring 1990, a full year behind the schedule specified in the original 1983 contract. Delivery dates for the remaining five ships stand as follows:

2nd ship--September 1990
3rd ship--April 1991
4th ship--April 1991
5th ship--October 1991
6th ship--April 1992

Whereas the first frigate contract was split between two companies, St. John Shipbuilding was awarded the contract to build the entire second batch of frigates. These ships should all enter service by 1996. Possible design changes, including a lengthening of the second batch of frigates by ten metres, are being considered. DND has officially denied reports that the new frigates will be unstable owing to increases in weight that were not taken into account in the original design.

*Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system*: On 16 April 1986, DND announced the awarding of the contract for a Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system for the Canadian Forces. The Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium received the contract of $1.14 billion to provide the Canadian Forces with thirty-six Air Defence/Anti-Tank Systems (ADATS) and twenty 35-mm twin guns with ten accompanying fire-control units. The Air Defence/Anti Tank Systems will be deployed at bases in Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, West Germany, as well as with the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, whose current role is to be ready for deployment in Norway in the event of crisis (this obligation is scheduled to cease 30 November 1989, at which time the CAST will be assigned to the defence of the European Central Front). Initial delivery of the twin guns to the Canadian Army in

Europe began in October 1988. The first ADATS were delivered in October 1988 and will arrive in Europe in fall 1989. The ADATS system is being manufactured in St. Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec, and is scheduled for completion in 1991.

*Heavy logistics vehicle*: Although a programme for the CAF to acquire a replacement for its heavy truck fleet began in 1983, the White Paper's reference to the current shortfall in logistic support added greater impetus to awarding a contract. On 5 February 1987, the then Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick announced that the team of Urban Transportation Development Corp. (UTDC) Inc. of Kingston, Ontario (eighty-five percent owned by Lavalin Industries Ltd.) and Stayr-Daimler-Puch of Austria would fill an order for 1122 heavy trucks. Over $310 million was budgeted for the purchase. The trucks, called the Percheron, will replace the current fleet of 800 five-ton trucks, forty percent of which were acquired between 1953-1963. The remaining sixty percent were built in 1975-1976. The first of the new trucks was delivered to DND in May 1989. A second batch of 1300 trucks was being considered for purchase in the 1990s but this has been put on hold as a result of the latest budget.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Despite the cutbacks noted above, in a speech delivered at ARMX, a defence exhibition held in Ottawa in late May 1989, Defence Minister Bill McKnight maintained that the Defence White Paper "was not dead." He indicated that most procurement projects were under review but the basic parameters were still in effect. Mr. McKnight declared:

> We must sharpen our pencils, rewrite the project further work on our on-going force must find the most productive and efficient ways to now-scarce defence dollars and improve and streamline Departmental procedures.[1]

Canada's commitments to NATO, NORAD, the Reserves, industrial preparedness, and its three coast lines would continue. In reference to naval forces, he stated: "We will proceed with a programme to deploy fixed acoustic sensors in our Arctic waters...." He continued by saying: "The naval staff are currently preparing alternatives to the SSN programme on an urgent basis. SSNs were the best vehicle for the task. We will now proceed to second best, and the Government will decide on a course that will permit the rebuilding of the navy into an effective force."[2]

Before the Special Committeee of the Senate on National Defence on 16 May 1989, the then Vice Chief of Defence Staff Lt. General John de Chastelain described the Army's situation in the wake of the new budget. He stated:

> In large part the decision to place army projects on by circumstance--the capital contracted naval projects as well as the balance of almost completed army ones like the low-level air defence, the heavy trucks and ammunition.[3]

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2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 Senate, *Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence*, Issue no. 3 (16 May 1989), p. 3:8.

He explained that the total amount budgeted for Army projects over the next fifteen years was approximately $18 billion. Of this total, approximately one-third would proceed, one-third was cancelled, and one-third was on hold. Twelve Army projects were proceeding, about thirty-five were delayed from one to four years, eleven are on hold, and ten were cancelled. In regard to the projects on hold, he stated: "All of these on hold projects have been de-scoped or reduced from the original full division requirement to the requirement to meet the readiness needs of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group [in Europe] alone."[4]

In announcing the procurement of mine counter-measures vessels, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty explained: "Above all, the project addresses a critical weakness in Canada's state of defence preparedness. We have taken an important step toward ensuring that we can protect our ports and coastal waters. In the process, we enhance our sovereignty and security, for current and future generations."[5] Mr. Beatty also explained the role the Reserves would play in future coastal defence activities.

The role of the Reserves also figured prominently in the announcements made for the northern terrain vehicles and the TCCCS.

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In the House of Commons, Liberal defence critic William Rompkey raised the issue of the equipment reductions resulting from the budget cuts. He referred to a statement made by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in May 1988 in Lahr, West Germany, that the Government would refit the Armed Forces, and went on:

> ...the Government has reneged on its commitment to increase Canadian land forces in Germany and supply them with tanks. How can the Minister square the statement of the Prime Minister made in Germany one year ago with the decisions taken in the last two weeks?

Mr. McKnight responded by saying that 2000 troops had been added since the last Liberal Government was in office and that more troops would be added this summer.[6]

Following the announcement of the plan to purchase northern terrain vehicles, former Liberal critic for National Defence Len Hopkins criticized the Government for allegedly pursuing an improper contract bidding procedure. He asked why companies other than Canadian Foremost Ltd. were not allowed to bid on the contract and why no tender was sought. The then Defence Minister Beatty responded by saying that Canada already had over 100 of these vehicles, making compatibility a concern, and that no other existing vehicle was available that met Canada's requirements. Mr. Hopkins pursued the issue by questioning the cost of the vehicles and suggesting that greater fairness in the tendering system would lead to better prices.

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4 Senate, *supra* note 3, p. 3:9.

5 Department of National Defence, *News Release* AFN: 70/88 (25 July 1988), p. 3.

6 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1601.

Mr. Beatty replied:

> The Honourable Member is incorrect when he suggests there has been a tripling of the costs of these vehicles. The average cost of the vehicles purchased by the Department of National Defence was $140,000 in 1984 dollars. The vehicles we are contracting for now in 1988-89 dollars are about $170,000 a piece. The difference is the difference in exchange rates and inflation during that period. This is a very good deal for the taxpayers of Canada.[7]

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

*BACKGROUND*

With the release of the White Paper on national defence in June 1987, renewed attention was drawn to the issue of Canada's defence industry. Prior to both the First and Second World Wars, this sector was not a major contributor to the economy. As Canada entered each war, however, the need to provide equipment and supplies for its armed forces was met through massive mobilization of Canadian industry for production of war materials.

In the early stages of World War Two, Canada and the United States recognized the need to combine their defence industry efforts in order to increase efficiency in production, and, thus, their ability to support the war effort and protect North America. Two agreements, the Ogdensburg Declaration (1940), which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), and the Hyde Park Declaration (1941), created the foundation for defence cooperation between the two countries. The PJBD was to administer the needs of an integrated continental defence of North America. The PJBD, on which Canada and the United States are equally represented, still exists today as a formal institution to oversee Canadian and US continental defence interests.

The interdependent nature of North American defence and the recognition that each nation's industry should concentrate on producing articles it was best able to provide, were fundamental principles agreed to in the above arrangements. Following the World War II, Canada and the United States maintained and enhanced these arrangements.

In 1959 the Defence Development and the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DD/DPSA) were agreed to, creating improved market access for Canadian defence industries in the United States. Through signing the DD/DPSA, Canada recognized that its own defence market was too small to be able to support a defence industrial base for major weapon systems of its own. The agreements provided a means by which Canada could take advantage of its ally's large-scale defence production. By reducing barriers to the US defence market, Canadian industries became specialized and more secure secondary sources of defence materials and products.

Apart from these general agreements, over 200 bilateral defence and cooperative research and development arrangements exist between the two nations. Between 1959 and 1987, the total value of defence exports to the United States was $13.490 billion, while the value of imports from the United States was $16.422 billion.

In 1984 work began in Canada on an inter-departmental Defence Industrial Base Review involving the Departments of National Defence, Supply and Services, Regional Industrial Expansion, and External Affairs. The purpose of the Review was to determine current Canadian industrial capabilities to provide for Canadian defence needs under varying conditions of mobilization and to make recommendations addressing any deficiencies.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985 between Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan, continental defence industrial cooperation was again given

prominence. The leaders pledged to work toward reducing barriers that existed in the North American defence market, improve the North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB), and focus on industrial preparedness planning.

In May 1985 the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force was created to examine the issue and provide recommendations on the state of the defence industry in Canada and North America. The Task Force completed its study in November 1987. It recommended, among other things, that Canada include industrial preparedness planning in DND's equipment acquisition and life-cycle management processes; that defence dollars be put into industrial preparedness measures, as opposed to stockpiling of materiel which is more expensive; and that defence preparedness be viewed on a continental basis.

As a direct result of these initiatives, in March 1987 Canada and the United States signed a Letter of Guidance for the Charter of a North American Defence Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO). The purpose of NADIBO is to define ways to more effectively ensure complementary industrial support for North American security requirements. Much of its focus is to carry out peacetime industrial planning to ensure an adequate supply of equipment for the armed forces and sustenance of supply in times of crisis or war.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In the Defence White Paper the defence industrial base was given considerable attention. The White Paper declared the importance of maintaining and enhancing the defence industry in Canada as essential to support of both the Canadian Forces and those of our allies. It cited the need for Canada to cooperate with its allies, particularly the United States, in acquiring defence equipment and pursuing military research and development. It stated that the Government would pay greater attention to the long-term industrial implications of equipment purchases. The White Paper also noted the Government's intention to continue emphasizing industrial preparedness measures "to enhance the responsiveness of the defence industrial base."[1]

Following the White Paper, a Defence Industrial Preparedness Advisory Committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the business community, banking, and universities. The Committee has consulted with the Minister of National Defence to generate proposals for strengthening industrial preparedness.

Canada has also signed nine Research, Development and Production Agreements with European nations, beginning with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 and now including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Belgium. Other defence industrial arrangements involving Canada also exist through the NATO Alliance.

By most measurements, the Canadian defence industry is relatively modest. Defence production accounts for less than one percent of Canada's gross national product and defence industries employ only 80,000 or 90,000 persons, or less than one percent of the workforce. The defence-industrial base is highly specialized with aerospace, electronics,

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1 Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, June 1987, p. 75.

communications, vehicles, and shipbuilding representing its primary areas of concentration. Recent efforts on the part of the Canadian Government and industry have served to enhance the industrial base in the areas of naval design, naval electronics, military pattern vehicles, small arms, light and medium helicopters, and engines. These efforts include, for example, focussing on procurement programmes, on industry, and on the establishment of new manufacturing facilities.

Approximately eighty percent of the Canadian defence industry's production is exported. As a result, the impact on the defence industry of the 1989-1990 Canadian defence budget cuts is expected to be relatively small.

## *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no comment in the House of Commons on the issue of the Canadian defence industrial base during this reporting period.

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## 19. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

*BACKGROUND*

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

> It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.[1]

In the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Allies set up machinery for collective defence, and extended membership to include Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. By the mid-1950s they were facing a more varied Soviet challenge and recognized that progress on European and other issues required efforts to strengthen Western unity, solidarity and cooperation. A committee of "Three Wise Men", established in 1956, recommended ways of improving political consultation and led to improvements which helped NATO to face up to the difficulties and opportunities of the following decade: Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the question of the control of nuclear weapons, and negotiations on arms control focussing on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation.

In 1967, faced with a changing strategic situation, NATO carried out a review of its policies and issued a report entitled: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report indicated that the basic policy of NATO is to pursue the two objectives of defence and detente, and stated that the aim of all member countries is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

The record of East-West relations over the last twenty years has been a mixed one. Nonetheless, NATO has continued to pursue better relations with the East whenever that was possible. In the early 1970s it supported negotiation of the SALT I Treaty, the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and the launching of negotiations on European security and conventional force reductions. A period of stagnation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and the imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s has recently given way to renewed hopes for improvements focussing on the INF Treaty, new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, and progress on other arms control issues.

At the same time, NATO has continued to give attention to the requirements of Western cohesion and defence. The Atlantic Declaration of 1974 reaffirmed the commitment of all members to the Treaty and clarified further their responsibilities in such

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1 NATO Information Service, *NATO and Warsaw Pact Comparisons*. Brussels, 1984, p. 1.

fields as political consultation. Defence improvements and force modernization programmes have also continued, together with work on defence planning, infrastructures, communications, crisis management procedures and similar tasks.

Increasingly significant has been the question of modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Over the past decade, successive NATO decisions have led to quantitative reductions in the Alliance's theatre nuclear capabilities. Not only have about 2400 short-range systems been eliminated, but, under the 1987 INF Treaty, a significant portion of NATO's medium-range capabilities as well. The desire to maintain a credible deterrent against Warsaw Pact forces, however, led to an Allied consensus that such reductions proceed in tandem with a commitment to modernize NATO's remaining short-range nuclear systems. This principle was asserted in 1983 at a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello, Canada, and has been reaffirmed ever since in successive NATO communiqués. Modernization plans include replacing 88 Lance missiles currently deployed in Europe with an improved version. The question of follow-on systems will be dealt with by the Alliance in 1992.

Allied enthusiasm for modernization has varied, however. The United States and Britain have strongly endorsed such plans, contending that modernization of SNF is necessary to offset Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces and thus to ensure a credible NATO deterrent. Other Allies, particularly West Germany, have expressed unease with such plans on the grounds that an overwhelming proportion of the weapons involved are stationed on their territory and thus place their homelands at risk.

In April 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for a postponement of a final decision on deployment of a follow-on to the Lance missile until after the West German elections in 1990, together with immediate negotiations on SNF. The United States and Britain, both favouring an early commitment to modernization and preferring to leave questions of SNF negotiation for the indefinite future, opposed the proposal. The Allied impasse was exacerbated by Moscow's arms control initiatives. On 12 May 1989, in an effort to increase momentum towards the removal of all theatre nuclear systems, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced the unilateral withdrawal of 500 short-range nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe.

In the weeks that followed, inter-allied bargaining resulted in some movement toward a compromise. By the beginning of the NATO Summit in Brussels, on 29 to 30 May 1989, Washington had acquiesced to Bonn's desire to postpone a final decision on the deployment of a follow-on to Lance, and had also put forth a plan to begin discussions with Moscow on short-range nuclear systems. However, questions of when negotiations would commence, the extent of the reductions envisaged, and when the Alliance would reaffirm the need for developing a follow-on to Lance, remained unresolved.[2]

On 29 May 1989, the opening day of the Summit, US President George Bush presented a four-point plan calling for a first agreement on force reductions at the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) within six months to a year, and complete implementation of such an accord by 1993. Allied compromise on SNF soon followed. Contained in a report adopted by the NATO Heads of Government, the consensus position asserted a willingness to hold negotiations with Moscow for "partial"

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2 "Compromise on Missiles Heads Off NATO Rift." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 5 (June-July 1989), p. 22.

reductions of SNF once cuts in CFE began. Actual reductions of short-range forces, however, would begin only after an accord had been fully implemented. As for Lance modernization, the Allies reasserted that nuclear forces should be "kept up to date," and added that the issue of a follow-on to Lance would be dealt with in 1992, in light of "overall security developments."[3]

On 6 July 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet short-range missiles would be reduced "without delay" if NATO agreed to negotiations on such systems. While the Soviet proposal seemed designed to force a reconsideration of the position adopted at the NATO Summit (i.e., that SNF negotiation could proceed only after a CFE accord), the Allied position remained unchanged.

*NATO Decision-making*

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in the Alliance. Composed of representatives of the sixteen member countries, it meets at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors). Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and so on, are held twice a year or more, while the Council in permanent session meets once a week or as often as required. Special meetings of Heads of Government are also held at particularly important junctures in Alliance affairs.

Under the Council, there is a range of committees and commands, such as the Political Committee, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Atlantic. The Secretary-General of NATO is the civilian head of the organization, chairing the Council and such other key bodies as the Nuclear Planning Group.

*Canada's Commitment*

At present, Canada's military commitments to NATO consist of:

- a mechanized brigade group of about 4200 men, stationed in Lahr, West Germany;
- three squadrons of tactical fighter aircraft plus related maintenance and headquarters elements with one Canadian Air Division at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- other headquarters and support elements in Lahr;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group, based in Canada and committed to reinforcing northern Norway when required in time of crisis;
- two Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons, previously committed to Norway and now slotted for the central front;
- a battalion group committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)), and a fighter squadron committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) (AMF(A)), for deployment to NATO's Northern Region. (Both the battalion group and the fighter squadron are stationed in Canada. The latter is one of the two squadrons also committed to the central front);

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3 *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 27.

- other land, air and maritime forces stationed in Canada and designated to contribute to the Allied defence of North America, to assist in the Allied naval defence of the North Atlantic and other waters, and to provide reinforcements for Europe in time of crisis or war.

The Defence White Paper of June 1987 announced the Government's intention to relinquish its CAST commitment to northern Norway and assign the brigade to a role in West Germany instead. The CAST commitment to northern Norway officially ends on 30 November 1989. On 24 June 1988, the creation of a composite NATO force to replace it was announced at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Contributing to the force are the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. Canada's contribution consists of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, based in London, Ontario--an infantry unit of about 1200 personnel.[4] Previously slotted for the defence of either Norway or Denmark, it is now committed exclusively to northern Norway. In turn, Belgium has replaced Canada in the role the latter previously filled in defence of Denmark.

The two squadrons of Rapid Reinforcement fighters which Canada had assigned to the defence of northern Norway have recently been shifted to southern Germany. These squadrons are presently being converted from CF-5 to CF-18 aircraft. The first became earmarked for deployment on the central front on 1 June 1988, and the second on 1 June 1989. Both are based in Canada, but intended to reinforce Canadian forces in Germany in time of crisis.[5]

In 1986, the last of the new assignment of CF-18 fighters were deployed to the Canadian Air Group in West Germany, replacing aging CF-104 aircraft. Following through on a commitment made in 1985, Canada has increased its forces in Europe by about 2400. Currently, a total of about 7900 Canadian Armed Forces personnel are stationed there.

*Training Facilities*

Canada also provides training facilities for NATO forces on its territory. Shilo, Manitoba is used by West German troops for tank training, while the British Army employs facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British, Dutch and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying.

Since 1984, Goose Bay has been under consideration as a possible site for NATO's new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). A site at Konya, Turkey, was recommended by NATO officials in September 1986, but Canadian officials were successful in convincing NATO to postpone a final decision until a more in-depth analysis could be carried out. The Canadian Government is currently spending $93 million to expand the Goose Bay facility.[6] A detached operating base, designed by Air Command and completed at a cost of $9 million, became operational in fall 1988. Also last fall, the NATO Fighter Training Centre Team conducted a resurvey of the base to update and

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4 Department of National Defence, *News Release* 65/88, 24 June 1988.

5 Department of National Defence, *Defence Update: 1988-89*, March 1988, p. 14.

6 *Commons Debates*, 1 March 1988, p. 13265.

refine its data for making a decision on the Centre's location.[7] NATO's Defense Planning Committee is expected to recommend a location for the base at its next meeting in November 1989, or at the following meeting in May 1990.[8]

The effects of low-level flying exercises on the environment and the lives of native peoples in the Goose Bay area have prompted considerable concern. During fall 1988, more than 200 Innu Indians were arrested while engaging in peaceful demonstrations protesting the low-level flights.[9] Fuelling their objections to the overflights has been their claim to a large area of Labrador based on history and tradition, as no treaty has ever been signed with the Federal Government regarding the territory.

This claim was bolstered on 17 April 1988 when a Labrador judge dismissed public mischief charges against four Innu arrested during a protest at the Goose Bay base, on grounds that their behaviour indicated a "genuine belief" that the air base land belonged to them. The judge observed that "(t)hrough their knowledge of ancestry and kinship, (the defendants) ha(d) shown that none of their people ever gave away rights to the land, to Canada."[10] The government of Newfoundland has launched an appeal of the decision, to be heard in St. John's on 3 October 1989.[11] The controversy has been compounded by the fact that the base constitutes the heart of the Goose Bay area's economy, currently employing about 1000 civilian and military personnel, with increases expected throughout 1989.[12]

At present, a Federal Environmental Review Committee is conducting a study of the impact of low-level flights and the proposed NATO base, but fears have been expressed that it will not be completed until after NATO's decision. Currently, military training at Goose Bay involves about 7000 low-level flights annually.[13] Given a favorable NATO decision on the base, the frequency of such flights would increase to about 40,000 per year.[14]

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7 Department of National Defence, *Defence 1988*, January 1989, pp. 52-53.

8 "NATO Base Environment Study Faces Time Crunch." *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 July 1989, p. A4.

9 Terry Gavin, "Natives Battle NATO." *Vancouver Sun*, 16 November 1988, p. C6.

10 Michelle Lalonde, "Innu Vow to Step Up Court Fights, Protests Against Military Flying." Globe and Mail, 17 April 1989, p. A7.

11 *Ibid*..

12 "Dispute Between Natives and Military Over Jets Defies Solution." *Montreal Gazette*, 13 October 1988, p. B1.

13 "NATO Base Environment Study Faces Time Crunch." *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 July 1989, p. A4.

14 "Labrador's Innu and the Jets of NATO." *Globe and Mail*, 25 April 1989, p. A9.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 31 October 1988, in a speech at McMaster University, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark outlined the rationale for Canadian membership in NATO:

> We are in NATO because a strong North Atlantic alliance serves the best interests of Canada. Obviously, the world has changed enormously since that western alliance was first put into place. But many of the conditions which led to the creation of NATO are the same today as they were in 1949. Europe is still divided between societies that are free and societies that are not. Canada is still vitally interested in protecting freedom, and advancing it, in Europe. The alliance across the Atlantic is still a powerful instrument to resist American instincts to isolation, and to encourage American co-operation within Europe, and co-operation by Europe with North America.... One thing that has changed is the direct threat to Canada is more terrible now, with strategic missiles. We are in the path between the superpowers. Changing our policy does not change our geography and, since we can't wish missiles away, we owe it to our own safety to maintain institutions which control them, or which bring their numbers down.[15]

The Minister added that, given Canada's immense landmass and its location, any attempt to defend and protect it, independent of others, would entail unbearable financial costs.[16]

In December 1988, a report on "burden-sharing" by NATO's Defence Planning Committee identified the percentage of gross domestic product Canada devoted to defence--2.17 percent--as being among the lowest in the Alliance.[17] Although the document also praised Canada's planned improvements in its NATO commitments as outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper, and acknowledged its financial contributions as being among the highest in NATO, it cited Canada as one ally that should contribute more to the common defence.

The then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty acknowledged that the report was generally accurate regarding Canada's role in NATO. However, he added that the European Allies should be more sensitive to Canada's defence activities in North America. "NATO," Mr. Beatty stated, "...tends to measure what you do in Europe. Our position is that you should see the integrated whole.... NATO is a transatlantic alliance."[18] Additional comment on the NATO report came from Robert Fowler, the then Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in the Department of National Defence. While Mr. Fowler conceded

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15 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (31 October 1988), p. 3.

16 *Ibid.*.

17 See:*Enhancing Alliance Security: Shared Risks and Responsibilities Within the Alliance; A Report by NATO's Defence Planning Committee*. December 1988.

18 "Beatty: NATO Doesn't Grasp How Much Canada Gives." *Montreal Gazette*, 2 December 1988, p. A7.

that "Canada is at the bottom of the heap in terms of manpower," he noted that the size of the Canadian Forces had actually increased from 75,000 in 1975 to a current total of 87,000.[19]

On 4 April 1989, Joe Clark, Perrin Beatty and Associate Minister of Defence Mary Collins marked NATO's fortieth anniversary by praising the Alliance's contribution to world peace and the importance of Canada's role within it.[20] Later that month, however, the Government's new budget called for the postponement, rescheduling, or outright cancellation of a number of programmes to improve the Canadian Forces in Europe. Plans to purchase 13-28 CF-18 jet fighters were cancelled. The planned purchase of 250 main battle tanks was reduced in scope, and the project was put on hold. The acquisition of some 199 wheeled light armoured vehicles was put on hold until at least 1990-1991, while the planned purchase of 820 Northern terrain vehicles was cut by over fifty percent (to 400) and is expected to be delayed until at least 1995-1996.

The full impact of the budget on Canada's NATO commitments is still somewhat unclear. In the budget's aftermath, there was speculation that the Government would cancel plans for a "division-sized force" in Central Europe during a crisis.[21] In May 1989, however, both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Defence Minister Bill McKnight were reported to have insisted that the commitment to field a 10,000-strong division in West Germany remained steadfast.[22] Nevertheless, on 24 May 1989 the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General John de Chastelain, noted that while such plans were "still in place, the previous plan to equip the division and indeed reinforce it over the years, was not."[23] General de Chastelain's remarks echoed more detailed testimony he gave eight days earlier to the Special Senate Committee on National Defence. At that time, he observed:

> It had been planned that these forces, as presently equipped (i. e., 4 CMBG, 5eGBC and divisional headquarters), would be jointly tasked for operations in southern Germany with effect 1 December, that their re-equipment would take place over a period of years. That plan has had to be modified. Because of budget cuts, the acquisition of much new equipment for the division is no longer possible. But the intention to change 5eGBC's fly-over role from Norway to Germany... will nonetheless proceed. There, it, along with the resources of

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19 Paul Koring, "Very Few Standing on Guard For Thee, NATO Figures Show." *Globe and Mail*, 1 December 1988, p. A14.

20 Department of National Defence, *News Release* (4 April 1989), and Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (4 April 1989).

21 See, for instance, "1st Division Commitment to NATO Cancelled." *Canadian Defence Update*, vol.3 no.4 (May 1989), pp. 1 and 8.

22 James Bagnall "Cuts Cloud Canadian Role in NATO." *Financial Post*, 29 May 1989, p. 5.

23 "1st Canadian Division Back On." *The Wednesday Report*, vol. 3 no. 21 (24 May 1989), pp. 2-3.

the in-place 4 CMBG, plus the divisional headquarters in Kingston, will be joined to form the combined forces which has already been agreed to with NATO.[24]

Negotiations are currently underway to provide Canadian forces with a small logistics base in Europe. Canada is also consulting with the Federal Republic of Germany to expand facilities used by Canadian forces, and to assure their adequate support in wartime.[25]

In April and May 1989, Canada played an active role in resolving the Alliance dispute over SNF. In the weeks leading up to the NATO Summit, Canadian officials pressed their US, British, and West German counterparts to accept a compromise supporting the principle of negotiations on the one hand, and modernization of a follow-on to the Lance missile on the other. Canada worked for acceptance of the concept of "partial" reductions, so as to foreclose a de-nuclearization of Europe--a major concern in Washington and elsewhere. According to one press report, the Canadian proposal called for negotiated reductions that would not exceed the minimum number of missiles required to offset the superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces.[26]

Canadian efforts to help effect a compromise continued during the Summit itself. Speaking at a news conference on 31 May 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney credited External Affairs Minister Clark with having played a "key role" in the negotiations leading to the agreed NATO reference to the "partial" reduction of short-range nuclear forces. He observed that although the drafting of the final document had proven difficult, the terms of the compromise "came from Mr. Clark's pen."[27]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 4 April 1989, the fortieth anniversary of NATO, External Affairs Minister Clark paid tribute to the Alliance in a speech to the House. Mr. Clark acknowledged NATO as a "cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy" and praised it for providing forty years of uninterrupted peace.[28] That peace, he continued, was made possible through the Alliance's persistent commitment to the pursuit of adequate defences to deter aggression, the control and limitation of armaments, carefully negotiated and verifiable agreements, and the constant promotion of dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe.[29]

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24 Special Senate Committee on National Defence, *Proceedings*, 16 May 1989, p. 10.

25 Department of National Defence, *Defence Update: 1988-89*, March 1988, p. 15.

26 Paul Koring, "Clark Offers Compromise To End NATO Missile Stalemate." *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1989, pp. A1, A11.

27 Patrick Doyle, "Clark Credited with NATO Breakthrough." *Toronto Star*, 31 May 1989, p. A1.

28 *Commons Debates*, 4 April 1989, p. 7.

29 *Ibid.*.

Mr. Clark concluded by stating:

> Canada has many means to influence peace in the world. One of these, which has worked for over 40 years, and is essential to continued progress in East-West relations, is the NATO alliance.... NATO has been good for Europe, good for North America and good for Canada. This Government is committed to ensuring that Canada continues to play a full and leading role in NATO in helping shape a new era in East-West relations.[30]

NDP Member Bill Blaikie followed Mr. Clark by acknowledging that NATO did indeed represent the "cornerstone" of Canadian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Alliance and some of the values its members had been asked to share, were, in his words, "arguably ambiguous, in other cases hypocritical and in some cases, morally questionable."[31] Mr. Blaikie maintained that progress in areas such as arms control derived primarily from the superpowers, with NATO acting as "a kind of spectator" and a "kind of lobby" for arms build-up. He also criticized Canada for being "far too much of a spectator with respect to NATO in particular and world events in general." For example, Mr. Blaikie complained of a lack of active participation by Canada in the ongoing debate within the Alliance over the modernization of nuclear weapons.[32] He concluded:

> The notion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, I think all of us hope, is a notion that belongs more to history than to the future. We hope that events in the Soviet Union and events in the West are leading to a time when the disengagement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, when the Manichaean world of two alliances contending with each other for the possible destruction of the world, will be a thing of the past. Canada does have a role to play. It is a role that this Government is not playing. If it should choose to live up to that role, it would receive much better comment from this corner of the House.[33]

On 19 April 1989, Mr. Blaikie raised the issue of low-level training flights of NATO military aircraft over Canadian territory. Noting recent protests by the Innu people regarding such flights and their disruption of their way of life, Mr. Blaikie called upon the Government to inform NATO that low-level flight testing was no longer acceptable in Canada.[34] Prime Minister Mulroney replied that such issues would be resolved by using proper channels.[35]

Returning to the issue of low-level flight testing the next day, Mr. Blaikie asked the Prime Minister for clarification of how the question of testing would be resolved and

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30 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

32 *Ibid.*.

33 *Ibid.*.

34 *Commons Debates*, 19 April 1989, p. 689.

35 *Ibid.*.

whether the forum chosen would address the concerns and allow the participation of the Innu people.[36] Associate Minister for National Defence Mary Collins replied:

> ...low-level flying has been taking place for over 25 years in the Goose Bay area. In 1986, my predecessor established in conjunction with the Federal Minister of the Environment, a federal environmental review process. This is a process by which we can determine the facts, the facts of what the environmental and social and economic implications of low-level flying may be in that area. That process is ongoing. The environmental impact statement is being prepared.[37]

Ms. Collins went on to point out that the Innu had submitted their views and their understanding of the environmental impact statement to the government, and that hearings would proceed in the fall of 1989. Such hearings, she added, would provide the forum for full discussion and rational decision-making on the issue.[38]

On 1 May 1989, Liberal Member Warren Allmand raised the subject of the NATO debate over SNF, telling the House:

> Canada must support West Germany in its attempt to reduce short range nuclear missiles in Europe. In this respect Canada must join with other NATO allies to convince the United States and Britain that this is the best option for peace and stability. To pursue modernization of these weapons, which was targeted for the mid-1990s, will jeopardize seriously the prospect for successful arms reduction in Europe, and undermine the possibilities for phasing out the cold war.[39]

The next day, NDP Member Bill Blaikie observed that there was growing support for the German position favouring negotiations on SNF instead of the modernization supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. Noting that there was little indication of Canadian involvement in the debate, Mr. Blaikie asked External Affairs Minister Clark whether Canada was in fact prepared to support the German position.[40] Mr. Clark replied:

> There is an agreement supported by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and all the Government heads of NATO that we should proceed with modernization. The question before NATO now is one as to the timing and balance between modernization and negotiation. The Government has been involved in

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36 *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, p. 736.

37 *Ibid.*.

38 *Ibid.*.

39 *Commons Debates*, 1 May 1989, p. 1125.

40 *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1203.

> discussions and correspondence with other of our allies to work out a way that will allow the alliance to find an agreement enabling us to proceed with modernization and negotiation.[41]

On 11 May 1989, Mr. Blaikie asked for clarification of information that Mr. Clark had made a proposal aimed at resolving the Alliance debate over SNF modernization.[42] In response, the Minister explained that while Canada had made some proposals and had received some responses to them, the sensitivity of the discussions precluded him from disclosing precise details about the process.[43] Nevertheless, he noted:

> ...a fundamental element of our position is that there should not be...the "third zero,"...a situation in which there is an absolute removal of SNF. Canada and other NATO partners, including West Germany...agreed to weapons..."up to date as necessary".... We adhere to that position. We believe there should also be negotiations, and we are looking for some way in which the two can be linked.[44]

Mr. Clark concluded:

> ...our preoccupation at the moment - this is not a new Canadian role in NATO - is trying to bridge differences, trying to ensure that countries can come to Canada.... The Canadian preferred position would be to have some linkage between modernization and negotiation, to have an explicit indication that we would not end up with a third zero. Both the Netherlands and Canada are trying to encourage countries that do not yet agree to move towards agreement. That is what we are doing, and it is a continuing process.[45]

That same day, Liberal Member William Rompkey raised questions in the House concerning Canada's NATO commitments in light of the recent budget cuts:

> One year ago in Lahr...the Prime Minister said " - we will refit all our forces in Europe with appropriate equipment. Our attitude is simple: you are the best. We want you to have the best equipment to do a tough job -." In the past several days the Government has reneged on its commitment to increase Canadian forces in Germany and supply them with tanks. How can the Minister square the statement of the Prime Minister made in Germany...with the decisions taken in the last two weeks?[46]

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41 *Ibid.*.

42 Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Proceedings*, 11 May 1989, p. 14.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

46 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1601.

Defence Minister Bill McKnight replied:

> I would like to take the Hon. Member back to 1983, the last time his Party was in Government. Based in Central Europe, Canadian forces joined with allies, had 5,400 troops. There has been an additional 2,000 troops added. There will be more troops added this summer.[47]

Interest in the NATO SNF debate continued throughout May 1989, with members of both the Liberal and New Democratic parties calling for strong Canadian efforts to help facilitate Allied agreement on the issue.[48] As the Summit concluded, comment was heard in the House on the compromise the Allies had finally achieved, and Canada's role in securing it. On 30 May 1989, Liberal Member Ross Stevenson commented:

> ...the compromise within NATO on a position for the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons was a major accomplishment. Our Prime Minister...and Secretary of State for External Affairs...have played an important role in achieving this compromise.[49]

NDP Member Bill Blaikie also commented on the results of the Summit. On 31 May 1989, he stated that the NATO Agreement

> ...is predicated on a guarantee that there will be no elimination of short-range nuclear weapons. It seems to me that any negotiation and any agreement worth this planet would...at least head toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the Government of Canada, the Prime Minister...and the Secretary of State for External Affairs...are not doing themselves any service by boasting about an agreement in which they had a part the essence of which is the preservation of short-range nuclear weapons.[50]

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47 *Ibid*..

48 See, for instance, *Commons Debates*, 12 May 1989, p. 1647; 19 May 1989, p. 1962; and 26 May 1989, p. 2199.

49 *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2317.

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*BACKGROUND*

Peacekeeping may be defined as the employment, under the auspices of a recognized international authority, of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of political conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. Peacekeeping activities range from unarmed missions with a role of observation and reporting only, through roles of investigation, supervision and control, to the interposition of armed military units and formations between the parties.[1]

In the late 1940s, international observer missions were established along the India-Pakistan border, and in the Middle East following the 1948 Arab-Israel war. In 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution granting it the authority to recommend specific measures deemed necessary to maintain international peace. That same year, a UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by the United States in the absence of the Soviet Union, led to the creation of a unified military command to counter the North Korean offensive into South Korea. This action was unprecedented and has never been repeated.[2] The first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), established with the help of Canada to supervise the cease-fire following the 1956 Suez Crisis. Since that time the UN has sent peacekeeping and observation missions to conflict areas including the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle East and Indochina. The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN peacekeeping forces.

In addition to participating in sixteen UN peacekeeping missions, Canada has also contributed to five non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), created in 1954 to oversee the cease-fire in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), established in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN), created to supervise the 1968 elections in that country; the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, established in 1979 to observe the elections in Zimbabwe; and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, responsible for monitoring the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Canadian contribution to the MFO began in 1986 and in 1988-1989 consists of 128 Canadians providing helicopter transportation for both troops and civilian observers.

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1 Colonel R.B. Mitchell, "Peacekeeping and the Canadian Army in the 21st Century" (Paper presented to the Seminar on "The Role of the Canadian Army in the 21st Century," Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 17 March 1989), pp. 2-3.

2 UN operations in Korea, 1950-53, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping. (*Peacekeeping*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Factsheet* No. 4 (October 1988, updated and reprinted March 1989), p. 2.) One Canadian attaché is posted at UNCMAC on the Participating Nations Advisory Group.

Canada currently contributes to seven UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was established in 1974 to monitor and supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria after the 1973 Middle East War. Two hundred and twenty-seven Canadians, of a total force of approximately 1300, provide logistics, communications and other technical services. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is a permanent mission created in 1948 to monitor and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and to supervise the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The force of approximately 295 includes twenty Canadians. Canada also participates in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. The 575 Canadians out of approximately 2100 participants are responsible for policing the cease-fire and resolving disputes between the opposing factions in a sector containing the capital, Nicosia. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established in 1949 to supervise the India-Pakistan cease-fire in the Jammu-Kashmir area. Canada provides Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biannually between Srinagar in India and Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

In 1988-1989, Canada agreed to participate in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). This operation was set up in May 1988 to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and to oversee the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Ten countries participate in UNGOMAP, each initially providing five military officers. One Canadian was stationed at Islamabad and four in Kabul with UNGOMAP's two Observation Teams. As of 1 May 1989, the number of Canadian military officers was reduced to three, two in Islamabad and one in Kabul. In January and February 1989 Canada began its participation in the Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP), a comprehensive humanitarian relief assistance programme for Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN. Canada provides a team of fourteen military persons, one in Islamabad and thirteen in Peshawar to train Afghan refugees in mine-clearing techniques. The plan does not fall under the present definition of peacekeeping but is regarded as "peacebuilding" (for more information see Southern Asia, Chapter 25 of *The Guide*.)

On 9 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). This operation was established by the UN Security Council, providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries to monitor the cease-fire implemented on 20 August 1988. Canada contributed a total of 525 persons to set up a fully self-sustaining communications network for all of UNIIMOG's communications needs along the 1200-km Iran-Iraq border, as well as fifteen observer troops who remain as part of the UN force. The soldiers arrived in Baghdad on 16 August 1988, followed by the members of the communications team. The latter returned to Canada between November and mid-December 1988.[3]

In February 1989, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created by the UN Security Council to monitor Namibian peace plan agreements signed on 22 December 1988. Canada provides 237 soldiers as part of a peacekeeping force of 4650 personnel.

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3 Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 171 (9 August 1988); Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 89/88; "Canadian Team Arrives in Iraq to Observe Truce." *Toronto Star*, 16 August 1988, p. A12; and Paul Koring, "UN Signallers Return Home Via Moscow." *Globe and Mail*, 5 October 1988, p. A8.

In December 1988, the Security Council unanimously voted to send a verification mission to Angola to verify the redeployment northward, and the total withdrawal of Cubans from that country. (This decision was a result of the regional accord formally signed in December 1988 by the US, South Africa, Angola and Cuba, which included the total withdrawal of Cuban soldiers fighting in the Angolan civil war [for further information see Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 24 of *The Guide*].) The mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) will run over a period of thirty-one months (January 1989 to July 1991). The verification team includes seventy military observers and twenty civilians from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia. Canada was not invited to join UNAVIM and, therefore, is not party to it.[4]

Approximately 1250 members of the Canadian Armed Forces were posted at various points around the world in 1988-1989 in peacekeeping activities. Successive Canadian Governments have emphasized that Canada views peacekeeping as one aspect of conflict resolution, as an important contribution to the creation of the environment necessary to achieve political solutions to conflicts. Canada sees peacekeeping as an interim measure in the resolution of regional conflicts and has consistently called for a strengthening of the UN's peacekeeping expertise, as well as its institutional, financial and administrative base. The principles used to determine Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations were outlined in the Defence White Paper of 1987:

> ...The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a cease-fire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably funded and logistically supported.[5]

Within the UN itself there is disagreement on a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and the financing of UN peacekeeping operations. A number of countries have substantial debts to the UN, some withholding funds earmarked for peacekeeping. The UN estimates that the cost of peacekeeping activities will increase over the next few years to between $1.5 and $2 billion, if existing peacekeeping operations continue and conflicts in Central America, Cambodia and the

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4 Paul Lewis, "Security Council Votes to Send a Force to Angola." *New York Times*, 21 December 1988, p. A7; and James Brooke, "U.N.'s Angola Mission to Take Cuba at its Word." *New York Times*, 8 January 1989, p. A5.

5 Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, Ottawa, 1987, p. 24.

Western Sahara are resolved and require UN peacekeeping forces.[6] (Troop needs would increase from the present level of 10,500 to 30,000.[7]) There is a projected deficit for UN peacekeeping operations of approximately $918 million for the years 1988 and 1989 (compared to a total annual UN budget of about $800 million).[8] Consequently, major peacekeeping operations, notably in Lebanon and Cyprus, are incurring large deficits, while troop-contributing countries such as Canada have generally borne most of the financial burden. The cost of Canada's current fiscal year peacekeeping commitments is in excess of $40 million.[9]

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 29 September 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated Canada's reaction to the awarding of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces as follows

> No country has been more steadfast or supportive in its commitment to U.N. Peacekeeping than Canada, and it is worth remembering that peacekeeping as we know it today was begun on a Canadian initiative more than 30 years ago....This award will have a special meaning for more than 80,000 Canadian men and women who have served in U.N. Peacekeeping contingents....This work has often been difficult even dangerous and 78 Canadians have given their lives in this duty.[10]

The then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced on 9 December 1988 that a statue would be erected in Ottawa, dedicated to the Canadian Forces members who have served in peacekeeping missions.[11]

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6 Tony Banks and Thalif Deen, "Namibia Casts Shadow Over UN." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 19 (15 April 1989), pp. 628-29; Paul Lewis, "The U.N. Dove: Hobbled by the U.S.?" *New York Times*, 9 August 1988, p. 10; and Paul Lewis, "U.N. Strains to Meet the Demand for Peace." *New York Times*, 28 August 1988, p. 3 (section 4).

7 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Chief Warns of Costs of Peace." *New York Times*, 11 December 1988, p. 4.

8 Banks and Deen, *supra* note 6, p. 629.

9 Robert Mitchell, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Background Paper* No. 23 (October 1988), p. 7; "200 Canadians to Join UN Force in Namibia." *Gazette*, 24 February 1989, p. B1; and "Peacekeeper Canada Steps in Again." *Toronto Star*, 10 August 1988, p. 14.

10 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 214 (29 September 1988).

11 Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 91/88 (9 December 1988).

At the UN General Assembly session in October 1988, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky recommended that UN peacekeeping operations be strengthened, consolidated and "...put on a more solid legal and financial basis" in order to be used "more extensively for the implementation of Security Council decisions as well as for the prevention of emerging armed conflicts."[12] External Affairs Minister Clark did not comment directly on the Soviet proposal to establish a permanent UN peacekeeping force, but did affirm Canada's interest in establishing peacekeeping on "a more professional and broader basis."[13]

On 3 February 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark and Defence Minister McKnight announced that Canada had accepted a request from the UN to appoint a Canadian Commander of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Major-General Clive Milner assumed command of UNFICYP on 10 April 1989, ending his formal ties to Canadian Forces in Cyprus. He now reports directly to the UN Secretary-General. This appointment marks the second time in approximately thirty years that a Canadian has commanded a UN Force, the first was Lt. General E. L. M. Burns, who commanded the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in Egypt in the mid-1950s.[14] In Cyprus, the Canadian contingent added 35 km of rural patrol to their duties in 1988 after Sweden pulled out the bulk of its 380 soldiers for financial reasons. Canada increased its contingent by sixty men, to make a total contribution to UNFICYP of 575 soldiers.[15] Negotiations aimed at a settlement of the Cyprus situation resumed in September 1988 between George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus and Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. An agreement in principle was concluded in early April 1989 to pull back from the Green Line (the dividing line) in Nicosia. The Commander of the Canadian Forces in Cyprus, Col. Chris Wellwoods, stated that should the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots withdraw from three sensitive positions in Nicosia, Canadian Forces would fill the gap.[16] Should the agreement in principle be ratified and implemented, this would allow the UN to begin to negotiate a complete demilitarization of Nicosia and eventually a comprehensive settlement of the Cypriot situation.

In a letter to UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar in May 1989, Canada and seven other countries contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus said that "they are bearing an unfair financial burden by having to rely on other UN members

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12 Letter from Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation, to the UN Secretary-General, United Nations Document A/43/629, 22 September 1988, p. 4.

13 As cited in David Cox, "Defence Notes: UN Peacekeeping." *Peace & Security*, vol. 3 no. 4 (Winter 1988/1989), p. 13.

14 Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 07/89 (3 February 1989).

15 Major-General Edward Fursdon, "Keeping the Peace in Cyprus." *Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 15 no. 8 (February 1989), p. 25; and Robert McDonald, "Guarding the Line." *Maclean's*, vol. 102 no. 13 (27 March 1989), p. 24.

16 "Canada Moves into Cyprus Battle Zones." *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 April 1989, p. A16.

to volunteer money."[17] Further, it was reported in early June 1989 that Canada had let it be known formally in the Security Council that it wanted "a countdown on the endless summer of Canadian peacekeeping forces on Cyprus." A spokesman for Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier stated that "there's no question that continued participation is needed, but we must make the council aware that we're concerned about the cost, and the length of time it's gone on without settlement."[18] The end result was a Security Council statement urging serious attempts at a political solution, without referring to the financing of the peacekeeping forces.[19]

On 22 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark committed Canada to assist in the implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence. Canada pledged approximately 225 Canadian Forces soldiers toward the 4650-strong UN operation.[20] An advance party departed from Canada in mid-March 1989, with the balance to have been in place by mid-April 1989. However, after over 1000 South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas crossed the Angola-Namibia border on the cease-fire date of 1 April 1989, the Canadian Government agreed to a UN request to hasten its troop deployment and provide additional air support to the entire UNTAG force.[21] External Affairs Minister Clark criticized the UN for its lengthy debate over the costs and size of UNTAG's force, cut from a proposed 7500, and confirmed that only some 200 of 1000 UN personnel were in place at the Angola-Namibia border when the SWAPO incursion occurred.[22] With on-going negotiations to place the Namibian peace process back "on track" in May and June 1989, the 257 Canadians committed to UNTAG are scheduled to return to Canada on 1 April 1990.[23]

At present there are two other areas in which a Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping forces may be called for in the immediate future: Central America and Cambodia. In addition, a UN peace plan for the resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara may involve Canadian participation in peacekeeping activities in the near future although there is, thus far, no stated Canadian position on this issue.

In February 1989, a letter to the UN Secretary-General from Foreign Ministry officials of the five signatories of the Regional Peace Accord in Central America requested a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain, West Germany and

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17 "Canada Joins in Complaint About UN Peacekeeping Tab." *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 May 1989, p. A13.

18 Olivia Ward, "Canada Pressures U.N. for Push on Cyprus Peace." *Toronto Star*, 11 June 1989, p. H2.

19 *Ibid.*; and "Peacekeepers Seek Additional U.N. Funding for Cyprus." *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1989, p. 12.

20 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 255 (22 December 1988).

21 "Petawawa Troops Rush to Namibia." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 April 1989 p. A6.

22 Gregory Wirick, "Report From the Hill: Peacekeeping Activity." *Peace & Security*, vol. 4 no. 2 (Summer 1989), p. 18.

23 John Best, "Rising Profile for Peacekeeping." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 June 1989, p. E3.

an unnamed Latin American country to verify a ban on providing bases for insurgents fighting neighbouring governments and to report on cross-border guerrilla movements.[24] A proposed observer force of 160 members was tentatively accepted by officials of the five signatory countries in March 1989, but full approval was stalled in disputes between the parties shortly afterwards. Should the proposal be approved by the Central American countries, the UN Security Council would debate the establishment of a UN force and send an advance party to further assess peacekeeping requirements.[25] Since the signing of the Guatemala Accord on 7 August 1987, the Canadian Government has expressed interest in participating in such a peacekeeping effort, but reservations focus on the relatively small size of the proposed peacekeeping force to date, and its eventual mandate. The official Canadian position is that should Canada receive an invitation to participate, as is widely anticipated, it will make its decision on the merits of the mission at that time.[26]

On 5 April 1989, Vietnam formally asked Canada, Poland and India to form a monitoring commission to verify the withdrawal of the 50,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, scheduled to end in September 1989. External Affairs Minister Clark set as conditions for Canadian participation a Vietnamese agreement to withdraw, UN Security Council endorsement of the plan, a clear peacekeeping mandate with a set lifespan, proper funding, and evidence that this would be part of a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem.[27]

In a letter sent to External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in April 1989, the Colombian rebel group M-19 (also known as the April 19 Movement) asked Canada to establish an observer mission to participate in the Colombian Government's peace negotiations with rebel groups beginning in July 1989. On 3 May 1989 it was reported that the group had still not received a reply from Mr. Clark. According to an External Affairs spokesman, a formal request to the Canadian Government by the Government of Colombia would be necessary before Canada would consider participating.[28]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In the House of Commons on 29 September 1988, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty rose to report on the selection of the UN Peacekeeping Forces as the recipient of the

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24 John Hay, "Keeping the Peace: Canada Weighing Risky Proposals from Vietnam, Central America." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 May 1989, p. B4; and "Central American States Ask UN for Observer Team With Canadians. *Gazette*, 9 February 1989, p. D12.

25 "UN Force for Central America." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 13 (1 April 1989), p. 547.

26 Gilles Paquin, "The Perils of Peacekeeping: Canada Should Think Twice Before Sending its Peacekeepers into the Quagmire of Central America's War." *Peace & Security*, vol. 3 no. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 6-7.

27 Hay, *supra* note 24, p. B4.

28 Malarek, Victor, "Colombian Rebels Seek Canadian Help." *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1989, p. A13.

1988 Nobel Peace Prize and to review Canada's long-standing commitment to UN peacekeeping operations.[29] MP Herb Gray (Lib.) spoke on behalf of the Liberal Party, extending his congratulations to the recipients as follows:

> Canada plays a special role when it comes to the concept of peacekeeping. I think it is clear - and history records this - that this very concept was something created by a Canadian. The late Right Hon. Lester Pearson, when he was Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Government of Louis St. Laurent, at that time convinced the United Nations to establish a force made up of troops of member countries, including Canada, in a way which resolved the Suez crisis of 1956. As a result, Mike Pearson received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957....[T]he awarding of this year's Nobel Prize...is a confirmation of how important, how valid, and how successful the concept...developed in 1956 has proven to be over the years.[30]

On 24 August 1988, Mr. Beatty deposited an Order in Council with the House for Canadian participation in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer's Group (UNIIMOG). He outlined the duties of the Canadian Forces and the communications team to be sent to assist UNIIMOG.[31] The opposition parties unanimously supported the motion. However, reservations concerning the necessity of debating this matter in light of the unanimous consent of the House for the motion, and the lack of opportunity to discuss peacekeeping in the general context of Canada's foreign and defence policies[32], prompted MP Derek Blackburn (NDP) to comment:

> ...[I]f you look at the Government's White Paper you will see that the Conservatives devoted just four paragraphs out of an 89-page document to peacekeeping. That shows you that support for the UN and peacekeeping really is not important to the Government, at least not at the time the White Paper was put together....Canadians have rejected the Conservative cold war vision of the world, and the Minister knows it. Now he is on his own little media campaign to try to tie his Government's image to peacekeeping. Otherwise, why are we not debating the submarine programme [and] the total force structure programme here in the House?[33]

In the same debate, Minister for External Relations Monique Landry insisted that Canadian participation in UNIIMOG was "in line with the many recommendations contained in the White Paper on Defence published in 1987."[34]

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29 *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, pp. 19747-48.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 19748.

31 *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, pp. 18801-806.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 18806-18809.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 18808.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 18810-18811.

On 25 August 1988, Conservative Member Alan Redway made the following statement regarding the resumption of peace negotiations in Cyprus

> ...[F]ormal negotiations aimed at bringing about a peaceful settlement in Cyprus will resume at long last on September 15, after some three and a half years of interruption....We have an international reputation as a peace negotiator. We have experience with both minority rights guarantees and with a federal system of government....Because of this I would urge our Government to take and to play an active role in these Cyprus peace negotiations.[35]

On 12 April 1989, Defence Minister McKnight rose to deposit an Order in Council approving the deployment of Canadian forces in support of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia

> I would like to take this opportunity to once again underline the importance that this Government attaches to international peacekeeping and peaceful resolution of disputes....Later this afternoon, the largest contingent of troops will be on their way to Namibia....[W]e have this week responded to an additional call from the United Nations above and beyond our troop commitments and will be providing additional air support for the speedy deployment of the UN force.[36]

On behalf of his Party, Liberal MP André Ouellet approved the decision to deploy Canadian Forces in support of UNTAG but had the following reservations:

> The Minister's remarks are unfortunately incomplete and I deplore his failure to say anything about the situation in Namibia since April 1. Obviously, the recent incidents, the loss of life of many SWAPO members, greatly concern us Canadians. When the Minister tells us that he is sending troops..., he should give us an overview of the situation and give a report to us in the House, to the Canadian people and especially to the families of these service people who are going to that troubled part of the world....[W]e were talking about a United Nations force of some 7,000 soldiers. We know that there will only be 4,000. Many impartial observers consider this force much too small to really do the job....Secondly,...barely one quarter of the military forces have arrived....I wonder why...[the] offer of additional support...was not made several weeks ago....[37]

During the same debate, MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) also approved the Canadian role in UNTAG on behalf of his Party, but complained of the delay in putting UN peacekeeping forces in place in time for the scheduled 1 April 1989 cease-fire in Namibia:

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35 *Commons Debates*, 25 August 1988, pp. 18839-18840.

36 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 396.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 396-397.

> It is...the result of the failure of the Security Council, of which Canada is a member, to ensure speedy deployment of UNTAG forces in sufficient numbers.[38]

On 15 August 1988, Liberal Member Lloyd Axworthy made a statement regarding Canada's prospective peacekeeping role in Central America:

> ...[A]ll Canadians were encouraged by the sight of troops of our Armed Forces going to join a UN peacekeeping mission in the Middle East....[A] Commons committee unanimously put forward a series of recommendations as to how the Government of Canada could provide important and constructive recommendations, proposals and initiatives to help the peace initiative along [in Central America]....I hope this House will call upon the Government to take some action and show the kind of initiative for peacekeeping that we can provide in Central America.[39]

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38 *Ibid.*, pp. 397-398.

39 *Commons Debates*, 15 August 1988, p. 18295.

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## 21. CENTRAL AMERICA

### *BACKGROUND*

The year 1988 was marked by unsuccessful efforts to adopt in full the Central American Peace Plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez. The "Arias Plan", signed on 7 August 1987 at Esquipulas, Guatemala, has retained its importance because it was the first time leaders of the five Central American countries--Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--agreed in principle to comply with a process aimed at bringing peace to the region. The plan essentially requires of each Government a national reconciliation with opponents, a cease-fire within the existing constitutional framework, efforts to halt foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment not to provide assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, free and democratic elections, measures to help refugees return home and joint efforts to obtain international economic aid.

That implementation and verification of the planned measures are the main obstacles facing the signatories was evident at the summit held in San José, Costa Rica on 15 and 16 January 1988. Talks between the Governments of Guatemala and El Salvador and their respective opponents to negotiate a cease-fire have yet to produce serious results. On 28 February 1989 the Salvadoran army unilaterally declared a cease-fire until 1 June, when President Duarte was to step down. However, the guerrillas immediately rejected the declaration and launched renewed attacks on military installations, declaring that they would accept only a negotiated cease-fire. In early February 1989 an accord was reached by the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua. The Sandinistas agreed to make serious moves towards democratization and ensure fair procedures at the elections set for February 1990, in return for promises by the Honduran Government to disband the *contra* forces operating within its borders.

At Tesoro Beach, El Salvador on 13-14 February 1989, the five Central American Presidents held a Summit meeting to "reactivate the Arias Plan." The five agreed to the Honduran-Nicaraguan accord reached days earlier, with the additional provision that the *contra* forces and their families operating within Honduras borders would be repatriated or moved to other countries after disbanding. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega reaffirmed his intention to eliminate all censorship laws and hold all-level government elections no later than February 1990. At the Summit, the Presidents also agreed to invite UN observers into the region.

On 24 February 1989, in a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Foreign Ministry officials from all five signatories of the Peace Accord requested that a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain and West Germany, as well as from an unnamed Latin American country, be sent to Central America. The main role of the observers would be to verify that none of the countries involved in the peace process supports any subversive activities against a neighbour country, to report on cross-border guerrilla movements, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. Canada, Spain and West Germany have agreed to take part in the peace-keeping mission and are now awaiting a formal request from the UN Secretary-General (for more information see Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*).

At a UN conference on Central American refugees in early April 1989 in Guatemala City, the Secretary-General stated that UN plans for a peacekeeping effort in the region were stalled because of a lawsuit filed at the World Court by Nicaragua against Honduras. The suit claims for damages and compensation as a result of *contra* activities in Nicaragua. Also in Guatemala City, on 13 April 1989, *contra* leaders met with representatives of various Nicaraguan political parties. Amidst reports of reduced US aid to their forces, the *contra* leaders stated that they would participate in a fair electoral process in Nicaragua.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada has always openly supported peace efforts in Central America, particularly those of the Contadora group. Although it has never publicly condemned US activities in Central America, the Canadian Government has voiced opposition to third-party intervention in the region.[1] At the Forty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, Canada voted in favour of a resolution urging the United States to comply with the June 1986 ruling of the World Court that US military aid to the *contras* violated international law, and that Washington should definitely cease these actions. In addition, Ottawa has provided Central American Governments with technical information on peacekeeping operations and on the verification of regional agreements aimed at ending hostilities. Canadian economic aid in the region, approximately $55 million in 1987-1988, is another important aspect of Ottawa's policy toward Central American countries.

Canada has repeatedly shown its support for the Central American Peace Plan. External Affairs Minister Clark has indicated that, if formally asked, Canada will agree to take part in control and verification of an accord. Noting that "[t]he disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict," he has declared that "Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us."[2]

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez visited Ottawa from 6 to 8 April 1989, and held talks with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, External Affairs Minister Clark and Finance Minister Michael Wilson. On 25 June 1989, Mr. Clark announced that Canada would provide technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua to help organize its general elections, scheduled for February 1990. Mr. Clark stated that "Canada attaches great importance to the holding of free and fair elections in Nicaragua." An elections official from Nicaragua met with Canadian officials in Ottawa on 26 and 27 June 1989 for discussions on Canadian assistance to the electoral process in Nicaragua.[3]

On the issue of human rights in Central America, External Affairs Minister Clark pointed out that "no outside country has been asked to involve itself in the political aspects of Esquipulas II; the commission for Verification and Follow-up, which presented its report to the Five in January 1988, was suspended precisely because it did not limit

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1 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 15 September 1986.

2 Department of External Affairs, *Statements* 87/49, 22 September 1987. See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release*(s) Nos. 154 and 163, 10 and 16 August 1987.

3 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 157, 28 June 1989.

its mandate to security issues."[4] This issue was addressed in a statement delivered by Canadian Ambassador A. Raynell Andreychuk in the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 23 November 1988. Ms. Andreychuk praised the Peace Plan for its strong support of human rights issues and the democratization process, and urged the Central American Presidents "to honour this commitment to regional reconciliation with renewed vigour."[5]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 5 July 1988, John Bosley, Chairman of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, tabled the Committee's report entitled *Supporting the Five*. This Committee, composed of five Members of Parliament, was formed to study how Canada could play a constructive role in the Central American peace process. The report contained recommendations on military and political verification, the guarantee of human rights, democratic development of conditions and institutions, economic and humanitarian aid and the enhancement of Canada's diplomatic presence in the region, including the appointment of chargés d'affaires in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.

On 15 August 1988, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy made the following statement on Canada's overall role in the Central American peace process:

> Six weeks ago a Commons committee unamimously put forward a series of recommendations as to how the Government of Canada could provide important and constructive recommendations, proposals and initiatives to help the peace initiative along. We have heard nothing from the Government since then. This is where Canada could provide a major contribution to an area of conflict in our own hemisphere and demonstrate our capacity and maturity as a country to help resolve conflicts.[6]

In a letter dated 23 September 1988 to the Chairman of the Special Committee, External Affairs Minister Clark responded positively to most of the report's recommendations. Mr. Clark said:

> The Special Committee's Report shows what Canada has done and what we can still do. The task they assumed was difficult and complex. The work is all the more valuable in the present circumstances. It gives us hope, and it provides concrete ideas upon which we can try to build our attempts to encourage a just and lasting peace, and a more prosperous future for Central America.[7]

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4 Department of External Affairs, Letter to Mr. Bosley, 23 September 1988, p. 2.

5 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 23 November 1988.

6 *Commons Debates*, 15 August 1988, p. 18925.

7 Department of External Affairs, Letter to Mr. Bosley, 23 September 1988, p. 5. See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 207, 26 September 1988.

Mr. Clark addressed the report's recommendation to continue and strengthen Canada's economic aid to the region as follows:

> The Government *accepts* the Committee's recommendation that $100 million, in addition to currently planned expenditures, be allocated to assist Central American reconstruction and economic development efforts at this critical period in the region's history. Although an increase of this magnitude cannot be accommodated over a 5-year period as suggested by the Committee, we will make such commitment for the 6-year period 1988-1994. The full implementation of this commitment could, of course, be affected by developments in the peace process.[8]

Mr. Clark also said that the Government would open aid offices in Tegucigalpa, Managua and San Salvador by the autumn of 1989.

Mr. Clark agreed with the Committee's recommendation to strengthen Canadian diplomatic representation in Central America. A new Honorary Consul had recently been approved for Tegucigalpa, Honduras and "a recommendation has been made for an Honorary Consul in San Salvador."[9] On 1 November 1988 Mr. Clark announced the appointment of an Honorary Consul of Canada in Managua, Nicaragua.[10]

In the House of Commons on 12 April 1989, Progressive Conservative MP Terry Clifford tabled the report of the Official Delegation of the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association on the Forum on Strengthening Democracy, held in Costa Rica on 6 to 8 February 1989. Mr. Clifford stated that, should proposals for the creation of a Central American Parliament be ratified, Canada would consider financial support towards that end.[11]

During a wide-ranging debate on Canadian foreign and defence policies in the House of Commons on 13 April 1989, NDP MP Bill Blaikie made suggestions to the Government concerning Nicaragua:

> ...[T]he Nicaraguan Government is interested in having Canada play a role in the months leading up to the election set for February, 1990. I hope that the Minister will be open to any way in which Canada can be part of the international presence at the Nicaraguan elections, so those elections can be beyond reproach and can be seen to be a legitimate part of the peace process....I would encourage the Minster at the same time to consider enhancing development assistance to Nicaragua in order to alleviate some of their severe economic problems that are a result of the war, the [U.S.] embargo and various other things.[12]

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8 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

9 *Ibid.*.

10 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 233, 1 November 1988.

11 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 398.

12 *Commons Debates*, 13 April 1989, p. 481.

Following Mr. Blaikie's reference to other concerns, External Affairs Minister Clark returned the debate to Central America:

> ...It is my view that had I accepted his voice and the voice of his Party over the last couple of years, and had we used our influence to condemn the United States in Central America, that probably would have cost us the capacity to play the very constructive, albeit quite limited and specific role that Canada is able to play in moving that region toward a peace process.[13]

Throughout 1988 and 1989, Members of Parliament addressed the question of human rights in individual countries in Central America (for further information refer to Human Rights - "Parliamentary Comment", in Chapter 27 of *The Guide*).

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## *BACKGROUND*

### *Iran - Iraq*

On 18 July 1988 Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 as the basis for talks with Iraq to end their eight-year war. Among other provisions, the Resolution calls for a UN-supervised cease-fire, withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries, prisoner exchanges, the establishment of a panel to determine responsibility for the war, and the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. On 8 August 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar announced that a cease-fire was to commence on 20 August 1988 and that both parties had agreed to send their representatives to Geneva for direct talks under UN auspices. In addition, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established by the UN Security Council, providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries, including Canada, to monitor the cease-fire, which went into effect as scheduled.

Several rounds of talks have taken place, all of which failed to make significant progress in implementing UN Resolution 598. Unresolved issues include the failure of Iran and Iraq to set up a joint cease-fire monitoring group. To settle the navigation question in the Shatt al 'Arab waterway, the strategic channel separating Iran from Iraq in the south, Iraq has demanded that Iran allow clearing of war debris from the waterway and concede Iraq's right to navigate freely in the channel. But Iran objects to the reopening of the waterway unless Iraq reaffirms support for the 1975 Algiers Treaty, which divides the channel between the two countries. Furthermore, Iraq is holding approximately 35,000 Iranian prisoners of war and Iran, 70,000 Iraqis. Iraq maintains that it accepted a prisoner exchange plan under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 5 October 1988. Iran refused an exchange of prisoners on 23 March 1989, demanding that Iraq first remove its forces to internationally recognized boundaries and return captured territory to Iran.

In December 1988 an international panel of aviation experts, in a report to the International Civil Aviation Organization, found that a series of mistakes by the US Navy contributed directly to the shooting down of an Iranian airliner on 3 July 1988. The USS *Vincennes* mistook the Iran Air passenger plane for an Iranian fighter plane. In mid-July 1989 the US announced compensation for the families of those killed in the incident. The money ($250,000 for wage-earner victims, $100,000 for others) will be held in escrow until agreement on its distribution is reached with Iran.

In March 1989 Iran broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, after Iran demanded that the British Government denounce the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie and his novel *The Satanic Verses*. Many Western nations, including Canada, lodged diplomatic protests over an Iranian call for the death of the author. On 3 June 1989, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died. President Ali Khamenei was chosen as interim leader of Iran by an eighty-member assembly of theological experts. Presidential elections in Iran are scheduled for 28 July 1989. In late June 1989, the Soviet Union formally promised to help Iran strengthen its defence capabilities as part of an economic cooperation pact between the two countries. A joint declaration signed during a Moscow visit by

Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani provided no details about the new defence cooperation.

*Lebanon*

The fourteen-year-old civil war in Lebanon continued in 1988-1989, recently pitting Lebanese Christians against Syrian forces in Lebanon and their Lebanese Muslim and Druze militia allies. Lebanese president Amin Gemayel ended his six-year term in office in September 1988. In his last act as President, Gemayel appointed General Michel Aoun as leader of an interim military government after an unsuccessful attempt by Parliament to choose a successor to Gemayel. Lebanese Muslims asserted that Gemayel had violated provisions of an unwritten power-sharing agreement, devised in 1943, whereby the President and Army Commander of Lebanon will be Christian, the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament, a Shiite Muslim. Consequently, in late 1988, Lebanon possessed two rival governments: a predominantly Christian-led Government in East Beirut under the leadership of General Aoun, and a Muslim Government in West Beirut headed by Dr. Selim al-Hoss.

The latest outbreak of savage fighting between the two rival groups began on 8 March 1989. About 40,000 Syrian troops occupy approximately two-thirds of the country, with the Lebanese Muslim militia currently receiving arms from Syria, Libya and Iran. Iraq supplies the majority of arms to the approximately 10,000-strong predominantly Christian forces. A cease-fire brokered by the Arab League, which took effect on 11 May 1989, reduced casualties somewhat. Nevertheless, as of 29 June 1989, local police had counted 375 killed and 1471 injured in the fighting since 8 March.

An Arab League Summit meeting in Casablanca in May 1989 failed to persuade Syria's President Haffez Assad to withdraw his soldiers from Lebanon in spite of intense pressure on League members by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Egyptian President Mubarak and Jordan's King Hussein called for a Syrian withdrawal from the Muslim sector of Beirut and installation of a joint Arab police force drawn from Arab League member states other than Syria and Iraq. The proposal was rejected, but the Summit agreed to appoint a three-member committee headed by Morocco's King Hassan II and including Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to oversee attempts to solve the problems in Lebanon, including the election of a new Lebanese president. On 5 July 1989 in Paris, French President Mitterrand and Soviet President Gorbachev called for an immediate truce in Lebanon and a halt to arms deliveries to Lebanese groups in the conflict; the leaders affirmed their willingness to work within the UN Security Council to effect a comprehensive settlement.

Israel launched a major attack on Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) positions in southern Lebanon on 8 December 1988. This marked the first ground attack into Lebanon outside of Israel's self-declared security zone since the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country. PLO and Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia announced an agreement on 22 December 1988 to end the fighting between them in order to concentrate on fighting Israel together. On 30 December 1988, the Syrian-backed Amal militia and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Shiite Muslim factions) signed a pact in Damascus establishing an immediate cease-fire between the two groups and a joint anti-Israeli operations centre in southern Lebanon.

*Israel and the Occupied Territories*

During 1988 and the first part of 1989, the Palestinian uprising (*intifada*) in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip intensified. By 15 July 1989, approximately 550 Palestinians, thirty Israelis and sixty suspected collaborators (killed by Palestinians themselves) had died.

Addressing the Palestinian National Council in Algiers on 15 November 1988, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as part of a broad political programme. On 25 November 1988 Arafat applied for, and a day later was denied, a visa to enter the United States to address the United Nations on the question of Palestinian independence. In Stockholm on 7 December 1988, and in Geneva on 13 December, in his address to the UN General Assembly (which had moved its session to Geneva in order to hear him), Arafat made significant announcements. He declared that the PLO acknowledged the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, including the state of Israel; he accepted UN Resolution 242 of 1967 (which calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories in return for security and recognition) and 338 of 1973 (which calls for the carrying out of Resolution 242) as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international peace conference; and he renounced all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism. In Paris on 2 May 1989, Arafat stated that the PLO Charter of 1964 calling for Israel's destruction was outdated, and null and void.

Heading a new coalition government, formed on 19 December 1988, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir presented peace plan proposals for the occupied territories in various stages. The main tenets of the proposals called for a re-endorsement of the Camp David Accords that led to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, the establishment of peace between Israel and Arab states, international efforts to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and elections to choose Palestinian representatives to negotiate a three-year interim period of self-rule to be followed by a comprehensive permanent solution to the occupied territories' problem. Shamir's election proposal was approved by the Israeli Knesset on 17 May 1989. On 5 July 1989 Shamir's Likud political bloc endorsed his election plan after he had accepted certain conditions, including: denying Arab East Jerusalem residents the right to vote; an end to the *intifada*; the continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and a refusal by Israel to give up any territory it holds at present. The PLO, which had reportedly been considering conditional approval of the election plan, stated that it could no longer do so because of the new conditions.

Twenty-two leaders of Arab League nations, meeting in Casablanca from 22 to 26 May 1989, had supported the PLO position that Israeli-proposed elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could be held only if Israel withdrew from the territories and the elections took place under UN or other international supervision.

After a thirteen-year ban, on 14 December 1988 the United States announced that it was to begin a dialogue with the PLO, since various preconditions set out in a 1975 Memorandum of Agreement between the US and Israel had been met by Yasser Arafat's statements earlier that month. First meetings between US and PLO officials took place shortly after the announcement. On 13 March 1989 the Bush Administration called on all parties to the conflict to reduce tensions in the area. Israel was asked to free some

Palestinian prisoners and forego the use of administrative detentions without trials, the Palestinians asked to stop raids into Israel from southern Lebanon and halt the distribution of inflammatory leaflets in the occupied territories. On 14 March 1989 US Secretary of State James Baker suggested that Israel may have to negotiate with the PLO. During Egyptian President Mubarak's visit to Washington, US President Bush called for an end to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and suggested that he favoured a "properly structured" international Middle East peace conference. On 11 May 1989 Secretary of State Baker pressed Israel for details of its plan for Palestinian elections and asserted that Arab East Jerusalem residents should be allowed to vote in such elections and insisted on foreign supervision of the balloting. On 23 May 1989 Baker stated that Israel should abandon all ideas of annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, that it should reopen closed Palestinian schools in the occupied territories, halt all Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, and move towards negotiations. Baker also called on Arab states to end their economic boycott of Israel, to respect Israel's right to membership in international organizations, and to "repudiate the odious claim that Zionism is racism." Regarding the PLO, Baker called for a formal amending of the PLO Charter which calls for the destruction of Israel; PLO non-interference in international organizations, and a channelling of *intifada* violence into political dialogue.

In a ten-day diplomatic mission to the Middle East in February 1989 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union supported the Arab call for an international Middle East peace conference under the auspices of the UN Security Council, winning support for his views from Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. Shevardnadze also set out Soviet preconditions for the reestablishment of full diplomatic ties with Israel. These included Israeli acceptance of both an international conference on the Middle East and a dialogue with the PLO.

For a discussion of UN activity on the occupied territories question, including Canada's role at the UN, see *Canadian Current Position.*

## *CANADIAN CURRENT POSITION*

### *Iran - Iraq*

After an eight-year hiatus in official relations, on 18 July 1988 External Affairs Minister Clark announced that, effective immediately, Canada and Iran would resume normal diplomatic relations, and accordingly the two sides would exchange ambassadors.[1] The Canadian Embassy in Tehran reopened its doors officially on 16 October 1988.[2] On 9 August 1988 the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to provide troops as part of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), set up to monitor the 20 August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. Sixteen Canadians serve in the mission, after an initial 483 Canadians set up UNIIMOG's

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1 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (18 July 1988); and Government of Canada, "Canada Welcomes Iranian Acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, New York, 18 July 1988." New York: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, *Press Release* No. 32.

2 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 226 (17 October 1988).

communications infrastructure.[3] Responding to Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's call for the death of author Salman Rushdie, on 22 February 1989 Canada followed the lead set by the twelve European Community nations and Norway and Sweden by withdrawing its chargé d'affaires from Tehran.[4] Customs officials at the Department of National Revenue temporarily stopped, and later resumed, the importation of the Rushdie book into Canada after considering whether the book constituted "hate literature" under Canadian law. Prime Minister Mulroney called the decision to block temporarily the book's entry into Canada, "ridiculous." Commenting on Khomeini's death call on 28 February 1989, Mulroney stated: "[t]he suggestion that a contract should be put on the head of a citizen in a free country...is an absolute outrage.... It violates everything that Canada stands for."[5] On 2 March 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark rejected a request from twenty-five Muslim diplomats in Canada to ban the Rushdie book and called for Islamic Conference member states to work with Canada and other states to remove the death threat.[6] On 14 July 1989, it was reported that the National Iranian Oil Co. was opening an office in Calgary. External Affairs Minister Clark stated that he knew about the office opening but was not certain whether high-technology energy equipment was to be sold to Iran.[7]

*Lebanon*

Speaking on behalf of Minister Clark, Secretary of State and Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Gerry Weiner told a group of Lebanese protesters in Ottawa, on 6 April 1989, that Canada supported their demands for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Weiner added that Canada supports the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon; looks forward to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from its soil; and urges all warring factions to respect a cease-fire.[8] On 20 April 1989 External Relations Minister Monique Landry outlined Canadian Government efforts to assist attempts to resolve the Lebanese crisis. Canada would continue to support the mediation efforts of the UN Security Council, the Arab League and President Mitterrand of France; continue participation in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) peacekeeping mission; provide a grant of $500,000 for humanitarian assistance in response to a special appeal by the Red Cross; temporarily suspend the deportation of unsuccessful refugee claimants from Lebanon; and dispatch an immigration officer to Cyprus to process additional immigration applications by those Lebanese wishing to

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3 Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 171 (9 August 1988).

4 "Canada Recalls Diplomat from Iran." *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A1.

5 "Mulroney Denounces Khomeini for Death Order." *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 March 1989; and "PM 'Embarrassed' by Blocking of Rushdie Book." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 1989, p. A1.

6 Iain Hunter, "Clark asks Muslims to Remove Death Threat." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 1989.

7 Christopher Donville, "Hi-Tech Leak Denied in Iran-Alberta Deal." *Globe and Mail*, 14 July 1989, p. A8.

8 Charles Ker and Alan White, "Lebanese Canadians Want Syria Out of Their Homeland." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 April 1989, p. A11.

emigrate to Canada.[9] In a report to Parliament submitted on 21 June 1989, an all-party House of Commons Committee recommended that Canada should reopen its embassy in Beirut (closed in 1985 because of dangerous and deteriorating conditions) in order to assist those Lebanese wishing to emigrate to Canada. The Committee also recommended the expansion of the special Canadian immigration office in Cyprus dealing with Lebanese applications for immigration to Canada, and a relaxation of immigration restrictions for Lebanese applicants.[10]

*Israel and the Occupied Territories*

Following conflicting statements from Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark as to whether Canada would recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),[11] Mr. Clark announced on 30 March 1989 that Canada was ending restrictions on official meetings with representatives of the PLO. In a lengthy statement, Mr. Clark outlined Canada's policy toward the Palestinian problem as follows:

> The fundamental principles [of successive Canadian governments over the years] have long been
> -support for the security, well-being and rights of Israel as a legitimate, independent state in the Middle East;
> -support for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as enunciated in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967;
> -recognition that for there to be a just peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be realized, including their right to play a full part in determining their future;
> -insistence that for the PLO to play a role in Middle East peace negotiations, it must accept Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries.... The intifada in the occupied territories has demonstrated that Palestinian nationalism is a reality that must be taken into account.... The PLO decisions and statements of recent months, declaring their recognition of the State of Israel and their readiness to find an accomodation with it, represent a revision of traditional PLO policy.... Canada does not recognize the Palestine state proclaimed last November. However, the proclamation of a state does cast a different light on the question of Palestinian self-determination. Canada has long accepted the right and need for Palestinians to play a full part in negotiations to determine their future. We had been concerned that the phrase "self-determination" was being used as a code-word for an independent state, and that Canadian endorsement of the principle would be interpreted as Canadian advocacy of an independent state. That interpretation is no longer possible, because an independent state has been declared, and not recognized

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9 *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, pp. 707-708.

10 "MPs Hear Plea to Help Lebanese Flee to Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 June 1989, p. B19; and "Should Take More Lebanese, Commons Committee Reports." *Globe and Mail*, 22 June 1989, p. A10.

11 Ross Howard, "Statements on PLO by PM, Clark Indicate Deeper Foreign Policy Rift." *Globe and Mail*, 15 March 1989, p. A3; and Deborah Dowling, "PM Denies Rift With Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1989, p. A3.

> by Canada. That allows Canada to endorse the principle that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination in accordance with the International Human Rights Covenants. That must be exercised through peace negotiations in which Palestinians play a full part. Those negotiations may lead to an independent state, or to a federation with an existing state, or to some other result. We do not prejudge the results of those negotiations.... The Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Yves Fortier, will meet with a representative of the PLO Mission to the United Nations. Other contacts will take place elsewhere as appropriate.... We take these actions in the expectation that they will encourage the PLO to continue on the course indicated by its recent statements and actions and with the hope that ultimately this will help bring security to Israel.[12]

On 4 April 1989 Mr. Clark stated that Canada retained a fundamental commitment to the security of Israel.[13] Speaking to a group of delegates at the Canadian Jewish Congress plenary meeting in Montréal on 4 May 1989, Minister Gerry Weiner stated that the Canadian Government "must be firm and unyielding" in its protection of the state of Israel and that until the PLO amends its Charter calling for the destruction of Israel, Canada "cannot afford any further recognition."[14]

From 26 to 28 June 1989, Israeli President Chaim Herzog visited Canada and addressed a joint session of Parliament. Herzog accused PLO Chairman Arafat of continuing terrorist activities and insisted that Israel was a model of restraint in its behaviour during the "maintenance of law and order" in the occupied territories. Prime Minister Mulroney reaffirmed Canada's commitment to Israel's security and stated that "Canadians are deeply concerned because of their friendship for Israel and because of their profound conviction that human rights must be respected.... Canadians who understand and sympathize with Israel urge...moderation and reasonableness in the belief that ultimately such a policy will bring about an equally responsible attitude on the other side."[15]

On 8 July 1989 the Department of External Affairs announced that External Affairs Minister Clark would consider meeting his counterpart from the PLO.[16]

At the United Nations on 2 December 1988, Canada voted in favour of the resolu-

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12 Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement...on Official Contacts with the PLO and Self-determination, Ottawa, March 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/8, pp. 1-3.

13 Mohammed Adam, "Israel's Security Important to Canada, Says Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 April 1989, p. A3.

14 Olivia Ward, "Canada Firmly Supports Israel Minister Assures Jewish Group." *Toronto Star*, 9 May 1989, p. A17.

15 Tim Harper, "Israeli Army Restrained in Uprising Herzog Says." *Toronto Star*, 28 June 1989, p. A1.

16 "Clark Will Consider Meeting PLO." *Globe and Mail*, 8 July 1989, p. A5.

tion to move the General Assembly to Geneva in order to hear PLO Chairman Arafat.[17] However, on 15 December 1988, Canada abstained on two resolutions: the first, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and Jerusalem, and the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and the second, upgrading the status of the UN Palestinian observer mission.[18]

On 11 January 1989 Canada abstained on a UN Security Council resolution to grant the PLO the right to address the Council directly as "Palestine". Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Yves Fortier, stated that Canada did not oppose Palestinian participation in Council debates, but reiterated that it had not recognized a Palestinian state.[19] On 17 February 1989, Canada and thirteen other members of the UN Security Council voted to deplore Israeli actions in the occupied territories. The Department of External Affairs explained that the resolution had "combined justified criticism of Israeli practices in the occupied territories, together with a call for maximum restraint.... [I]t reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict.... Canada's statement...confirmed our historic bond of friendship with Israel and expressed our concern about the ongoing situation in the occupied territories." On the same date, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva passed a resolution, which Canada opposed, condemning the treatment and killing of Palestinians in the occupied territories.[20]

On 20 April 1989 Canada voted with the majority of the UN General Assembly to condemn Israel for the excessive use of force and restrictions placed on worship in the occupied territories.[21] In explaining Canada's vote in favour of a similar Security Council resolution on 9 June 1989, Ambassador Fortier stated that "[t]he information available to my government indicated a new and quite grave deterioration in the level of violence....In Gaza especially, new measures to control the movement of individuals, including repeated curfews, have produced tinderbox conditions which an incident could ignite." At the same time Fortier commended Israeli authorities for standing up to Israeli "vigilantes", urged Israel to continue to prevent attacks by Israeli settlers against the local population, and called for Israel to reopen Palestinian schools in the occupied territories.[22]

In his first direct communication with PLO Chairman Arafat, in a letter on 5 May 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark urged the PLO to drop its plan to seek membership in UN Agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Clark warned that PLO

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17 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes to Move Session to Geneva." *New York Times*, 3 December 1988, p. 1.

18 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Ends Session in Geneva, Passing 2 Mideast Resolutions." *New York Times*, 16 December 1988, p. 15.

19 "Security Council Grants PLO Right to Speak as Palestine." *Globe and Mail*, 12 January 1989, p. A11.

20 "Canada Backs Move to Criticize Israel/U.S. Vetoes Proposal Criticizing Israeli Action." *Toronto Star*, 18 February 1989, pp. A1 and A14.

21 "Canada Votes to Condemn Israel." *Toronto Star*, 21 April 1989, p. 1.

22 Trevor Rowe, "Canada Condemns Israel in U.N. Vote." *Toronto Star*, 10 June 1989, p. 1.

membership in the latter might cause a world health care "crisis" because of a threatened cut in funding by the US. He also raised concerns about the PLO Charter calling for the destruction of Israel and suggested that Arafat reconsider his rejection of Israeli proposals for Palestinian elections in the occupied territories.[23]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 24 August 1988 the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty rose in the House of Commons to explain the Canadian Government's announcement (9 August 1988) of Canada's intention to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) peacekeeping mission to Iran and Iraq.[24] Speaking on behalf of their Parties, several MPs expressed their support for Canadian participation in UNIIMOG.[25] For further Parliamentary comment on this subject, see Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*.

***Lebanon***

During April and May 1989 the House of Commons heard numerous statements and extensive debate concerning Canadian Government policies toward Lebanon. On 20 April 1989 Liberal MP Jesse Flis commented:

> To my question about Canada taking the initiative and calling for an emergency debate in the [UN] Security Council, the Secretary of State [for External Affairs] insisted that a debate was not warranted at this time as, according to the Minister, it would not have any effect on this situation.... One of the reasons I hope Canada lobbied so hard to get a seat on the Security Council was to play an active role in crises such as these.... While we applaud the aid that Canada has offered Lebanon through the Red Cross,...[t]his should be aid over and above the half million dollars that is to be put to use in Lebanon. To the suggestion from my Liberal colleagues and me that Canada open an office in Cyprus so that the refugees from Lebanon would not have to go to Syria to obtain visas, there was no response.[26]

NDP MP Bill Blaikie agreed with the inadequacy of Canadian humanitarian aid to Lebanon and also called on the Government to initiate an emergency UN Security Council debate on Lebanon.[27]

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23 Paul Koring, "Abandon Plan to Join WHO, Clark Tells PLO." *Globe and Mail*, 10 May 1989, p. A1; and "UN Agency Delays Decision on PLO." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 May 1989, p. A6.

24 *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, p. 18802.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 18804-18806.

26 *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, pp. 708.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 709-710.

In response to a question from MP Alex Kindy (PC) on 21 April 1989 concerning Canadian immigration services to Lebanese citizens, External Relations Minister Landry stated:

> ...[O]ur embassy in Damascus is able to provide all immigration services. We have four officers on the spot.... Yesterday, we heard from our representative in Syria that Lebanese citizens can enter Syria on their Lebanese I.D. Card or passport.... People living in the Christian sector of Beirut, have passports that will get them to Cyprus. As for the services we are able to offer in Cyprus at the present time, I said yesterday in a statement in the House that we had a consular officer on the spot.... [W]e are able to cope with the demand for the time being....[28]

On 2 May 1989 Liberal MP Sergio Marchi recalled:

> We in the Liberal Party had asked repeatedly in the House...[for the Government] to establish, at the very earliest, a full consular immigration operation in Cyprus, because the very large and proud Lebanese Canadian community in this country wanted to extend an invitation or a sponsorship to families and friends back in Lebanon.... The problem was the inability and the inaccessibility of people in Lebanon to get to a Canadian office.... We have a full operation in Damascus, Syria, but because Syria is one of the antagonists in the war we could hardly imagine whether people, particularly of the Christian faith, would venture into Damascus.... The Government finally responded to those calls by saying that it was going to send one official to Cyprus in order to process those applications.... Our party thinks that we need a full-time immigration consular operation staffed with six or seven employees....[29]

Liberal Member André Ouellet rose in the House on 29 May 1989 to comment on the Arab League's call for a political settlement to the Lebanese crisis:

> ...[W]e deeply regret that the Arab Summit did not recognize that it will be almost impossible to hold free presidential elections, to form a new government or to develop the constitution until the non-Lebanese armed forces have left the country.... I ask the Canadian Government to use all the resources at its disposal, especially its seat on the United Nations Security Council, to help the Lebanese determine their own future and their own government and be able finally to live in freedom and peace.[30]

On 12 July 1988 Liberal MP Roland de Corneille called on the Government to develop measures to help those in Beirut refugee camps that were caught in the crossfire of rival Palestinian militia groups.[31]

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28 *Commons Debates*, 21 April 1989, pp. 794.

29 *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, pp. 1238.

30 *Commons Debates*, 29 May 1989, p. 2246.

31 *Commons Debates*, 12 July 1989, p. 17458.

*Israel and the Occupied Territories*

On 16 December 1988 Progressive Conservative Member Bob Corbett asked External Affairs Minister Clark whether, in light of the Palestinian National Council's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and its proclaimed renunciation of terrorism, the Canadian Government was planning to raise the level of contacts with the PLO. Mr. Clark replied: "We are intending no immediate change in the level or nature of those contacts, but we are naturally encouraged by developments which we think are important and positive in the Middle East...."[32] On 7 April 1989 Mr. Corbett (PC) welcomed the subsequent initiative of the Canadian Government to upgrade its contacts with the PLO, noting that "Canada has long been well regarded by all parties in the Middle East as a peacekeeper and a moderate, trusted voice. This move will further reinforce that position."[33]

Progressive Conservative Member Bill Attewell suggested on 15 May 1989 that "Canada would be more than willing to assist with any international supervisory process" with respect to Israel's proposed peace plan for the occuppied territories.[34]

On 27 June 1989 NDP MP Bill Blaikie asked External Affairs Minister Clark for the Canadian Government position on Israel's plan. Clark replied:

> ...We believe it is a significant and important proposal on the part of Israel. There are obviously a great many details that remain to be worked out. We think that it does provide a basis for movement toward a peaceful settlement in that region, based upon Resolution 242. In that spirit we support it actively and we will try to continue our efforts to encourage the Palestinians to respond in a positive way to that initiative.[35]

On 28 September 1988 NDP Member Howard McCurdy voiced concerns over the violence in the occupied territories:

> ...I rise today in response to reports from the West Bank and Gaza Strip indicating that the Israeli Army is now using plastic bullets without restraint against Palestinians protesting their continuing oppression under occupation.... The replacement of rubber bullets by plastic ones last month has been accompanied by a marked increase in the number of people wounded, up from 19 in July to 130 in the first 25 days of September in the Gaza Strip alone.- ...[T]hose casualty statistics are considered appalling by representatives of the United Nations.... Representatives of the United Nations have protested this

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32 *Commons Debates*, 16 December 1988, p.147.

33 *Commons Debates*, 7 April 1989, p. 215.

34 *Commons Debates*, 15 May 1989, p. 1715.

35 *Commons Debates*, 27 June 1989, p. 3691.

> deliberate and futile escalation. I call on the Government of Canada to do the same.[36]

On 14 April 1989 Progressive Conservative MP Bob Corbett stated: "Surely it is high time for Israel's friends to tell her, in no uncertain terms, that the continual murdering of Palestinian civilians by the Israeli military is cruel, intolerable, and must stop."[37]

Members of Parliament Bill Attewell (PC), Shirley Maheu (Liberal) and Sheila Finestone (Liberal) rose in the House on 10 May 1989 to make separate statements to honour the 41st anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel. Ms. Finestone stated:

> For the past 41 years our country and Israel have shared a strong and close friendship based upon mutual respect and understanding. Although Israel has had to struggle to deal with some of the most trying crises that have ever challenged a modern state, Canadians are pleased to note that she remains a democratic and pluralistic state.... I hope all Members of the House join me in wishing Israel well on this occasion...in the hope that this year we shall finally see an enduring peace brought to all neighbours in the Middle East, as well as to the entire world.[38]

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36 *Commons Debates*, 28 September 1988, pp. 19725-26.

37 *Commons Debates*, 14 April 1989, p. 505.

38 *Commons Debates*, 10 May 1989, pp. 1529-30.

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*BACKGROUND*

***Western Sahara***

The thirteen-year guerrilla war in Western Sahara continued in 1988-1989. This conflict, which pits the Kingdom of Morocco against the *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro* (Polisario), has, to date, claimed approximately 10,000 lives. The Polisario, strongly supported by Algeria, is fighting for the independence of Western Sahara. Spain ended its colonial rule of the area with the signing of the Madrid Accords in late 1975, giving administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania. The latter renounced control of its portion in 1978, resulting in the complete annexation of the territory by Morocco.

In 1975, the International Court of Justice denied Morocco's claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

On 16 May 1988 Algeria and Morocco resumed diplomatic ties following a twelve-year break caused by Algeria's decision in 1976 to recognize the Sahrawi (Saharan) Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), proclaimed by the Polisario on 27 February 1976. In early February 1989, the President of Algeria, Chadli Bendjedid, made a three-day visit to Morocco. It was the first time in seventeen years that an Algerian President had been to Morocco officially. This rapprochement has nurtured hope for a speedier settlement of the Saharan conflict.

The United Nations in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has already made various attempts to initiate a peace process in the area. In 1987, a technical team of UN and OAU envoys visited Western Sahara and the bordering states in a fact-finding mission to establish a framework for a political solution to the conflict. During the summer months of 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar conducted separate negotiations with the parties in Geneva. On 30 August, representatives of the Polisario and Morocco accepted in principle the peace settlement proposed jointly by OAU Chairman, President Moussa Traore of Mali, and the UN Secretary-General.

The peace plan calls for a cease-fire and a referendum--to be organized and monitored by the UN in cooperation with the OAU--for self-determination by the Territory's people. A contingent of UN observers would also be deployed to verify the cessation of hostilities, a cease-fire implementation, and a prisoner exchange.[1] Algeria and Mauritania would assume the role of observers of the peace plan.

On 20 September 1988, the Security Council unanimously voted for the appointment of a UN Special Representative for Western Sahara to oversee the implementation of the peace process. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar assigned Héctor Gros Espiell of Uruguay to this post. In January 1989, Gros Espiell commenced his mission by visiting the Sarwi refugee camps (a total of twenty-six) located in the Tindouf region inside the

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1 *UN Chronicle*, vol. 25 no. 4 (December 1988), p. 32.

south-western Algerian border. These camps, which hold an estimated 165,000 refugees, are controlled by the Polisario and largely supported by Algeria. A substantial amount of humanitarian assistance comes from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

In early January 1989, an unprecedented meeting between King Hassan II and a high-level delegation of the Polisario took place in Morocco. An official Moroccan communiqué reported that the visit's working agenda included discussions on the proposed referendum. Furthermore, according to the Secretary-General of the Polisario Front, Mohammed Abdelaziz, a second round of talks between the two parties would most likely be held at the end of February.[2]

In the interim, the conflict in 1988 has seen intensified assaults along the Hassan Wall, which now extends for approximately 2500 km. (Morocco completed the sixth section of this "Sand Wall" of defence, which is enmeshed with barbed wire and links a series of fortified garrisons, in 1987. This area is further protected by minefields.[3]) In late September 1988, within three weeks of the conditional acceptance by Morocco and the Polisario of the UN-OAU peace plan, heavy fighting took place in the Oum Dreiga region.

*Libya-Chad*

Immediately following the Libyan capture of northern Chad's Aouzou Strip, Libyan bombing raids on N'Djamena, and a response by Chad in the form of air raids on the Libyan air-base at Maaten Es Sara, in mid-September 1987, a cease-fire between the two countries was negotiated upon the initiative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The cease-fire was generally regarded to have remained in place despite continuous sporadic fighting and provocative Libyan military flights over Chadian territory.

As a result of a Libyan initiative, direct talks under the aegis of the OAU were held in Libreville, Gabon from 7 to 9 July 1988 between the Libyan Foreign Minister, Jadallah Azouz at Talhi, and the Chadian Foreign Minister, Captain Gouara Lassou.

On 1 September 1988 Colonel Qaddafi declared that Libya's policy toward Chad had been in error. On 3 October 1988, a formal end to the Libya-Chad war was announced by the Chadian Embassy in Paris. Both countries agreed to immediately restore diplomatic ties, including the setting up of diplomatic missions in each other's countries, to respect the September 1987 cease-fire, and to settle their territorial disputes (centring on the Aouzou Strip).

Libyan concerns in further negotiations will focus on the 2000-3000 Libyans being held in detention in Chad, whereas the Chadians are concerned about the approximately 8000 Libyan soldiers stationed along Chad's northern border.

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2 "Morocco - Polisario Talks Seen." *New York Times*, 21 February 1989, p. A13.

3 Dmitry Zgersky, "The 'Saharan wall' that the U.N. wants to pull down." *New Times* No. 39 (September 1988), p. 9. See also: K.R. Singh, "The Sand Wall is Crumbling." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 5 (August 1988), pp. 479-495.

France continues to provide economic and military assistance to Chad, including 1700 servicemen located in various parts of the country. In 1988 and early 1989, France reduced the size of its military contingent in Chad by 500 persons.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada maintains a policy of neutrality and non-interference toward the situation in Western Sahara. Ottawa encourages the ongoing efforts of UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar aimed at settling the conflict.

Canada abstained from voting on the Resolution concerning Western Sahara passed by the Forty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 November 1988. This Resolution (86 for, 0 against and 53 abstentions) called upon the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario, to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a referendum.

Canada had also abstained from voting on the Resolution concerning the Western Sahara conflict passed by the Forty-second Session of the UN General Assembly in 1987. The Assembly's official records of the forty-second Session summarized Canada's explanation of the vote as follows:

> Ms. Miller (Canada) said that her delegation urged all parties to the dispute to take advantage of the good offices made available to them to find a solution that would be acceptable to them and to the international community. It welcomed the agreement of the parties concerned to receive a technical mission and was prepared to provide technical advice if called upon to do so. Canada's abstention had been premised on the wish to leave the search for a solution to the parties involved and not to prejudge the matter.[4]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The Western Sahara and Libya-Chad conflicts were not raised in the House of Commons between mid-July 1988 and mid-July 1989.

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*BACKGROUND*

***Angola - Namibia - South Africa***

Angola obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) formed the Government and sustained its position with the help of 13,000 Cuban troops. (This number eventually grew to an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Cuban soldiers.) A guerrilla group known as the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), aided by South Africa, became the major opposition force. South Africa defended its involvement on the grounds that Angola was being used as a base by the (Namibian) South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its war for Namibia's independence from South Africa. In 1987 the civil war in Angola reached a stalemate as a result of Cuban and Soviet aid to the MPLA being matched by South African and US aid to UNITA.[1] By 1989, over 100,000 had died and 1.5 million required emergency food and other aid because of the war. On 22 June 1989, at a summit meeting of eighteen African heads of state in Gbadolite, Zaire, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA rebel Leader Jonas Savimbi agreed to an immediate cease-fire. Negotiations on the role of UNITA in the Angolan Government broke down shortly afterwards, with the Government accusing the rebels of breaking the cease-fire.

Namibia has been controlled by South Africa since Germany lost this colony in World War I. (The name of the territory was changed from South-West Africa to Namibia by the United Nations in 1968.) SWAPO, which is under the control of Ovambo tribe leaders and headed by Sam Nujoma, began a guerrilla war for independence in 1966. (The Ovambo tribe constitutes approximately fifty percent of Namibia's 1.63 million inhabitants.) In 1973, the UN General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people" after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1971 that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. In 1978, Security Council Resolution 435 called for a cease-fire, a UN peacekeeping force, and UN-sponsored elections. Subsequently, South Africa affirmed its intention to negotiate the details of a Namibian peace process only if Cuban troops in Angola were withdrawn.

On 22 December 1988, high-level representatives of Angola, Cuba and South Africa formally signed two agreements in New York, following preliminary regional peace talks on 3 and 4 May 1988 in London under the mediation of the United States, and further rounds in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and Brazzaville, Congo. These established the basis for peaceful transition in Namibia. The first of the new agreements, signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), while expanding its terms to reduce South African forces from approximately 50,000 troops to 1500 troops in Namibia, within six weeks of the Agreement's implementation and to confine these troops to two bases south of the Angolan border. The second agreement, signed by Cuba and Angola, set out a withdrawal timetable for the 50,000 Cuban troops, to begin with a 3000-troop reduction on 1 April 1989. All Cuban troops would be redeployed north of the 15th parallel (200 miles north of the Angola-Namibian

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1 John Laffin, *The World in Conflict 1989 - War Annual 3.* London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, pp. 27, 29, 199-201.

border) by August 1989. Twenty-five thousand would be withdrawn from Angola, and the remainder moved north of the 13th parallel (350 miles north of the border), by November 1989. The Cuban departure from Angola is to be completed by 1 July 1991. Further provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and the agreements signed in December 1988 include full independence for Namibia by April 1990, preceded by the election of a Constituent Assembly on 1 November 1989 to draft a Constitution and organize a new government.

On 16 February 1989, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), composed of 4650 peacekeeping troops (including approximately 250 Canadians), 500 police officers and 1000 civilian election monitors. Pressure from the five permanent members of the Security Council reduced the number of peacekeeping troops from an original count of 7500. To oversee Cuban troop withdrawals, a seventy-member UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) had been established in December 1988 by the UN Security Council.[2]

However, on 1 April 1989, the official cease-fire date and the commencement of the Namibian independence process, more than 1,000 SWAPO guerrillas entered Namibia from Angola, taking advantage of the fact that the independence plan did not specify precisely where SWAPO forces were to remain during the arranged cease-fire. Over 300 SWAPO guerrillas were killed by South African forces as a result.[3] In May 1989, talks resumed between Angolan, Cuban, and South African officials in an attempt to "retrack" the Namibian independence process. By July 1989, conditions in the original timetable, including the withdrawal of South African troops and the return of an estimated 40,000 Namibian exiles for scheduled elections on 1 November 1989, were being met. However, on 28 June 1989, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar warned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, perpetuated by South African police forces in northern Namibia, might jeopardize conditions for fair elections.

***Mozambique - South Africa***

After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won control of the new nation. The opposition guerrilla Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), known as RENAMO, was founded by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977. After the end of white-minority rule in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1982, South Africa took over the support and training of RENAMO guerrillas. In 1984, Mozambique's President Samora Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, which provided for an end to South African support to RENAMO and Mozambican use of its territory as a base for African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas in their operations against South Africa. Machel was killed in a plane crash on 19 October 1986 and Joachim Chissano took over the presidency. Mozambique has regularly accused South Africa of violating the 1984 Accord by continuing to support RENAMO. In August 1987, a Joint Security Commission was revived to monitor compliance with the

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2 Tony Banks and Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "UN to Monitor Angolan Pull-out." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 1 (7 January 1989), p. 10.

3 Gwynne Dyer, "Namibian Blunder a Case of Singular Stupidity." *Toronto Star*, 10 April 1989, p. 13; and "Namibia Independence Plan Stalled." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 May 1989, p. A7.

Accord. Nevertheless, 20,000 RENAMO troops remain in control of rural Mozambique, despite the assistance of 10,000 Zimbabwean troops to the Mozambican Government.

In a visit to Mozambique on 12 and 13 September 1988, South African President P. W. Botha called for reactivation of the 1984 Accord, reiterated previous assurances that South Africa no longer supported RENAMO, and pledged economic aid for Mozambique. RENAMO rebels continued a campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians (deaths being estimated at 100,000 since 1984), as well as attacking government installations such as the Cabora Bassa dam. On 7 February 1989 South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha asked the United States to broker a peace settlement for Mozambique. At the end of June 1989 the Mozambican Government offered to open peace talks with RENAMO rebels, provided they renounced violence and adhered to constitutional rule. In response, RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama called on FRELIMO to agree to a two-year transitional government that would prepare for elections and constitutional reform in Mozambique.

***South Africa***

In June 1988, South African President P. W. Botha renewed a two-year old state of emergency for another year and announced new press restrictions. On 12 August 1988, Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the African National Congress (ANC), was hospitalized for tuberculosis and in December 1988 was moved to a private home on prison grounds. South African municipal elections were held in October 1988. The ruling National Party retained control over the majority of white cities, but the right-wing Conservative Party made gains in the areas of Transvaal and Natal provinces. Also in October, a fire bomb attack on the South African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) headquarters took place, following the 31 August bombing in Johannesburg of Khotso House, headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and other human rights groups. In November 1988, nineteen black activists on trial since 1986 for demonstrations and rent strikes near Johannesburg in 1984 (the "Delmas Treason Trial") were sentenced. Eight were acquitted, while the rest received sentences ranging from suspended five-year sentences to twelve-year prison terms. Also in November 1988, South African President P. W. Botha granted clemency to the "Sharpeville Six" who had been facing execution since March 1988 for their part in the killing of a municipal councillor in Sharpeville at the start of township unrest in September 1984.

South Africa's state of emergency was renewed in June 1989. During the previous three years an estimated 30,000 people had been detained under the special emergency powers, not including an estimated 6000 detained under other South African security laws. Frederik de Klerk captured the ruling National Party leadership in February 1989 and was to take his party into national elections scheduled for 6 September 1989, in which the 28 million-strong black majority would not be allowed to vote. Jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela confirmed in early July 1989 that he had met with President Botha.

***Ethiopia - Somalia***

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of the Ogaden region began in 1977. Ethiopia and Somalia signed a treaty formally ending the conflict in April 1988 and agreed to an exchange of prisoners in August 1988. Ethiopia was motivated to negotiate because of the need to free its troops for counteroffensives against the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), fighting for secession from Ethiopia, and the Tigrean People's Liberation Army (TPLF), fighting to overthrow the present Ethiopian

Government. In 1988 and through the first months of 1989, fighting in the fourteen-year old Ethiopian civil war resulted in heavy Government territorial losses in the provinces of Tigre (December 1988) and of Eritrea. The Soviet Union, the country's main source of military and economic aid, pressured Ethiopian President Mengistu to negotiate with the rebel groups. On 15 May 1989, a coup attempt by senior Ethiopian military officers against President Mengistu failed. On 6 June 1989, the Ethiopian Parliament passed a resolution calling for peace talks with Eritrean and Tigrean rebels. The Resolution called for talks to be held without preconditions, in public, and in the presence of a neutral observer. On 13 June 1989, Tigrean rebels accepted Mengistu's offer of unconditional talks, with the Eritrean rebels subsequently following suit.

Regarding Somalia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocké, charged the Somali Government with using international food aid to feed Ethiopian refugees drafted to fight in its civil war against the Somali National Movement, a rebel group based in northern Somalia. Hocké also insisted that UN food supply routes be re-directed, and called for negotiations to phase out aid to Ethiopian refugees in Sudan by 1991 while assisting their return to their homeland.[4]

***Sudan***

Between 1955 and 1972, the Muslim Arabs of northern Sudan fought a major war against the Christian and animist rebels of the south. Despite a negotiated peace settlement, the southern peoples formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to fight oppression from state security forces and the imposition of Islamic laws (*sharia*). Receiving arms from Ethiopia, the SPLA, led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, has encouraged the Dinka tribe, of which he is a member, to retaliate against the Sudanese Army. The war-induced starvation, aggravated by the obstruction of international food relief deliveries, is estimated to have killed 250,000 southern Sudanese in 1988 and led to the displacement of 1.6 million people.

On 14 May 1988, Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi announced the formation of a twenty-seven-member coalition Government. On 29 September 1988, President Museveni of Uganda announced that negotiations to end the civil war would take place between the SPLA and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the second largest partner after the Mahdi's Umma Party in the Sudanese coalition Government. Meetings between the SPLA and the DUP took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and on 16 November 1988, a peace agreement was reached calling for an immediate cease-fire, an end to the state of emergency, and an all-party conference to end the war and form a new government. The Mahdi Government accepted the peace accord on 26 March 1989 under pressure from its own army, moderate Arab states concerned with Islamic fundamentalism, and the US Government (which objected to the use of food as a weapon of war). In March 1989, the Sudanese Government stated, amid international skepticism, that it would agree to the

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4 Jane Perlez, "Ethiopia Starts to Come Unglued After String of Military Setbacks/Ethiopian Regime is Said to Face Deepening Crisis." *New York Times*, 22 March 1989, pp. A1 and A8; and "U.N. Withholds Aid in Somalia Dispute." *New York Times*, 28 January 1989, p. A4.

large-scale distribution of relief food to southern Sudan.[5] On 30 June 1989 Sudanese Army officers staged a bloodless coup, toppling the Mahdi Government and imposing martial law. The new military leader, General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, declared a month-long cease-fire in the civil war. This followed a unilateral rebel cease-fire called on 1 May 1989. Talks between the Sudanese Government and the SPLA were scheduled to begin in mid-July 1989.

***Burundi***

Long-standing tensions between the Tutsi, the politically dominant tribe which forms fifteen percent of the population, and the Hutu, erupted in the Ntega region of northeast Burundi on 10 August 1988. An estimated 1000 people from both tribes were killed in clashes on 15 and 16 August. The Burundian Army, composed mainly of the Tutsi tribe, launched reprisals between 17 and 22 August that claimed an estimated 5000 Hutu lives. Approximately 60,000 of 100,000 homeless have taken refuge in makeshift camps in the Butare region in neighbouring Rwanda.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

***Angola - South Africa - Mozambique***

Canada has attempted to assist those countries affected by the conflicts in southern Africa. Canada was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council when Resolution 435 of 1978 (the Namibian independence plan) was adopted. In 1977, Canada joined the five-country "Contact Group" established by the UN to find a solution to the occupation of Namibia. In addition, Canada annually provides an estimated $140 million in economic aid, chiefly through the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), to front line states (those bordering South Africa) such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Since 1961, when the Diefenbaker Government declared its opposition to *apartheid*, Canada has repeatedly condemned South Africa for its domestic policies and intervention in the affairs of front line states. Since 1985, Ottawa has also imposed limited economic and diplomatic sanctions on Pretoria. (See previous editions of *The Guide*.)

The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa held its second and third meetings in Toronto (August 1988) and Harare, Zimbabwe (February 1989). The Commonwealth Committee was created by the Heads of Governments Meeting in October 1987 in Vancouver, and comprises the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the Toronto meeting chaired by Canada, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced that $1 million would be put forward by Canada to implement a strategy to counter South African propaganda and censorship.[6] In addition, Clark announced a feasibility study to explore the creation of a

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5 Jane Perlez, "The Sudan's War by Starvation is Exhausting U.S. Diplomacy." *New York Times*, 19 March 1989, p. A2; Jane Perlez, "Sudan Agrees to Food Relief but Skepticism Persists." *New York Times*, 11 March 1989, p. A4; and "Sudan: Pragmatism Rules Peace Bid." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 March 1989, p. A8.

6 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.165 (3 August 1988).

Commonwealth-wide network of non-governmental organizations to educate and train black South Africans.[7]

At the Commonwealth Ministers' Committee meeting in Harare, Clark expressed Canada's concerns as follows:

> It is important to focus on South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbours.... Zimbabwe has suffered both directly from South African oppression and just as significantly from South African aggression and interference. So have the other states of the frontline. There is no reason for anyone to assume that South Africa's intentions have changed.... [W]e have to work on the assumption that it will not disappear until the system of apartheid itself is dismantled.[8]

At the same meeting, Clark announced that Canada would provide $954,200 to the Canadian Council of Churches to assist displaced persons in Mozambique and Mozambican refugees who have fled to neighbouring states as a result of RENAMO guerrilla activities.[9]

Both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September 1988 [10]) and External Affairs Minister Clark have responded to requests from front line states for the protection of SADCC and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) projects from sabotage, by pledging logistical support, food and training to these states. Clark explained that "[t]he success of development projects in the SADCC region, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors, depends on the ability of those countries to protect the project sites. Destabilization and insurgency activities continue to be a threat to major development projects...."[11]

On 26 September 1988, the Canadian Government announced that it would tighten a 1986 ban on Government procurement of South African goods by applying it to subsidiaries of South African companies. These companies would not be eligible for Canadian Government assistance and would not be able to sell to South African clients. Other measures included a ban on Crown Corporation product and commodity sales to South African-controlled companies and an expansion of the high-technology items sales ban to include the private sector. Toward this end, on 7 March 1989, South Africa was added to

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7 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 164 (2 August 1988).

8 Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "At the Opening of the Third Meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa: Speech...[to the Committee], Harare, Zimbabwe, February 6, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/5, pp. 1-2.

9 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 025 (7 February 1989).

10 Rt. Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, "Address...before the UN General Assembly, New York, United States, September 29, 1988." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, pp. 2-3.

11 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 213 (29 September 1988), p. 1.

Canada's "Area Control List", a list of countries for which exports in strategic and high-technology equipment are subject to control by the federal Government.[12]

Despite these measures, the voluntary nature of the bulk of Canada's sanctions against South Africa was reported to have contributed to an increase of sixty-eight percent in South African exports to Canada during the first eleven months of 1988. Total Canadian exports to South Africa were up forty-eight percent in 1988.[13] Statistics Canada reported imports of $76.9 million worth of goods from South Africa in the first four months of 1989, up 130.7 percent from $33.33 million imported in the same period of 1988. Exports totalled $30.9 million, down from $38.7 million.[14]

In early 1989, it was reported that the Canadian Government had approved a $600 million loan by the Bank of Nova Scotia to the South African Anglo-American Corporation through its base in Luxembourg.[15] The loan was for a takeover of another South African company, but fell through when the bid collapsed. Further debate focussed on the export of commodities such as sulphur to South Africa and on the Canadian importation of products such as pulp and strategic metals from South Africa.[16] Canadian-made equipment used by the South African military was reported to have been shipped through third parties.[17] The 1988 annual report of the Canadian Government agency which monitors the Government's code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa gave Canadian firms passing grades for fair hiring, wages, and working conditions. Eleven Canadian firms pulled out of South Africa in 1987 and two in 1988, while six firms remained.[18]

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12 Rt. Honourable Brian Mulroney, *supra* note 10, pp. 2-3; Nancy Wood, "Clark Tightens S. African Sanctions." *The Gazette*, 27 September 1988, p. B5; "More Restrictions Put on South African Trade." *Gazette*, 7 March 1989, p. B1; and Ross Howard, "Tougher S. Africa Trade Ban is Sought/South Africa Ban Tightened." *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 1989, p. A1.

13 Oakland Ross, "Ottawa-Pretoria Trade Jump Alarms African Nations/Clark Planning to Explain Increased Trade Figures." *Globe and Mail*, 6 February 1989, p. A1.

14 Charlotte Montgomery, "S. African Exports to Canada Double." *Globe and Mail*, 13 July 1989, p. A1.

15 Douglas Anglin, "Canada Can Toughen Its Sanctions Policy." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 May 1989, p. A9; and Oakland Ross, "Clark to Caution Canadian Banks on Loans to S. African Companies." *Globe and Mail*, 9 February 1989, p. A1.

16 Andrew Cohen, "Sulphur for South Africa a Hot Issue." *Financial Post*, 13 February 1989, p. 13; and John Kohut, "Canada Seen as Having Few Options to Trade With South Africa." *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1989, p. B5.

17 Tim Harper, "Ottawa Said at Fault as Arms Embargo Broken." *Toronto Star*, 8 February 1989, p. A19; and Oakland Ross, "Canada Not Only Nation Queried on Arms Sales, Zimbabwe Says." *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1989, p. A1.

18 John Hay, "In South Africa, There's Now Hope For Change." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 June 1989, p. A9.

The Canadian Government has maintained a policy of supplying humanitarian aid, but not military or institutional support, to the African National Congress (ANC), the main anti-*apartheid* group in southern Africa. Canadian Government officials did not meet with Peter Mahlangu upon his arrival in Toronto as the new representative of the ANC in Canada. The ANC has no diplomatic status in Canada, although it opened one of its forty-four world-wide missions in Canada eleven years ago.[19]

On the occasion of Nelson Mandela's seventieth birthday in July 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark urged the South African Government to grant his unconditional release and that of all political prisoners.[20] Clark condemned the August 1988 bombing of Khotso House, headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and other human rights groups and the October 1988 bombing of the headquarters of the South African Catholic Bishop's Conference (SACBC), and pledged assistance to help rebuild the two facilities.[21] Commenting on the municipal elections held on 26 October 1988, Clark stated that the elections were "undemocratic, because they were organized on a strictly racial basis and severely limited the number of blacks eligible to vote."[22] Expressing concern over the sentences received by defendants in the "Delmas Treason Trial", Clark maintained that the South African Government was using the legal system "to harass and suppress legitimate opposition to apartheid."[23] Clark welcomed the clemency granted to the convicted "Sharpeville Six" and urged that clemency be exercised in other, similar cases.[24]

In July 1988 the Canadian Government announced that individuals travelling on South African passports and seeking entry into Canada to participate in sports events would be denied visas. On 28 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark and Minister of Fitness and Amateur Sport Jean Charest announced a strengthened Government policy on sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa. The policy includes encouraging Canadian sports organizations to decline invitations to events in third countries in which South Africans are participating. Further, Canadian sports organizations are requested to suspend athletes within their purview who participate in sports events in South Africa, compliance with which will be taken into account in Government funding decisions.[25]

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19 Charlotte Montgomery, "Ottawa Unlikely to Change Policy on ANC." *Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1989, p. A13; and Charlotte Montgomery, "PM Assailed as Lewis Welcomes ANC Envoy." *Globe and Mail*, 12 May 1989, p. A10.

20 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 150 (15 July 1988).

21 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 188 (1 September 1988); and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 221 (12 October 1988).

22 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 232 (28 October 1988), p. 1.

23 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 246 (8 December 1988).

24 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 240 (23 November 1988).

25 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 156 (28 June 1989).

***Namibia***

On 22 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the agreements signed in New York providing for the UN-supervised Namibian independence plan, including the phasing out of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia. Subsequently, Clark announced that Canadian troops would be part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). An advance group of fifty soldiers departed from Canada in March 1989. Following the outbreak of hostilities on 1 April 1989, the Canadian Government pledged to accelerate the deployment of 200 additional peacekeeping troops, who arrived in mid-April 1989.[26] (See Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*.) Aside from personnel attached to UNTAG, Canada will be sending a group of parliamentary election observers in September 1989. In addition, Canada has donated 4,000 ballot boxes and the services of an electoral computer expert for UN-monitored elections for Namibia's Constituent Assembly scheduled for 1 November 1989.[27]

***Ethiopia***

Following a meeting with UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar in New York on 19 May 1988, Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry stated that "Canada, one of the principal donors to Ethiopia, continues to hope that the Ethiopian Government will agree to allow the actions of all Non-governmental Organizations who have expressed a humanitarian and unselfish desire to participate in relief operations."[28] In response to an urgent appeal from the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), a Canadian Forces humanitarian relief mission to Ethiopia began on 1 June 1988 and continued through to September 1988, delivering food supplies for 100,000 people.[29]

***Sudan***

It was announced on 17 October 1988 that Canadian Government officials had met with the Sudanese Ambassador to Canada to discuss the civil war in Sudan. According to an External Affairs press release, "The Canadian Government used the occasion to reiterate its serious concerns about the disastrous effects the civil war is having on the Sudanese population and pressed the Sudanese Government to explore all means available to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict." The Canadian Government contributed a total of $17.5 million in aid to Sudan during 1988, including $9 million in food aid, $2 million for

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26 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 255 (22 December 1988); "Clark Pledges Forces for UN in Namibia." *Globe and Mail*, 31 January 1989, p. A5; and Paul Koring, "SWAPO Broke Accord, Clark Acknowledges." *Globe and Mail*, 7 April 1989, p. A12.

27 *The Election Process in Namibia: An International Roundtable - A Summary Report Prepared by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security*. Ottawa, Canada, 6-7 July 1989, pp. 7-8 and 10; and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (22 June 1989).

28 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 110 (20 May 1988).

29 Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 75/88 (7 September 1988).

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, and approximately $2 million for Canadian and UN relief activities in the Sudan.[30]

***Burundi***

On 31 August 1988, the Burundian Ambassador to Canada met with External Affairs Minister Clark, who expressed concern over the tribal conflict in northeastern Burundi. Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry announced that CIDA would provide food aid of $100,000 and pledged initial humanitarian aid of $100,000 to the refugees of the conflict. Further humanitarian aid was proposed as soon as Canadian Government fact-finding missions were concluded.[31]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 16 September 1988 MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) questioned the Government's promise of 23 October 1985 to sever all economic relations with South Africa if there was no improvement in the situation with respect to *apartheid*. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark replied:

> If other measures will not allow Canada to help us bring an end to an apartheid regime, then we are prepared to consider the absolute disruption of economic and diplomatic relations.[32]

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney responded to a similar question by McCurdy on 27 September 1988 as follows:

> It is widely recognized by the leaders of the Front Line States, the leaders of the Commonwealth, et le Sommet de la Francophonie that Canada has provided very important moral leadership in this vital fight against apartheid....We view it as a most complicated, important moral issue, the most sensitive moral issue affecting nations today.[33]

In an exchange on 30 September 1988 between the Leader of the Opposition John Turner and Acting Prime Minister Flora MacDonald, Turner asked:

> The situation has deteriorated in South Africa. Why did the Prime Minister not keep his word yesterday by imposing total sanctions and breaking diplomatic relations?

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30 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 225 (17 October 1988), pp. 1-2.

31 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 191 (2 September 1988).

32 *Commons Debates*, 16 September 1988, p. 19334.

33 *Commons Debates*, 27 September 1988, p. 19696.

The Acting Prime Minister replied:

> ...the policy of the Canadian Government is to move in a deliberate and systematic way toward total sanctions....That approach is endorsed by the majority of members of the Commonwealth. It is endorsed by the leaders of the Front Line States in southern Africa. It is endorsed by those who best know the terrible situation which exists in South Africa....[34]

According to Ms. MacDonald, in August 1988 Mr. Mugabe of Zimbabwe had told Prime Minister Mulroney "privately and publicly that he endorsed the anti-*apartheid* measures that Canada has taken, and that further steps are not necessary at this time."[35]

On 31 August 1988, Liberal MP John Nunziata questioned the Government on the operation of South African companies in Canada. He asked:

> If the Minister and his Government are committed...[to measures to demonstrate opposition to apartheid in South Africa], will he explain why two South African companies operating in Canada, Boart Canada International and Long Year Canada, have received grants from the federal Government, and that Long Year and another company linked closely to Boart Canada have received $2 million in government contracts? Does the Minister feel that the Canadian taxpayer should be subsidizing South African companies operating in Canada?

Mr. Clark replied that he was not aware of the arrangements of these companies with the Canadian Government. Responding to a follow-up question by Mr. Nunziata, the then Minister for Regional Industrial Expansion and Minister of State for Science and Technology Robert de Cotret declared:

> I can tell the House that the Department has not provided any financial assistance to Boart Canada Incorporated. At the moment there are some applications from Boart or Long Year before the Department, that any corporate citizen can make. They are under review and...I have requested that these particular cases be brought to my immediate attention.[36]

On 18 July 1988, NDP MP Bill Blaikie spoke on behalf of his caucus, calling on the Government of South Africa to free Nelson Mandela.[37] On 17 August 1988, MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) stated:

> ...Mandela is a symbol of black South Africans' struggle for justice. His refusal to bend to the racist regime or to be robbed of his human dignity is nothing less than a fiery demand by all black South Africans for full and complete equality, socially, politically, and economically.... The South African Govern-

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34 *Commons Debates*, 30 September 1988, p. 19813.

35 *Ibid*..

36 *Commons Debates*, 31 August 1988, p. 19110.

37 *Commons Debates*, 18 July 1988, p. 17662.

> ment must release Nelson Mandela, not because he is sick but for the same reason it should free all black South Africans, because it is right. Canada and the world should insist upon it.[38]

On 29 August 1988 MP Dave Nickerson (PC) asked that Canada press the United Nations to conduct an investigation and to take action to stop the continuing of intertribal violence in Burundi.[39] Following questions from MP Barry Turner (PC) on 30 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark stated:

> Officials of my Department have met the Ambassador from Burundi. A representative of the Government of Canada was in the country last week, has just returned to Rwanda and is reporting to us. We are meeting today with representatives of the Hutu population in the region. We will work through the Francophonie and other organizations to try to change the practices that have so shocked the world.... [T]he European Community has suggested that it would be helpful to have an independent commission of inquiry. That was rejected initially by the Government of Burundi. We hope that it will reconsider that reaction.[40]

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38 *Commons Debates*, 17 August 1988, p. 18428.

39 *Commons Debates*, 29 August 1988, p. 18953.

40 *Commons Debates*, 30 August 1988, p. 19042.

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*BACKGROUND*

***India - Pakistan***

On 17 August 1988 President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan was killed in a plane explosion, which a Commission of Official Inquiry later described as an "act of highly-sophisticated sabotage."[1]

The resulting political vacuum was filled by the Chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was appointed interim President, and in early 1989 was voted in as President for five years. Elections for the National Assembly, which had been announced by Zia for 16 November 1988, proceeded as scheduled. Both Pakistanis and foreigners agreed that the elections were generally conducted freely and fairly (the first such elections in eleven years).[2] The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the main opposition party, won the largest number of seats (92 out of 205 contested seats) and Benazir Bhutto, the head of the PPP, was asked on 1 December 1988 by President Ishaq Khan to form the new government.[3] Bhutto has thus become the first woman to lead a modern Islamic state.[4] (Bhutto is the daughter of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who held office from 1971 to 1977 until he was deposed in a coup led by General Zia, at the time the Army Chief of Staff.)

The above-mentioned events, including Pakistan's thrust toward democratization, have contributed to a recent thaw in relations between India and Pakistan. Past tension has resulted from border disputes, complex ethnic and religious problems and, in more recent times, a regional arms race. On 29 December 1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India visited Pakistan, it was the first time in nearly thirty years that the head of an Indian Government had done so. During their meetings the two leaders finalized agreements on trade and cultural ties, as well as signing a separate agreement in which they pledged not to attack each other's nuclear power installations. The agreement has yet to be ratified by the Parliaments of the two countries.[5]

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1 "Un acte de sabotage a fait exploser l'avion de Zia." *Le Devoir*, 17 October 1988, p. 1.

2 Barbara Crossette, "Bhutto Says Vote Gave Her Mandate." *New York Times*, 18 November 1988, p. 1; and "Bhutto crie victoire." *La Presse*, 17 November 1988, p. A1.

3 Crossette, *supra* note 2.

4 "Benazir Bhutto est prête à prendre la tête du Pakistan." *La Presse*, 18 November 1988, p. A8; and Barbara Crossette, "Daughter of Determination: Benazir Bhutto." *New York Times*, 2 December 1988, p. 1.

5 Barbara Crossette, "What Gandhi and Bhutto Didn't Discuss: Kashmir." *New York Times*, 3 January 1989, p. A10; and Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

The issue of Kashmir, which continues to harm relations between the two countries, apparently was not discussed during these meetings.[6] Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars, of which two, in 1947-1948 and in 1965, were over Kashmir. When India and Pakistan were divided in 1947, Pakistan believed that Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population, should have fallen under its control. India did not agree and an armed conflict ensued, resulting in the division of the region between the two countries.

The United Nations has called for a plebiscite on the issue among the Kashmiris both in Pakistan and India. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in which Canada participates, was established in 1949 to supervise the "line of control." Canadian observers provide Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biennially between Srinagar (India) and Rawalpindi (Pakistan).

At the end of June 1989 it was reported that India and Pakistan had agreed to discuss the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Siachen (Himalayan) glacier, to create a demilitarized zone. The Siachen glacier, located in Kashmir and bordering China, has never been officially demarcated. Tensions over the glacier have intensified since 1984 when India seized the area.[7]

In early March 1989, India announced a reduction in its defence budget. According to an Indian senior official, this decision was partly a by-product of recently improved relations with both China and Pakistan. However, he also stressed that if the US agreed to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, then the decision to reduce the budget might be rescinded.[8]

On 22 May 1989, India successfully launched its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Agni. The missile is credited with a range of 2500 km and a payload of one ton. Prime Minister Gandhi insisted that the Agni was not a nuclear weapons system,[9] although some Western defence experts maintained that the missile could be equipped with a thermonuclear bomb.[10] (In 1974, India detonated a "peaceful" nuclear explosion.)

Reports continue of a Pakistani programme to develop nuclear weapons, despite repeated official assurances that it is engaged in a strictly peaceful nuclear program.

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6 Crossette, *supra* note 4.

7 Sanjoy Hazarika, "India and Pakistan Plan Pullout of Troops From Disputed Glacier." *New York Times*, 28 June 1989, p. 2.

8 Sanjoy Hazarika, "India Reduces its Military Budget as Links With Neighbors Improve. *New York Times*, 2 March 1989, p. A8.

9 Bryan Johnson, "India Flexing New Military Muscle With Missile-Based Defence Plan." *Globe and Mail*, 27 May 1989, p. A1; and Pushpindar Singh, "India's Agni Success Poses New Problems." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 22 (3 June 1989), pp. 1052-53.

10 "Launch Puts India in Missile Club." *Toronto Star*, 23 May 1989, p. A17.

In an address to the US Congress in June 1989, Prime Minister Bhutto repeatedly denied that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and stated that her country "remain[s] ready to accept any safeguards, inspection and verification that are applied on a non-discriminatory regional basis."[11] Pakistan and India are not signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Pakistan has stated that it would sign the Treaty if India agreed to do so.

In early 1989, Pakistan announced the successful testing of two long-range surface-to-surface missiles with a payload of half a ton, the HATF-1 (approximately 70-km range) and the HATF-2 (approximately 300-km range). Furthermore, on 29 June 1989, Pakistan's Secretary of State for Defence announced that Pakistan would attempt to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile similar to India's Agni.

In early June 1989, during an official visit to Britain, Bhutto said that Pakistan had formally invited India to engage in bilateral arms control talks as well as discussions that might lead to a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation.[12] In July 1989, US President Bush reportedly urged India to begin talks with Pakistan about each other's nuclear research programs in order to reduce tensions between the two countries.[13]

***India - China***

On a visit to India in November 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev stressed that the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union, China and India would not only be beneficial to all parties involved, but also "crucial for Asia and the world." However, Gandhi reportedly told Gorbachev that although China had expressed the need for improvements in relations with India, it had not yet given any indication of change in what Gandhi described as its "rigid" stand on settlement of their border dispute.[14]

The following month Gandhi visited Beijing, marking what has been described as the "beginning of a new era" in relations between India and China.[15] The two countries signed accords on science and technology, civil aviation (the establishment of direct air flights between New Delhi and Beijing), and culture (exchanges of students, artists and films).

Gandhi and his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng, also signed an agreement establishing a high-level working group to negotiate a possible solution to the Himalayan border

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11 "Pakistan has No Nuclear Arms, Bhutto Tells U.S. Congress." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A20; and "Bhutto obtient le soutien du président américain." *Le Devoir*, 7 June 1989, p. 4.

12 "Bhutto has Invited India to Talk About Arms Control." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A2.

13 Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

14 Salamat Ali, "A Shot in the Arm: Gorbachev Reassures Gandhi over China Rapprochement." *The Economist*, vol. 142 no. 48 (1 December 1988), p. 38.

15 "Gandhi se rend à Pekin." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5.

dispute which has soured relations between the two countries since the eruption of a brief border war in 1962. India claims that China is illegally occupying an area of approximately 38,000 sq km on the western Himalayan border; China is calling for the return of approximately 90,000 sq km of mountainous frontier making up India's northeast Province of Arunachal Pradesh.[16] Eight rounds of talks on the territorial dispute have been held between experts from the two countries since 1981, but without success.

Li Peng also reportedly discussed the issue of Tibet with Gandhi, underlining the hope that India would retain its traditional position of "non-interference" as well as "non-involvement" with the alleged "separatist" activities of some members of the Tibetan community in India. The Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, and approximately 100,000 Tibetan refugees live in India.[17]

***Afghanistan***

In accordance with the agreement signed in Geneva in April 1988 by Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union and the US as guarantors, roughly half of the more than 100,000 Soviet military personnel had been withdrawn from Afghanistan by September 1988. On 4 November 1988 Soviet President Gorbachev, charging that increased attacks against the Afghan Government were directly a result of arms provided to Afghan guerrillas by the US through Pakistan, temporarily suspended the military withdrawal. Addressing the United Nations on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev proposed an agreement to cut off weapons shipments to the guerrillas and to the Afghan Government headed by President Najibullah. The proposal was renewed in a message to US President Bush on 17 February 1989, but was rejected by Washington.

On 25 December 1988, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to Afghanistan Yuli M. Vorontsov met with the exiled King of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, for talks on forming a broad-based Afghan Government.

In Taif, Saudi Arabia on 3 to 5 December 1988, the Soviet Union and the Afghan-guerrilla alliance based in Pakistan held their first meeting since Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979. The Kabul Government was excluded from the talks at the request of the guerrilla coalition. Following sessions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in January 1989, the guerrillas broke off the negotiations as a result of the Soviets' insistence that President Najibullah be included in any future Afghan coalition government. On 3 January 1989, the guerrilla alliance announced the formation of a temporary representative council that would have the authority to name an interim government in Afghanistan.

Following visits to Kabul and Islamabad by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in January and early February 1989, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. Afghan guerrilla leaders called for a *shura* or consultative council of about 400 delegates to form the basis of a new government in exile. The council, which met from 10 to 24 February 1989, elected Sibgatullah Mojadedi as acting President and

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16 "Gandhi prône l'amitié sino-indienne." *La Presse*, 20 December 1988, p. B10; and "China and India Agree to More Border Talks." *New York Times*, 23 December 1988, p. A3.

17 *La Presse*, *supra* note 2; and "Rajiv Gandhi quitte Pékin avec quelques accords, dans une nouvelle 'ambiance'." *La Presse*, 23 December 1988, p. B5.

Adurab Resul Sayyaf as acting Prime Minister of the government-in-exile. Feuding between various groups dominated the council, particularly on the issue of representation of Afghanistan's largest minority, Shiite Muslims. At the start of March 1989, the guerrilla Provisional Government held its first cabinet meeting inside Afghanistan.

On 5 March 1989 intense fighting began in a prolonged guerrilla attack on the border city of Jalalabad, 160 km east of Kabul near the Afghan border with Pakistan. Fighting has continued through to July 1989, the summer months traditionally incurring the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan, before the winter hampers guerrilla movements. On 20 May 1989, President Najibullah appointed a three-member commission to negotiate, without condition, an end to the war.

Ending a five-day visit to the US on 10 June 1989, Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto joined with US President Bush in stating that they were both committed to a political solution to the Afghan war, while continuing to provide weapons, transport and food to Afghan rebel groups. It has been widely reported that the Soviet Union has continued to supply weapons to the Kabul Government after its military withdrawal from the country in February 1989. US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan were scheduled for 31 July to 1 August 1989.

*Sri Lanka*

The first anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to establish peace in Sri Lanka, on 29 July 1988, was marked by protests, acts of violence, and a general strike. The Agreement by the then President, J. Jayawardene, of Sri Lanka and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was intended to "legitimize" India's military presence on the island in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Indian troops were deployed to help the Government in Colombo put an end to Tamil militant violence against the majority Sinhalese, specifically by disarming all militant Tamil groups including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who had become the "undisputed masters" of the Tamil resistance (separatist) movement.[18] However, ethnic strife and the guerrilla war, which had erupted in 1983, continued. There are currently an estimated 45,000 to 60,000 Indian troops in the northern and eastern regions of the country.

Approximately 9000 to 10,000 Sri Lankans have died as a result of the civil war, and terrorist activities by the resurrected *Janata Vimukti Peramuna* (JVP or People's Liberation Front), a militant Sinhalese group operating in the south. The IPKF has suffered more than 900 casualties.[19]

On 8 and 9 September 1988, President Jayawardene issued a proclamation allowing for a temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, essentially creating a semi-autonomous Tamil-dominated province as stipulated by the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. Elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council (also provided for under the Agreement) were held on 19 November 1988. The majority in the seventy-one-

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18 John Laffin, *The World in Conflict 1989 - War Annual 3*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, p. 205.

19 "Les Sri Lankais vont voter dans la peur et le sang." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5; and "India Seeking Way Out of Sri Lankan Conflict." *Gazette*, 8 May 1989, p. A10.

member Assembly was won by the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), which has since been under the protection of the Indian Force. The LTTE boycotted the elections. The merger will be subject to a July referendum in the former Eastern Province.[20]

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa of the ruling United National Party (UNP) won the Presidential elections which were held on 19 December 1988. On 12 January 1989, the new President lifted the state of emergency which had been imposed by President Jayawardene in May 1983. In addition, Premadasa quickly acted to fulfill an electoral promise calling for a "negotiated withdrawal" of the IPKF by requesting a partial removal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka. The Indian Government subsequently withdrew approximately 3000 soldiers. (A similar withdrawal of an estimated 2500 troops had occurred on 7 June 1988.)

The first direct negotiations between the LTTE and the Colombo Government since 1983, were held in May and June 1989. On 28 June, it was announced that the two sides had agreed to an immediate cease-fire, and had decided to pursue discussions on a variety of important issues, including demands for a Tamil independent state.[21]

President Premadasa officially requested, in early June 1989, that India begin a total withdrawal of its personnel from Sri Lanka, to be completed by 29 July 1989, the second anniversary of the signing of the July 1987 "Peace Accord". This request was repeated on 27 June. Gandhi replied in a letter to Premadasa in mid-July that a withdrawal would be possible only when the terms of the July 1987 Agreement had been fully implemented, especially those regarding an end to the Tamil insurgency.

Renewed violence was reported in both north and south at the end of June 1989. The militant Sinhalese (JVP) demand the complete withdrawal of Indian troops and an end to Tamil autonomy before they will lay down their arms. Tamil groups have also begun an offensive against the Tigers (LTTE), fearing that any peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Government will exclude them from the "political picture." On the other hand, the Tigers demand total removal of the Indian Force and dissolution of the Provincial Council in the Northeastern province, which is administered by members of Tamil groups protected by Indian troops.[22] Growing opposition has been reported among the Sri Lankan population to the presence of Indian troops on their soil, which are being perceived as an "army of occupation."

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 17 August 1988, following the death of President Zia, the Minister for International Trade and Acting External Affairs Minister John Crosbie extended condolences on the

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20 Barbara Crossette, "If the War has Ended, Why are so Many Dying?" *New York Times*, 9 March 1989, p. 4.

21 "Sri Lanka and Tamil Rebels Agree to a Cease-fire." *The New York Times*, 29 June 1989, p. A5.

22 Gabriella Gamini, "Insurgency Pushing Sri Lanka Near Chaos." *Toronto Star*, 9 July 1989, p. H3.

part of the Government of Canada to the people of Pakistan. Crosbie described Zia as being

> ...deeply committed to the social and economic development of the people of Pakistan and to bringing peace to that troubled area of the world. He will be long remembered for the leadership he provided in assisting the people of Afghanistan in their efforts to restore independence.... The Government and people of Canada hope that this tragedy will not affect the further restoration of democracy to Pakistan.[23]

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced, on 21 February 1989, that Canada had agreed to participate in a comprehensive humanitarian relief and economic assistance programme for Afghanistan, under the auspices of the United Nations. To train Afghan refugees in mine-clearing techniques, Canada would provide a team of twelve military personnel for a period of four months, starting 23 March 1989.

There are reportedly millions of unexploded mines in war-torn Afghanistan. Other countries providing teaching teams included France, Italy, Norway, Turkey, and the United States.

Mr. Clark described the mine awareness and clearance training programme (known as Operation *Decimal*), as " a most important one in the overall relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan." "Canada's participation," he said, was "a concrete and highly visible demonstration of our commitment to the United Nations' humanitarian assistance efforts."[24]

Canada also pledged $22 million over the next two years to the Afghanistan Repatriation and Rehabilitation Programme. This pledge was in addition to the $19 million which Canada had been providing annually to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.[25]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The only Parliamentary comment on Southern Asia during this period consisted of condolences on the death of Pakistan's President Zia,[26] and approval of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.[27]

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23 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 88/37 (17 August 1988). See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 182 (19 August 1988).

24 Government of Canada, *News Release* AFN: 13/89 (21 February 1989, p. 1; and Captain Marsha Dorge, "Helping the Afghans Home." *Sentinel*, vol. 25 no. 3 (March 1989), pp. 2-4.

25 Government of Canada, *supra* note 24, p.2.

26 *Commons Debates*, 17 August 1988, pp. 18439-40.

27 *Commons Debates*, 13 April 1989, p. 482.

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## *BACKGROUND*

### *Sino-Soviet Relations*

In the early 1980s, Soviet overtures to China ran up against China's declaration of three major obstacles to better relations with the Soviet Union, namely, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet troops along the Chinese border, and Moscow's support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Gradually, steps were taken which improved the climate for the establishment of better relations, including the announced Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and agreement to resolve border disputes and help end the Cambodian conflict.

From 1 to 3 December 1988, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qicheu was in Moscow for preparatory talks before a Summit meeting between Chinese and Soviet leaders. During the visit, the Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers announced agreement on a diplomatic-military group of experts to discuss methods of force reduction along their common border. Against the background of student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities, Soviet President Gorbachev attended a Summit meeting with Chinese leaders on 15 to 18 May 1989, the first such meeting held between the two countries in thirty years. As reported in the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit, agreement was reached on various fronts. The two countries stated that their relationship would develop on the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. Both sides agreed to take steps to reduce armed forces on the Soviet-Chinese border to a minimum, with the Chinese welcoming the December 1988 Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of seventy-five percent of its troops stationed in Mongolia. The Chinese expressed the hope that the remaining Soviet troops would soon be fully withdrawn from Mongolia.

Concerning unresolved border issues, the countries agreed to upgrade the negotiations under way, from the deputy foreign minister level to the foreign minister level. In Shanghai at the end of his visit, on 18 May 1989, Gorbachev proposed talks to demilitarize the 6400-km border. The Summit communiqué also declared that neither country laid claim to hegemony in any form in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other parts of the world. Both also agreed to the active development of economic, trade, scientific, technological and cultural ties between their countries. Discussions were also held on the Cambodian problem (see the "Indochina Conflict" below).

### *The Indochina Conflict*

The ten-year Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia continues to be a focal point of tension in East Asia. The major parties to this conflict remain the Soviet-funded, Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the titular leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The United Nations recognizes the Coalition as Cambodia's legal Government, although the PRK controls the greater proportion of the country's territory, including the capital of Phnom Penh. Most of the aid to the CGDK is channelled through Thailand from China.

The arduous path to a comprehensive peace settlement for Cambodia included a number of regional talks. In July 1988, an Indonesian and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led initiative pulled all interested parties (Kampuchean factions, the PRK and Vietnam) together for informal talks in Jakarta. These made little progress, however. In October 1988, further sessions of all parties were marked by deadlock, and a November 1988 Paris meeting of the Kampuchean factions also resulted in little progress. On 19 to 21 February 1989, with all parties present in Jakarta once again, the regional peace process stalled on the questions of verification of the proposed pullout of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the composition of an interim government prior to elections.

As a result of Soviet prodding and internal economic pressures, Vietnam declared in 1988 that its forces would be withdrawn from Cambodia no later than the end of 1990, regardless of the outcome of the peace talks. Other developments outside the formal regional peace process included the reaching of a broad agreement between China and Vietnam in January 1989 on an internationally supervised withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia by September 1989. This resulted from the first direct talks between the Vietnamese and the Chinese in more than nine years. In April 1989, Vietnam formally announced, amid international skepticism, that it would unconditionally withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia by September 1989.

On 1 May 1989, the Hun Sen Government announced changes to Kampuchea's Constitution, including the declaration of Buddhism as the state religion and the restoration of the country's official name to Cambodia for the first time since the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot took power in 1975. These changes were in line with demands of the Sihanouk-led coalition.

The Sino-Soviet Summit held in Beijing in mid-May 1989 included discussions on the Cambodian problem, building upon previous statements issued by the two sides in February 1989. As recorded in the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit, the Soviet Union and China expressed a desire to prevent a civil war after the scheduled withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Both sides agreed that, as Vietnamese troops are withdrawn, all states concerned should gradually cut, and eventually halt, military aid to the Cambodian parties. They also agreed to support the holding of an international conference on the Cambodian problem. Regarding Cambodian internal politics, the Soviets maintained that the various problems, including the holding of general elections under international control and agreements between the parties, should be solved by the Cambodians themselves. The Chinese declared support for an interim four-party coalition government led by Prince Sihanouk during the transition period between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of an election. Finally, both sides agreed to respect the results of such an election.

For a brief period in May 1989, it was reported that a power-sharing agreement between Hun Sen and Sihanouk was within reach. Stumbling blocks toward such an agreement were reported to include fears, both internationally and in Indochina, of a Khmer Rouge takeover of the Sihanouk coalition, and an announcement on 30 May 1989 by US officials that the Bush Administration would launch a new covert military aid programme for the non-communist resistance in Cambodia. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee blocked the latter proposal, however.

On 3 July 1989, the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Brunei declared that a UN-monitored Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and subsequent elections, would have to be part of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. A meeting between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, scheduled for 24 July 1989 in Paris, was expected to pave the way to a peace settlement. In an open letter on 11 July 1989, Prince Sihanouk called for US aid to strengthen his bargaining position against both Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge. Representatives from Sihanouk's forces, Hun Sen's Government, the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam were scheduled to meet in Paris on 30 July 1989 for a conference aimed at producing a power-sharing agreement.

Clashes occurred repeatedly between Vietnamese and Chinese forces along their 400-mile border from 1988 through early 1989. Military actions also continued between the forces of Thailand and Laos, in their border dispute, which began in 1975.

***Japan - Soviet Union***

In spite of Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be strained. Widely cited as the greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations is the territorial dispute over the four islands northeast of Hokkaido seized by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and over which Japan claims sovereignty.

In December 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo (for the first time in almost three years) for a round of talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno. Some of the issues discussed included economic cooperation between the two countries, regional security, the environment and the disputed territories. The only concrete result of the talks was an agreement in principle to establish a working group to continue talks on the territorial issue at the deputy foreign minister level.

***East Timor***

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, declared its independence in 1975 but was subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces. Guerrilla forces, led by the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) have continued to resist the Indonesian occupation. The source of military aid (albeit, small) to the FRETILIN is unclear, but the supplies are believed to have reached the resistance movement via Malaysia. An estimated 200,000 out of a population of 688,000 have died over a period of ten years.

While this issue is the subject of debate in Portugal, the Indonesian media have been restricted by its Government from reporting on military activities in East Timor. There seems to be little chance of direct negotiation between the fighting parties. Several organizations, including the Canada-Asia Working Group, petitioned the UN Decolonization Committee in August 1988 to keep the issue of East Timor on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. In the fall of 1988, on the recommendation of the General Committee, the Forty-third Session of the General Assembly decided to include an item entitled "Question of Timor" in the provisional agenda of its Forty-fourth Session.

*North and South Korea*

Despite a series of contacts and proposals, North and South Korea continued to disagree on terms that would result in their first high-level political and military bilateral talks. In July 1988, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea called for the normalization of relations between the North and South. He proposed certain measures, including a formula for economic trade and cultural exchanges, as steps toward this normalization.

Addressing the UN General Assembly for the first time, on 18 October 1988, Roh Tae Woo proposed a peace conference between North and South Korea, with the added participation of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. He also discussed reunification, as well as commercial and cultural exchanges. In November, a communiqué released by the North Korean Central News Agency outlined a plan for reunification suggesting a loose confederation of the North and South, upholding their respective political systems.

On 17 January 1989, North and South Korea tentatively agreed to meet in February for a round of highest-level official political and military talks. On 8 February, North Korea announced that it would not attend these preliminary talks, citing annual South Korean and American joint military manoeuvres ("Team Spirit") as a major obstacle to any further inter-governmental dialogue. Nevertheless, North Korean and US officials have reportedly met in Beijing three times since autumn 1988.

In late June 1989, a bill was introduced in the US Senate to withdraw 10,000 of the over 40,000 US troops in South Korea over three years. The US House of Representatives heard calls for South Korea to consider taking over more responsibility for its own security, given US fiscal pressures and the prospering South Korean economy. The Bush Administration opposes a unilateral cutback in US forces, insisting that reductions could occur only after agreement with South Korea and other US allies in Asia. On 28 June 1989, President Roh Tae Woo rejected all demands for US troop cuts in Korea, citing the continued intransigence of North Korea and the "recent turmoil in China." Roh also called on the US to disregard rising anti-US sentiment in South Korea.

Sporadic meetings between North and South Korean legislators have taken place, beginning in August 1988. In late April 1989, the Chairman of the Democratic Justice Party, South Korea's ruling party, was chief delegate to the "South-North parliamentary talks." The talks ended with little result, however.

Despite the inconclusive political and military talks between North and South Korea, some success has been reached in the economic sphere. On 1 February 1989, Chung Ju Young, founder of the Hyundai conglomerate, and Choe Su Gil, president of the Taesong Bank of North Korea, signed an agreement in principle on a joint business project (the development of a tourist site on the eastern coast of North Korea). It was the first time in forty-three years that an agreement of this kind had been signed between North and South Korea. Also, in June 1989, South Korean delegates attended the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students in North Korea.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Ottawa suspended its aid to Vietnam, in 1979, following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and, in 1982, recognized the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Canada supports peace efforts such as those made by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and once again co-sponsored, in late 1988, a UN Resolution on the situation in Cambodia. The original Resolution of 1978 called for an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, and a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means. Canada has continued to support this resolution, which has undergone minor revisions, through 1988-1989. It has also continued to support the Coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk, of which the Khmer Rouge is a member. Philippe Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada at the United Nations, told the General Assembly on 3 November 1988:

> ...For Canada, there has been no greater cause of concern within the South East Asian region than Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia.... There are hopeful signs of Vietnam's movement on Cambodia, as evidenced in their announcement of the withdrawal of their troops from Cambodia by 1990.... We welcome the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) which was held this July [1988] and attended by the main Cambodian parties as well as the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos.... The dialogue between Prince Nordom [sic] Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen over the past year is another manifestation of the search for a lasting and just solution to the Cambodian question and I wish to take this opportunity to express Canada's strong support for the efforts made by Prince Sihanouk.... Other interested parties outside the region also have indicated a willingness to assist and encourage the negotiating process.... We join them in seeking the comprehensive political solution.... The main elements of such a solution are clear. First and foremost is the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces, which must be carried out in the context of that overall political solution. This must be accompanied by the cessation of all foreign interference.... We also strongly support the establishment of a Cambodian government of national reconciliation, drawn from the various Cambodian political groups. Finally, the international community must do everything possible to assure external support and to encourage and reinforce peace and stability in the region.... I cannot, however, leave the subject of Cambodia's future without expressing Canada's strong support for the call made in the draft resolution..., not to return to "the universally condemned policies and practices of a recent past".... We abhor the crimes and atrocities committed under the Pol Pot Regime [Khmer Rouge].... It is thus our collective responsibility to ensure that there is no return to these extreme violations of human rights witnessed in Cambodia.... [I]t is that same sense of responsibility which has led Canada to provide ongoing aid to Khmer refugees in Thailand. Our ASEAN friends continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing exodus.... To show our support, Canada has given tens of millions of dollars to assist refugees in these countries of first asylum, as well as further humanitarian

> support for elements of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. More than 117,000 refugees from this region have found a home in Canada since 1975. More are expected this year, and again in 1989.[1]

In April 1989, Vietnam and Cambodia invited Canada, India and Poland to form a monitoring commission to verify the scheduled withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. The three invited countries had previously served in a peacekeeping role in Cambodia (1954-1969), Laos (1954-1974) and Vietnam (1954-1973). The Canadian Government has established certain pre-conditions before agreeing to take part in such a mission, including agreement from all Cambodian political groups to its presence (for a further discussion of Canada's position see Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*).

Regarding the Korean question, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark welcomed the July 1988 proposal of South Korean President Roh Tae Woo to improve exchanges between the North and the South. Mr. Clark declared: "We strongly support the restoration of the dialogue between North and South Korea which is critical to easing the tension on the Korean peninsula."[2]

## *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

NDP MP Jim Manly addressed the issue of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in a statement made in the House of Commons on 11 August 1988. He said:

> ...the Special Committee on Decolonization [UN] will consider the illegal occupation of East Timor since 1975 by Indonesia. Since that time Indonesia has waged a genocidal war against the people of East Timor.... This is the human rights situation that Canada chooses to ignore. Because of extensive trade links with Indonesia, Canada turns a blind eye to its human rights abuses.... In spite of Canada's pretence that our development assistance is linked to human rights, Indonesia remains one of our largest aid recipients.[3]

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2 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 146, 11 July 1988.

3 *Commons Debates*, 11 August 1988, p. 18198.

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*BACKGROUND*

The fortieth anniversary of the adoption, by the United Nations General Assembly, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was celebrated on 10 December 1988. Professor John Humphrey, a member of two drafting committees which prepared the original Declaration and the first Canadian to be awarded a United Nations human rights prize[1], was invited to join the Canadian delegation at the United Nations in New York for the celebration. In his speech to the UN, Humphrey noted:

> [The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] quickly became a standard by reference to which the conduct of governments in their relations with individual men and women is judged. Its influence is reflected in the law and jurisprudence of many countries. And it has inspired a whole new body of international law, including the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights.... Human rights are directed to the protection of the dignity and worth of the human purpose. But human rights law also has another purpose. History tells us that there is a close relationship between respect for human rights and the peace of nations.[2]

The principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been legally codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1976. These include the rights to life, liberty and security of persons, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, equality before the law, and freedom of thought and expression. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), also of 1976, includes the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to education. The "Optional Protocol" to the ICESCR allows individuals to press complaints against their own government through the UN Human Rights Committee. Other conventions on specific rights include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force in 1951), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954) and its 1967 Protocol, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987). Canada is a party to all of the above Conventions, with the exception of the Convention on Apartheid.[3]

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1 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 244 (8 December 1988).

2 Professor John Humphrey, "Intervention of Canada...Item 38: Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York, 8 December 1988." New York: Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, *Press Release* No. 65, pp. 1 and 2.

3 Compiled from Gerald Schmitz and Victoria Berry, *Human Rights: Canadian Policy Toward Developing Countries*. Ottawa: North-South Institute, *Briefing Paper* No. B-21e (December 1988), pp. 2-3.

The International Bill of Rights (the collective title for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and its "Optional Protocol"), has spurred on the development of other international and regional agreements on human rights. An example of this is the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which entered into force in 1975, and to which Canada is a signatory. Adherence to UN covenants and conventions is monitored by the UN and UN-related agencies--particularly by the General Assembly (Third Committee), the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Office. Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act is monitored by the CSCE.

On the bilateral plane, in response to human rights abuses, Canada suspended its aid to the Amin Government of Uganda in 1977; to Chile, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan in the 1970s; and to El Salvador and Guatemala in 1981.[4] (The decision to reinstate aid to El Salvador was made in December 1984 and to Guatemala in November 1987.)

In 1982-1983, in response to the Final Report of a House of Commons Sub-Committee on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean[5], the Canadian Government announced that it "was prepared to terminate or suspend aid where 'gross violations of human rights or conditions of conflict make the provision of an aid program impossible,' and to prohibit arms sales 'to any government whose human rights practices are wholly repugnant to Canadian values'."[6] The 1987 Government response to the Final Report of the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, known as the Winegard Report[7], stated:

> The degree to which human rights are respected is a factor in determining eligibility for Canadian development assistance.... In situations where there is concern about...human rights, the content and channels through which development assistance is directed are chosen to alleviate the condition of those oppressed.... Where violations of human rights are systematic, gross and continuous, government-to-government aid is denied or reduced...Canada will continue to use a combination of public pressure and private persuasion to register our concerns and to make clear the importance of these issues in Canadian foreign and development policy.[8]

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4 *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also: Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean* (Issue No. 78). Ottawa, 1982.

6 *Ibid.*.

7 William C. Winegard, Chairman, *For Whose Benefit? (Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs).* Ottawa, May 1987.

8 Canadian International Development Agency, *Canadian International Development-Assistance: To Benefit A Better World: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade--or Whose Benefit?: Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs.*

Upon tabling its new aid strategy in 1987, the Government stated that "Cabinet will be provided annually with information on the relevant human rights situations as part of their determination of channels through which Canadian assistance will be provided and what level of bilateral assistance will be allocated." Canadian aid, it announced, would be channelled through non-governmental and multilateral organizations to ensure that "aid goes directly to the poor in areas where it is most needed."[9]

Canada has adopted legislation to protect human rights within its own boundaries, namely the Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted in 1960, the Constitution Act on Human Rights (1977), and the Constitution Act comprising the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). Since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces (which have also passed their own legislation) to formulate Canadian policies in this field.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 19 January 1989, after twenty-seven months of talks in Vienna, the thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issued a broad-ranging agreement on the protection of human rights. The Vienna Conference was the Third Follow-up Meeting (FUM) on the review of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and involved all European countries (including the Soviet Union but with the exception of Albania), as well as Canada and the United States.

The Vienna Concluding Document commits participating governments to "respect the right of citizens to participate actively in the promotion and protection of human rights;...ensure freedom of religion and prevent discrimination against religious communities and individuals;...[and] respect freedom of movement within and between countries including the right to leave any country and return to one's own country."[10] Other provisions ensure against arbitrary arrest, detention and abusive psychiatric practices and allow individuals, institutions and organizations "to obtain, possess, reproduce and distribute information material of all kinds."[11] Canada contributed to the

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Ottawa, September 1987, pp. 50-52. See also: Schmitz and Berry, *supra* note 3, p. 13.

9 Canadian International Development Agency, *Sharing Our Future*. Ottawa, 1987, p. 93; and Schmitz and Berry, *Supra*[9]2 note 3, p. 13.

10 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 008 (16 January 1989), p. 1 (of Annex).

11 "Excerpts from East-West Agreement on the Protection of Human Rights." *New York Times*, 17 January 1989, p. 1. See also: Robert Pear, "35 Nations Issue East-West Pact to Protect Broad Human Rights." *New York Times*, 17 January 1989, p. 1.

drafting of various individual clauses, especially those pertaining to the freedom of religious practice, the freedom of movement, and, in co-sponsorship with Hungary, the protection and promotion of the human rights of minorities.[12]

During the conference, Canada and others expressed concern over progress in human rights by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Concern was particularly evident over Romanian statements that qualified the binding aspect of the agreement on the Romanian Government, and with the suppression of demonstrations in Prague by Czech authorities.[13] In response to the Romanian statements, Canadian Ambassador William Bauer stressed that, according to CSCE rules, official CSCE documents are adopted by consensus and are therefore fully binding on all CSCE States.[14] At the CSCE concluding session, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

> Not all participating States have made the same progress. Even in those participating States where reforms are being implemented, there remain pockets of resistance and all-too-frequent lapses into old ways. In some participating countries, minorities and religious believers continue to be harassed and persecuted, and attempts are made to deny them their rights, indeed their very existence, and to eradicate their cultural and religious identities.[15]

From 18 April through 12 May 1989, a CSCE Information Forum was convened in London to review the "information provisions" of the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document. Unique to the Helsinki process was the active participation of journalists at the Forum, including six on the Canadian delegation. Among the approximately seventy proposals tabled at the meeting, one was co-sponsored by Canada, an omnibus text containing measures to eliminate travel restrictions and improve the working conditions of journalists, improve citizens' access to information of all kinds, and facilitate exchanges, seminars, and joint ventures among participating states. The proposal also addressed the impact of high technology on the dissemination of information, and emphasized the importance of a free flow of information to members of national minorities or regional cultures. The proposal is expected to be improved and re-introduced at the next main CSCE review meeting in Helsinki in 1992.[16] In his opening address,

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12 Richard Gwyn, "Soviet's Plight Almost Sank Rights Accord." *Toronto Star*, 18 January 1989, p. A27.

13 "Droits de l'Homme: Clark critique Prague et Bucarest." *La Presse*, 20 Janvier 1989, p. C12.

14 A. Bloed, "Successful Ending of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, vol. 7 no. 1 (January 1989), p. 114.

15 Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "On Conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Follow-up Meeting: A Speech...[to the CSCE], Vienna, January 19, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/3, p. 7.

16 "CSCE Information Forum: Closing Statement by Ambassador William Bauer, Head of the Canadian Delegation," 11 May 1989, pp. 3-4.

Canadian Ambassador Bauer declared:

> ...Canada is committed to increasing, through all the avenues offered by modern means of Communication, freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.... [W]e welcome and support the decisions by Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union to comply, to a much greater degree than in the past, with their CSCE commitments in this sphere. It is regrettable, however, that some signatory states remain locked in a dark age of information where the only 'correct' facts are those put out by the ruling party....[17]

An information sheet, distributed by External Affairs, later identified the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and especially Romania, as having displayed a negative attitude at the meeting, while the Soviet Union's performance was described as "uneven".[18]

Canada also played an active role at the inaugural meeting of the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Paris, between 30 May and 23 June 1989. In his speech to the opening session of the Conference, External Affairs Minister Clark noted that the next meeting would be held in Copenhagen in 1990, and went on :

> ...Then it will be fair to expect full compliance with all provisions [of the Vienna Concluding Document] by all participating states.... Already there has been enough progress in certain areas to confirm that the expectations of Vienna were realistic. On the issue of family reunification, I am pleased to say that Canada now has no outstanding cases with Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union.... In Poland the Round Table Agreement between the government and the solidarity [sic] movement has refreshed the hope for human rights and progress towards democracy.... In Hungary the tearing down of fenced barriers to the West has been accompanied by expanding economic and political pluralism and freedom....And in the Soviet Union we have seen remarkable elections.... We look forward to the legal and constitutional reforms which will firmly secure the rule of law in the Soviet Union and work towards the fulfillment of the human rights obligations that its government has agreed [sic].... There are, unfortunately, some countries whose record has not matched their Vienna commitments.... One of them is Bulgaria, its treatment of its Turkish minority population is cause for particular concern.... Romania...has formally declared that it is not bound by the important new human dimension undertakings.... It has, in short, openly and conspicuously violated important elements of the Vienna Concluding Document. It has continued, with increasing heavy-handedness, to ignore the fundamental rights and freedoms of large numbers of its people.[19]

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17 "CSCE Information Forum: Statement by Ambassador William Bauer, Head of the Canadaian Delegation," 20 April 1989, p. 3.

18 "Canada at the CSCE, London Information Forum, April 18-May 12, 1989," p. 2.

19 Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "[A] Speech...to the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Paris, May 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/15, pp. 3-5.

At the Francophone Summit in Dakar, Senegal, from 24 to 26 May 1989, Canada introduced a resolution, which received unanimous support, calling for "the respect of human rights as well as for the right to development both within and outside our community."[20] It was the first time that the Francophonie had adopted such a resolution, which had reportedly been on the Canadian agenda since the previous Summit in Québec in 1987.[21] External Affairs Minister Clark described the move as "a significant step forward," while conceding that it would not result in "immediate or dramatic improvements."[22] In his words: "Once you get people started, you have some leverage to affect their behaviour."[23] Prime Minister Mulroney reportedly stressed human rights in his opening speech at the Summit's first closed-door session of Heads of State and Heads of Government, declaring:

> Throughout the world, one thing becomes clearer and clearer: Human rights are inseparable and indispensable. Without economic, social and cultural rights, development is stunted because the spirit is weak. Human rights are a precondition for peace, an engine for prosperity, a legacy for our children.[24]

The Prime Minister affirmed that respect for human rights would be an important element in the decisions that the Canadian Government would take in responding to requests for foreign aid.[25]

On 17 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark announced the appointment of Ms. A. Raynell Andreychuk as Canada's Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Elected in May 1988 to the Commission after a normal rotational absence since 1984, Canada began its three-year term in January 1989.[26] Ms. Andreychuk told the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in November 1988:

> One of the dominant themes of the past year has been "reconciliation". Major conflicts are gradually being resolved.... Nonetheless, we must not let more dynamic political situations blind us to glaring human rights inadequacies.... In

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20 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

21 Patrick Doyle, "France Forgives $3 Billion in Debt as Summit Opens." *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1989, p. 25.

22 *Ibid.*.

23 Graham Fraser, "Francophone Summit to Consider Rights." *Globe and Mail*, 24 May 1989, p. A8.

24 Doyle, *supra* note 21.

25 Denis Lessard, "Droits de l'homme: la France refroidit les espoirs du Canada." *La Presse*, 24 May 1989. See also: Denis Lessard, "Le sommet de Dakar abordera la question des droits de l'homme." *La Presse*, 23 May 1989; and Denis Lessard, "Le Canada menace de lier son aide au tiers-monde au respect des droits de l'homme." *La Presse*, 25 May 1989.

26 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 111 (27 May 1988); and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 178 (17 August 1988).

> El Salvador the government of President Duarte rolled back significantly the level of violence and human rights violations from the early 1980s.... [T]he protection of human rights in El Salvador over the last year has weakened, and that number of human rights abuses has increased markedly.... In Guatemala, while human rights violations have diminished significantly since the beginning of the decade,...[t]he resurgence of death squads and disappearances is a matter of profound concern. The Esquipulas accord of last year, agreed to by all five Central American Presidents...sought not only peace but respect for human rights and democratic values.... [W]e urge them to honour this commitment.... The Canadian government is deeply concerned by the overall treatment by the Iraqi authorities of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, and particularly by the reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians.... Of particular concern [in Iran] are reports of summary arrests, torture and large-scale arbitrary executions of political detainees.... National reconciliation was the essential theme of the recent plebiscite in Chile, conducted under conditions which were sufficiently fair and equitable to produce credible results.... By contrast,...the situation in the Israeli Occupied Territories presents serious human rights concerns.... We believe that respect for human rights is an essential component of the peace process.... We stress the concept of reconciliation in these situations because so many conflicts originate, directly or indirectly, in human rights problems, or because divisive political conflicts have potentially disastrous consequences for respect for human rights.[27]

An investigator from the UN Commission on Human Rights arrived in Canada, in mid-July 1989, to prepare for the start of an inquiry into allegations that Canada has violated treaties with its aboriginal peoples.[28]

Canada's ratification of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in June 1987 exempted Articles 21 and 22 "which recognize the right of the monitoring Committee [set up by the Convention] to accept and judge complaints against a country by another nation or by individuals." Of the thirty-eight countries that have thus far ratified the Convention, twenty-three, including Canada, the Soviet Union, Mexico and China, have not agreed to be judged by the monitoring Committee. However, on 19 January 1989, an External Affairs spokesperson stated that "Canada will accept the right of a United Nations Committee to hear complaints of torture and cruelty against the country" by June 1989 or sooner.[29] The delay has been officially attributed to the necessity of coordinating federal-provincial legislation pertaining to this matter.

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27 Her Excellency Ms. A. Raynell Andreychuk, Ambassador of Canada in the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations,"[A] Statement [to] the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations, New York, November 1988." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* pp. 1-3.

28 Geoffrey York, "UN Rights Agency Set to Start Probe into Canada's Treatment of Indians." *Globe and Mail*, 15 July 1989, p. 1.

29 Charlotte Montgomery, "Canada Assailed for 'Opting Out' of UN Scrutiny on Torture Treaty." *Globe and Mail*, 18 January 1989, p. A9; and "Canada to Accept UN Committee." *Globe and Mail*, 20 January 1989, p. A8.

On 15 August 1988, Bill C-147, an Act to establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, was introduced in the House of Commons. The legislation received royal assent in September 1988. The mandate of the Centre, which will be located in Montreal, is, in the words of the Bill, "to initiate, encourage and support cooperation between Canada and other countries in the promotion, development and strengthening of institutions and programs that give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the *International Bill of Rights*...."[30]

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Human rights violations in the Soviet Union and the East European countries continued to spark comment in the House of Commons. Several Members of Parliament referred to incongruities between the "promises" of *perestroika* and *glasnost* and the present "realities". On 23 August 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie urged Chairman Gorbachev to stretch "new thinking" beyond Soviet borders:

> One of the true tests of *glasnost* and *perestroika* will be whether the new winds of freedom are allowed to blow in countries which for too long have been under Soviet domination. It has been suggested that Chairman Gorbachev show good faith by allowing free and open elections at the municipal level throughout Soviet occupied Europe as a first step. We in the NDP urge that this be done.[31]

In the case of Poland, on 1 September 1988, Progressive Conservative Member Andrew Witer called upon External Affairs Minister Clark "to press Polish officials to reinstate Solidarity, and to fulfil their obligation as a signatory of the Helsinki Accord by guaranteeing freedom of expression...."[32] The Romanian Government was strongly criticized for abusing its citizens and especially for its decision "to bulldoze 7000 villages, uprooting and scattering the 2.5 million native Hungarians throughout Romania...."[33]

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30 Canada, The House of Commons, *Bill C-147: An Act to Establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development*. Ottawa: September 13, 1988, p. 2. See also: Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Issue No. 34 (27 September 1988), pp. 34 : 17-38; Daniel Drolet, "Montreal, not Ottawa, gets Rights Centre." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 August 1988, p. A5; Gisèle Côté-Harper and John Courtney, *International Cooperation for the Development of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions (Report to the Right Honourable Joe Clark and the Honourable Monique Landry)*. Ottawa, June 1987, pp. 1-5; and Schmitz and Berry, *supra* note 3, pp. 13-14.

31 *Commons Debates*, 23 August 1988, p. 18694. See also: 22 August 1988, pp. 18614-18615; and 27 September 1988, p. 19669.

32 *Commons Debates*, 1 September 1988, p. 19153. See also: 22 August 1988, pp. 18614-18615; 23 August 1988, p.18694; and 27 September 1988, pp. 19669-19670.

33 *Commons Debates*, 11 August 1988, p. 18196. See also: 19 August 1988, pp. 18574-18575; and 31 August 1988, p. 19114.

On 11 May 1989, PC Member Barbara Greene stated:

> Europe is incensed and outraged at the disaster zone that is now Romania. Hungary is overflowing with refugees from this cruel regime.[34]

On 20 June 1989 PC Member Maurice Tremblay informed the House that thousands of Bulgarian citizens, belonging to the Turkish minority, had been expelled to neighbouring countries. Tremblay stated that he was pleased that External Affairs Minister Clark had issued a communiqué on 16 June 1989 expressing Canada's concern about the expulsions, and that the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires had been called in and been made aware of the Canadian disapproval of his Government's actions.[35]

Statements were also made in the House on behalf of individual Soviet citizens and minority groups within the Soviet Union.[36]

On 23 May 1989, one day prior to the start of the Third Francophone Summit in Dakar, Senegal, Opposition Leader John Turner asked whether the Government intended to "denounce vigorously the human rights abuses of some Francophone countries" at the Summit. The Minister of State (Finance) Gilles Loiselle replied:

> ...[T]he Secretary of State (for External Affairs) has indeed placed a resolution for debate at the Dakar conference. I believe and hope that this will be a beginning of the improvement he desires.[37]

Following the crackdown of the Chinese Government on protesters in Beijing's Tian'anmen Square on 3 to 4 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark proposed the following motion, seconded by the leaders of the Liberal Party and the New Democrat Party, which received the unanimous consent of the House:

> ...[N]oting that:
>
> -the relationship between Canada and the People's Republic of China is important to Canadians and has been of benefit to both countries over the past many years;
>
> -authorities in the People's Republic of China have directed the armed forces of China to attack the unarmed civilian population of Beijing in contravention of all humane principles of conduct;
>
> -the students and citizens of Beijing were peacefully advocating democratic principles and human freedoms as is the fundamental right of all peoples of the world; and the authorities of China resorted to the use of excessive and

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34 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1590. See also: 18 May 1989, pp. 1910-1911.

35 *Commons Debates*, 20 June 1989, p. 3292.

36 *Commons Debates*, 25 August 1988, p. 18841; 26 August 1988, p. 18902; and 3 May 1989, p. 1242.

37 *Commons Debates*, 23 May 1989, p. 2042.

> indiscriminate armed force on a scale and scope which appalls all Canadians and has resulted in the tragic deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians; [Members of Parliament] therefore:
>
> unequivocally condemn this brutal use of force against the peaceful populace of Beijing and call upon the authorities of China to cease this senseless killing and immediately adopt a course of dialogue with the people of China.[38]

(For further information concerning events leading up to and following the Chinese Government crackdown of June 1989, including the Canadian Government response, refer to Appendix 7 of *The Guide*.)

Several Members of Parliament expressed concerns over human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala, especially the increase in violations in the former.[39] NDP Member Lynn Hunter declared:

> Since 1983, Canada has provided over $13 million in bilateral aid to the Government of El Salvador.... With the presidential elections concluded, government-supported violence and repression are on the increase.... Canadians do not want to be associated with a regime which utilizes human rights violations and murder. Canadians are proud of our record of promoting peace, yet our Government, through bilateral aid, does business with this Government which refuses to negotiate a settlement to the nine-year war....
> I call on the Government to reconsider our bilateral aid program to El Salvador so that the aid is channeled through non-governmental organizations until we see a substantial improvement in the human rights environment.[40]

On 2 May 1989, Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry assured the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade that "the bilateral aid program to Salvador...has been managed by a Canadian NGO [non-governmental organization], the Canadian Hunger Foundation, and has been carried out by Salvadorian NGOs to assist some 200,000 displaced persons in need."[41] In reply, Ms. Hunter charged that "The non-governmental organizations of Canada have repudiated that program completely, except for one, the Canadian Hunger Foundation, and the minister knows very well what is going on here.... You have a credibility problem if you think you can foist off the Canadian Hunger Foundation as not being anything other than a bilateral aid program that supports the government of El Salvador."[42]

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38 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, p. 2599.

39 *Commons Debates*, 15 September 1988, p. 19283; 12 April 1989, p. 384; 20 April 1989, p. 725; 24 May 1989, p. 2083; and 1 June 1989, p. 2414.

40 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 384.

41 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 1 (2 May 1989), p. 1 : 40.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 1 : 40-41.

Other countries whose human rights records were criticized in the House of Commons included Burma, Burundi, Chile, Indonesia (East Timor), Iraq (Kurds), Pakistan (Ahmadis), and Zimbabwe.[43] On 13 September 1988, Liberal Member Roland de Corneille stated:

> There is confusion on the part of Canadians who ask how it is that we are giving assistance to a Government like that of Haiti when it is thoroughly repressing its people...we must look at what is happening in Burundi because of threatened genocide, not only threatened but, in fact, genocide of the Hutu tribe and majority of the people by a minority repressive regime.... While it is correct to criticize the policies of the Soviet Union, Chile and so on in terms of their failure to live up to the idea of human rights, brutal genocide and the massacre of tens of thousands of people is going on elsewhere.... The same thing could be said about the aboriginal people in East Timor and in Irian Jaya. The oppression by Indonesia of those people and the genocide which has taken place over many years is again another example of brutal murder and slaughter on a wholesale scale.... Yet Indonesia receives international development assistance from Canada.[44]

In September 1988, parliamentary debate focussed on the establishment of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Bill C-147). Although the House generally agreed with the main thrust of the Bill, several members of parliament expressed some reservations on specific issues pertaining to the Centre. On 13 September 1988, NDP Member Howard McCurdy sounded the following concerns about the Centre's "terms of reference":

> ...while the Bill attends...to a kind of definition by saying that for the purpose of this Act the International Bill of Rights will constitute the reference and source for adjudicating what constitutes human rights, it fails to deal with what constitutes democracy and democratic development.... One of the concerns...is that Canada seeks to enhance human rights and democracy by a means which would not impose on other nations our own institutions and values.... What we want, I think, is to be able to communicate the ideal of democratic values which are common to the Canadian people.... I think Canada must reflect internationally--not by imposing its institutions or rigid definitions on other nations--a kind of Canadian consensus of the values underlying democracy and to apply criteria developed from those values in distributing aid.[45]

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43 See *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19179, 19183; 20 September 1988, p. 19431; 16 December 1988, p. 138; 14 April 1989, p. 506; 16 May 1989, p. 1786; and 24 May 1989, p. 2085.

44 *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, p. 19176.

45 *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19179-19180.

Similarly, Liberal Member Jean-Robert Gauthier complained that "...the Bill gives no indication what the Government wants to do or how we define democratic rights.... I don't want us to be accused of imperialism and I don't want us to export our way of life to these countries."[46]

Also questioned in the House were the structure, financing, location and name of the Centre.[47]

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46 *Ibid.*, p. 19181.

47 See *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19173-19185; 15 September 1988, p. 19282; and 30 September 1988, pp. 19835-19845.

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## 28. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

*BACKGROUND*

A general rise in the frequency of international terrorist incidents in the early to mid-1980s prompted Western states to place a high priority on adopting policies and measures to counter such acts. Their effectiveness has been evidenced in the relative decrease of overt terrorist incidents, in particular cases of air terrorism, although the problem is far from solved. Bombings continue to comprise over half of all terrorist incidents, while hostage-taking and assassination are the second and third most frequent forms.

International efforts have been generated through the strengthening of existing conventions, such as the Tokyo, Montreal and the Hague Conventions created under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and through the creation of new agreements and resolutions. Among the most significant of these is the 1985 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61, passed by consensus, which condemns, outright, all acts of terrorism.

The new American Administration has pledged to continue the fight against international terrorism and is determined, along with other governments, to see terrorists brought to justice for their actions. Examples include the trial and conviction of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers, and the case of Fawaz Younis who was the first person convicted in March, 1989 in the United States under a 1984 law permitting US authorities to apprehend terrorists outside of US borders. Younis was convicted for the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian airliner in 1985.

Other developments over the past year include the decision of the US Government in late August 1988 not to override a Federal Court ruling allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer mission to the UN to remain open. Congress had originally approved closing the office on the basis of a 1987 Anti-Terrorist Act. Although the US felt the PLO should not be permitted to operate on American soil because of its purported terrorist affiliations, it was decided that the Anti-Terrorist Act could not be applied to the organization. Many countries, including Canada, had found the US to be in breach of its obligations as host country under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement.

These same sentiments, however, did not prevent the US from denying PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat a visa entry in November, 1988, blocking him from addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. This decision came despite a UN resolution supported by 151 countries "deploring" the American denial and stating that the decision violated its obligations as host country. In December the Assembly was moved to Geneva for its annual debate on Palestine in order to hear Arafat, and, in an historic move, the Chairman personally renounced terrorism. He also declared that the PLO had rejected terrorism "in all its forms." This move led to an American decision to commence a dialogue with the PLO in December 1988. Similarly, the Canadian Government decided in March 1989 to permit the development of official, high-level talks with the PLO.

Pan American Flight 103 crashed outside of Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers on board as well as an estimated eleven persons on the ground. Officials have traced the source of the crash to a bomb planted in a radio-cassette player, although the organization responsible has not yet been determined.

In response to the Lockerbie disaster, a meeting of the ICAO Council was held at its Montreal Headquarters in February 1989. Transport ministers from ten countries passed a resolution at this time calling for improved detectability of explosives on board aircraft, and requesting a further development of standards to strengthen aviation security.

In January 1989 the NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral European countries signed an East-West Agreement on Human Rights which includes several articles condemning terrorism and presses for an increase in national and international efforts to combat terrorism and "insure the extradition or prosecution of persons implicated in terrorist acts."

In late June 1989 US and Soviet experts met for the first time in Moscow in order to determine possible areas for bilateral cooperation and coordination in counter-terrorism efforts, including exchanges of information. However, both sides refrained from officially giving any details on the meetings.

State-sponsored terrorism has become of increasing concern for Western states in recent years. Several events in the past year underscore this, such as the allegation that Libya was building a chemical weapons plant which could have been used to supply several known terrorist organisations, and the Iranian-sponsored death threat against British citizen Salman Rushdie. A joint political declaration issued by the Group of Seven in July 1989 at the Paris Summit reaffirmed the industrialized countries' commitment to fighting terrorism, and stated that "in particular, they condemned state-sponsored terrorism."

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

A recent publication by the Department of National Defence reports that, in relative terms, there has been a low level of international terrorist incidents directly affecting or involving Canada.[1] A similar conclusion was reached by a Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety in 1987, which nevertheless stated that "terrorism presents one of the principal security threats to Canada today in terms of immediacy, but not severity" and that "international terrorism presents a major challenge to Canada, to Canadian policy, to intelligence and to law enforcement, currently and for the foreseeable future."[2]

Incidents such as the 1985 seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by Armenian gunmen and the Air India crash over the Atlantic which killed 329 persons, demonstrate that Canada is not invulnerable to terrorist acts. More recently, in April 1989, a Canadian resident of Lebanese origin hijacked a bus and held several people hostage on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. The hijacker, Charles Yakoub, claimed to represent the Front

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1 Anthony Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Impact on Canada.* Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Report No. R100, February 1988.

2 William Kelly, *Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety.* Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1987, pp. 1 and 8-9.

for the Liberation of Christian Lebanon, although the RCMP believe the group to be nonexistent.

Canada has consistently condemned acts of terrorism and has in recent years continued to join other nations in doing so. This has included statements issued at various economic summits, the most recent example being at the Toronto Summit in June 1988, when the Group of Seven reaffirmed its condemnation of terrorism and its commitment to fight against it.

Canada has also cooperated on an informal basis since 1987 with the Trevi Group, formed by ministers of the European Economic Community to exchange and compile information on, among other areas, counter-terrorism.

In an effort to support existing ICAO principles, Canada and the United States jointly issued a declaration in November 1988 stating that their governments "will not allow hijacked aircraft which has [sic] landed in their territory to take off again" and would take measures to regain control of the aircraft and detain the hijackers.[3] Canada and the United States also held a meeting in Ottawa in October 1988 as part of their Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, formed in January 1988 with a view to meeting annually, or more often if required.

In February 1989, Liberal Leader John Turner called for Canada to break diplomatic ties with Iran in reply to the death threat issued against Rushdie. He stated that Canadians "do not support terrorism of any kind, and certainly not the style of state-supported or state-sponsored terrorism advocated by Iran."[4] External Affairs Minister Joe Clark responded to the Rushdie affair by summoning a meeting of Islamic states' representatives to Canada in an effort to urge their governments "to engage themselves in a search for a pragmatic solution to the Rushdie affair and the elimination of the threats to the author and his publishers."[5]

After traces of cyanide were found in a few Chilean grapes in Philadelphia in April 1989, Federal Health Minister Beatty banned the imports of all Chilean produce for four days and ordered existing stocks taken off the shelves. The US had received threats through its embassy in Santiago in March that Chilean exports would be poisoned. Canada receives most of its produce from Chile via the US.

### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In September 1988, Progressive Conservative Party Member John Oostrom commented on the case of Francesco Piperno, an Italian terrorist who lived in Canada for seven years while applying for refugee status, before being extradited and sentenced by an Italian Court in 1988. Mr. Oostrom used this case to exemplify what he termed the abuses in the immigration system, and requested that the following action be taken:

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3 Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 235 (2 November 1988).

4 Ottawa *Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A2.

5 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 040 (25 February 1989).

> ...Any individual who commits terrorist acts in countries which have democratic Governments should be returned to those nations....All terrorists who commit crimes against innocent civilians, such as airplane hijackers, should be returned to those countries to face justice.[6]

Progressive Conservative Party Member Geoff Scott expressed his sympathies to the families who suffered losses in the Lockerbie tragedy in December 1988, and asked the Department of External Affairs to "keep us posted on the international intrigue surrounding the disintegration of Flight 103" since Canadian citizens were involved.[7]

The hostage-taking incident on Parliament Hill in April 1989 sparked comment by several Parliamentary Members. Mr. Nunziata expressed concerns about the timing of the information relayed to the RCMP:

> The hijacking incident on Friday raises some very serious questions about national security and the ability of our policy forces to respond quickly, effectively, and co-operatively with respect to acts of terrorism.[8]

Solicitor General Pierre Blais responded by congratulating the RCMP on its effective and quick reaction to the situation and assured Mr. Nunziata, as well as other Members who had commented on the lack of communication between various police units, that a full review was to be conducted into the handling of the incident.

In June 1989, the fourth anniversary of the Air India crash provoked renewed comment from Liberal Party Member John Nunziata. He questioned why little was being done by the Government to investigate the circumstances surrounding the downing of the aircraft, and whether it was not necessary to undertake a royal commission of inquiry. Solicitor General Pierre Blais noted that the RCMP was still conducting a criminal investigation and added:

> Obviously it is most unfortunate. Many people died. This type of investigation takes a lot of time to get all the facts...We must let the RCMP continue this investigation. It has committed all the available energy and resources required for this purpose.[9]

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6 *Commons Debates*, 27 September 1988, pp. 19719-20.

7 *Commons Debates*, 23 December 1988, pp. 713-4.

8 *Commons Debates*, 10 April 1989, p. 283.

9 *Commons Debates*, 22 June 1989, p. 3526.

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***APPENDIX 1***

**Canadian Treaty Obligations***

*The Geneva Protocol of 1925*

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).
Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

*United Nations Charter*

Signed: 26 June 1945.
Ratified: 9 November 1945.
Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

*North Atlantic Treaty*

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.
Ratified: 3 May 1949.
Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

*Partial Test Ban Treaty*

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.
Ratified: 28 January 1964.
Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

* *in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.*

*Outer Space Treaty*

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.
Ratified: 10 October 1967.
Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

*Non-Proliferation Treaty*

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.
Ratified: 8 January 1969.
Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

*Seabed Arms Control Treaty*

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.
Ratified: 17 May 1972.
Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

*Biological Weapons Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction).

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.
Ratified: 18 September 1972.
Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

*ENMOD Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.
Ratified: 11 June 1981.
Entered into force: 5 October 1978.
Entered into force for Canada: 11 June 1981

*Inhumane Weapons Convention*

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident*

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Assistance for Nuclear Accidents*

(Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport).

Signed: 22 September 1980.
Ratified: 21 March 1986.
Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

*The Antarctic Treaty*

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material).

Acceded: 4 May 1988.
Entered into force: 4 May 1988.

***APPENDIX 2***

## The Canadian Armed Forces

**1. Personnel** (1989)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Regular Forces | 87,874 | July 1989 |
| Primary Reserve | 26,399 | December 1988 |
| Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List | 36,595 | December 1988 |
| Civilian Strength | 37,362 | |
| | 188,230 | |

| Command[1] | Regulars | Reserves | Civilians | Total[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maritime | 12,098 | 3,616 | 7,707 | 23,421 |
| Mobile | 19,883 | 19,849 | 5,988 | 45,720 |
| Air | 23,216 | 1,023 | 7,041 | 31,280 |

1. Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

2. As of December 1988

**2. Functional and Regional Commands**

| Command | Headquarters |
|---|---|
| Maritime | Halifax, Nova Scotia |
| Mobile | St.-Hubert, Quebec |
| Air | Winnipeg, Manitoba |
| Canadian Forces Europe | Lahr, F. R. Germany |
| Canadian Forces Communication Command | Ottawa, Ontario |
| Canadian Forces Training System | Trenton, Ontario |
| Northern Region | Yellowknife, NW Territories |

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1989**

**3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength**

| Type | Number[1] |
|---|---|
| Patrol Submarines | 3 |
| Destroyers | 4 |
| Frigates | 15 (3 reserve) |
| Replenishment Ships | 3 |
| Tanker, Small | 1 |
| Research Vessels | 3 |
| Patrol Vessels/Training Ships | 7 |
| Gate Vessels | 5 |
| Reserve Tenders | 14 |
| Tugs | 14 |
| Auxiliaries | 25 |
| MCMAs | 2 |
| | 96 |

1. As of July 1989

**4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment**

| Type | Number |
|---|---|
| Tanks | 114 Leopard C-1 |
| Armoured Fighting Vehicles - Reconnaissance | 175 Lynx |
| Armoured Fighting Vehicles (Cougar) | 195 Cougar |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 1090 M-113<br>269 Grizzly |
| Artillery (Howitzer) | 44 Model 44 [L-5] (pack 105 mm)<br>189 towed 105 mm<br>50 M-109 Self-Propelled (155 mm) |
| Anti-tank Weapons (TOW) Recoiless Rifles | 787 Carl Gustav 84 mm |
| Anti-tank Guided Weapons | 151 Tow |
| Air Defence | |
| Guns | 57 L-40/60 40 mm |
| Surface-to-air Missiles | 111 Blowpipe |

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1989**

**5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment[1]**

| Type | Number |
|---|---|
| Figher | 81 CF-116 (Freedom Fighter) |
| | 135 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet) |
| Electronic Countermeasures | 7 CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20) |
| | 16 CC-144 Challenger |
| Maritime Reconnaissance | 18 CP-140 Aurora |
| | 29 CP-121 Tracker |
| Transport | 27 CC-130E/H/MT Hercules |
| | 5 CC-137 (Boeing 707) |
| | 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan |
| | 7 CC-138 Twin Otter |
| | 14 CC-115 Buffalo |
| | 67 CT-133 Silver Star |
| | 132 CT-114 Tutor |
| | 21 CT-134/134 A Musketeer |
| | 2 CC-142 Dash 8 |
| **Type (Helicopters)** | |
| Anti-Submarine Warfare | 35 CH-124 Sea King |
| Observation | 66 CH-136 Kiowa |
| Transport | 45 CH-135 Twin Huey |
| | 7 CH-147 Chinook |
| Search and Rescue | 14 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur |
| | 9 CH-118 Iroquois |
| Training | 14 CH-139 (Bell 206) |

1. Includes storage, instructional, and repair.

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE SUMMER 1989**

## 6. Canadian Forces Europe

### a. Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) - Headquarters: CFB Lahr, F. R. Germany

| Unit Formation | Unit Name | Base |
|---|---|---|
| Armoured Regiment | The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) | CFB Lahr |
| Mechanized Infantry Battalions | 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry | |
| | 1st Batallion Royal 22nd Regiment | CFB Baden--Soellingen |
| | 1st Batallion Royal 22nd Regiment | CFB Lahr |
| Artillery Regiment | 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery | CFB Lahr |
| Engineer Regiment | 4 Combat Engineer Regiment | CFB Lahr |
| Helicopter Squadron | 444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron | CFB Lahr |
| 4 Air Defence Regiment | 128 Airfield Air Defence Battery | CFB Baden-Soellingen |
| | 129 Airfield Air Defence Battery | CFB Lahr |
| Headquarters & Signal Units | 4 Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron | CFB Lahr |
| Support Units | 4 Service Battalion | CFB Lahr |
| | 4 Field Ambulance | CFB Lahr |
| | 4 Military Police Platoon | CFB Lahr |
| Communications Units | CFE Communication Group Headquarters | CFB Lahr |
| | Communication Squadron | CFB Baden-Soellingen |
| | Communication Squadron | |

**b. Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) - Headquarters: Lahr, F. R. Germany**

| Unit Formation | Unit Name | Base |
|---|---|---|
| Fighter | 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18 | CFB Baden-Soellingen |
| | 439 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18 | CFB Baden-Soellingen |
| | 421 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18 | CFB Baden-Soellingen |
| Headquarters Unit | Headquarters 1 CAD | CFB Lahr |
| Support | 1 Air Maintenance Squadron | CFB Baden-Soellingen |

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1988**

**Sources** In addition to interviews with staff of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), the following sources were consulted for this Appendix:

Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Proceedings, Issue No. 23, 31 May 1988, p. 23A:6.

DND, Defence 88

DND, Fact Sheets

IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988

***APPENDIX 3***

**Canadian contribution to Peacekeepoing Operations, 1948 to Present**

| Operation | Location | Dates | Maximum Troop Contribution | Current Troop Contribution | Total UN Troop Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO) | Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria | 1948 | 22 | 79 | 298 |
| United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) | Kashmir | 1949-1979 | 27 | Yes[1] | 102-39 |
| United Nations Command Korea (UNCK) | [2]Korea | 1950-1954 | 8000 | - | |
| United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) | [2]Korea | 1953- | 2 | 1 | |
| International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) | Cambodia Laos Vietnam | 1954-1974 | 133 | - | |
| United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) | Egypt | 1956-1967 | 1007 | - | 6373-3378 |
| United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) | Lebanon | 1958-1959 | 77 | - | 591-375 |
| Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC) | Congo (Zaire) | 1960-1964 | 421 | - | 19,828 |
| United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) | West New Guinea | 1962-1963 | 13 | - | 15,761 |

| Operation | Location | Dates | Maximum Troop Contribution | Current Troop Contribution | Total UN Troop Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) | Yemen | 1963-1964 | 36 | - | 189-25 |
| United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) | Cyprus | 1964- | 1126 | 575 | 6411-2345 |
| Dominican Republic (DOMREP) | Dominican Republic | 1965-1966 | 1 | - | 3 |
| United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) | India-Pakistan Border | 1965-1966 | 112 | - | 96-78 |
| Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN) | Nigeria | 1968-1969 | 2 | - | |
| United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2) | Egypt (Sinai) | 1973-1979 | 1145 | - | 6973-4031 |
| International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) | South Vietnam | 1973- | 278 | - | |
| United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) | Israel-Syria (Golan) | 1974- | 227 | 227 | 1450 |
| United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) | Lebanon | 1978- | 117 | - | 7000-5773 |
| Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) | Egypt-Israel | 1982-(1986) | 140 | 128 | 2700 |

(1) Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)
(2) UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the Present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*

| Operation | Location | Dates | Maximum Troop Contribution | Current Troop Contribution | Total UN Troop Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan | Afghanistan Pakistan | 1988 | 5 | 3 | 50-40 |
| United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) | Iran/Iraq | 1988 | 540 | 15 | 408-955 |
| United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) | Namibia | 1989 | 301 | 237 | 4650 |
| [3]Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) | Pakistan | 1989 | 14 | 3 | 70 |

(3) The Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) for Afghanistan, 1989, falls outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*. It is a humanitarian relief assistance programme.

*Source:* National Defence, Canada, Directorate Peacekeeping Operations.

***APPENDIX 4***

## PUBLIC OPINION

Many polls measuring Canadian attitudes on arms control, defence, foreign policy, and regional conflict issues were conducted between July 1988 and July 1989. The following is a summary of many of these, categorized under the subject headings of Canadian Defence Policy; Canadian Foreign Policy; and International Affairs.[1]

*Canadian Defence Policy*

In July 1988, Gallup Canada asked 1033 Canadians, regardless of their voting preference in the upcoming federal election, which federal leader best represented their way of thinking on a number of national issues, including defence. The survey found that 39 percent of the respondents did not know which leader came closest to their way of thinking on defence matters; 29 percent stated Brian Mulroney; 14 percent, John Turner; 10 percent, Ed Broadbent; and 9 percent, none of the leaders.

Gallup asked 1033 Canadians in July 1988 for their opinion on the issue of mandatory one-year military training for young men. Forty-five percent of the populace favoured such a proposal, 50 percent were opposed and 5 percent had no opinion. Military training for women received less support, with 31 percent in favour, 63 percent opposed and 7 percent having no opinion.

The same poll also asked respondents who deemed themselves capable of serving in the military whether they would fight for their country. Over half--56 percent--stated they would fight for Canada; 17 percent stated it would depend on the immediate circumstances of the conflict; 23 percent said they would not fight; and 5 percent did not know.

In a poll conducted by Angus Reid and Associates for the Department of Finance in July 1988, 1505 respondents were asked to rate the importance they placed on nineteen different issues. The results were grouped into four categories according to public priorities. The purchase of new equipment for the armed forces fell into the category of lowest priority, with only 17 percent of those surveyed thinking the issue required a great deal of attention from the Government.

In January 1989, Gallup asked 1021 Canadians their opinion of the planned purchase of nuclear-propelled submarines (SSNs) for the armed forces. Of those surveyed, 22 percent supported the plan, 69 percent were opposed, and 9 percent did not know. In an Angus Reid poll conducted for Greenpeace and released in February 1989, over 70 percent of 1503 respondents indicated opposition to the purchase of SSNs. Fifty-nine percent were strongly opposed; 12 percent were moderately opposed; 11 percent were strongly in

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1 Owing to the length and scope of the 1988 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey, only selected questions and responses appear in this summary. For a more detailed analysis of the CIIPS survey, see Michael Driedger and Don Munton, *Security, Arms Control and Defence: Public Attitudes in Canada.* Ottawa: CIIPS, *Working Paper* No. 14, December 1988; and Don Munton, "Canadians and Their Defence." *Peace and Security*, vol. 3 no. 4 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 2-4.

favour; 14 percent were moderately in favour; and 4 percent offered no opinion. The CIIPS poll conducted in June and July 1988 asked its 1005 respondents whether they approved or disapproved of the purchase "to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans." In contrast to the above results, 18 percent strongly disapproved; 26 percent disapproved; 44 percent approved; and 12 percent strongly approved.

Telepoll Research Inc. surveyed 1498 Canadians in March on whether women should be given equal opportunity with men for military employment, including combat roles. The poll, sponsored by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, found that 65 percent favoured giving women combat roles, while 30 percent were opposed. More respondents--78 percent--favoured allowing women to be fighter pilots, and 78 percent also agreed that women should be allowed as crew members on warships. On the same issue, Gallup interviewed 1037 people in April and found that 48 percent favoured women in combat roles; 43 percent were opposed; and 9 percent had no opinion.

Following the release of the Federal budget, Telepoll conducted a survey of 1520 people in May asking whether they believed the defence cutbacks, including cancellation of the purchase of SSNs and closing of military bases, would affect Canada's security. Nearly 70 percent of the Quebecers surveyed, thought the cutbacks would have no effect on national security, with 45 percent of all other Canadians polled sharing the same view. Twenty-six percent of the Quebecers believed that the cutbacks would decrease national security, while 47 percent of the rest of those polled held this view.

The CIIPS poll of June and July 1988 asked if Canada should reduce its NATO commitment. Twenty-six percent of the respondents strongly disagreed; 53 percent disagreed; 17 percent agreed; and 4 percent strongly agreed. The CIIPS poll also asked if Canada ought to spend significantly more on defence. Eighteen percent strongly disagreed; 40 percent disagreed; 31 percent agreed; and 12 percent strongly agreed.

An April 1989 Gallup poll found that 44 percent of 1024 people questioned believed Canada should permit cruise missile testing over Canadian territory by the United States while 51 percent felt tests should not be permitted. Five percent did not know.

*Canadian Foreign Policy*

To begin its survey, the CIIPS poll asked its respondents to judge how well-informed they were on international affairs and Canadian foreign policy issues. Fourteen percent felt they were very well-informed; 55 percent, somewhat informed; 26 percent, not too informed; and 5 percent, not at all informed. The questionnaire then asked how much influence Canada has on the course of world events. The poll found that 5 percent believed Canada has a great deal of influence; 55 percent believed it has some influence; 39 percent, very little influence; and 2 percent, no influence at all.

Turning to regional conflict issues, a Gallup poll of 1028 people conducted in October 1988 found 46 percent of respondents approving increased Canadian aid to black-ruled countries in Southern Africa. Thirty-one percent felt Canada should not get involved, while 10 percent disapproved for some other reason. Thirteen percent did not know.

A November 1988 survey of 1021 Canadians by Thomas Lightstone and Co. for the Department of External Affairs found that 23 percent favoured full sanctions by Canada against South Africa and 24 percent favoured more sanctions than Canada had imposed.

Twenty-four percent were satisfied with the level of sanctions, while 11 percent called for fewer, 7 percent called for none at all, and 11 percent did not answer. Asked which regional conflict concerned them most, 51 percent named South Africa; 22 percent, Nicaragua; 19 percent, Afghanistan; and 8 percent did not answer. A slim majority of respondents--51 percent--indicated they were somewhat familiar with the South African conflict, while 16 percent said they were very familiar with it. Those not very familiar equalled 20 percent and 14 percent said they were not familiar with the situation at all. The survey also showed that a majority does not believe that the South African government is putting an end to apartheid, or that Canadians are getting an accurate picture of what is happening in South Africa.

A Gallup poll of 1024 Canadians conducted in March 1989 found 62 percent of respondents aware of South Africa's racial policies and 38 percent, not. Asked what Canada should do about the situation, 13 percent felt we should not interfere; 47 percent believed Canada should maintain relations while urging South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies; 35 percent believed Canada should cut off relations; and 5 percent did not know.

In April Gallup conducted 1037 interviews on the issue of Canadian relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Asked whether they believed Canada should upgrade its diplomatic relations with the PLO, 35 percent said yes; 43 percent said no; and 22 percent did not know.

A survey conducted by Angus Reid in May indicated that 59 percent of 1502 Canadians thought Canada supported US foreign policy too often. One-third of the respondents disagreed.

*MacLean's* magazine and Decima Research conducted a poll in early 1989 in which they asked 1000 people: "Would you strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly oppose, Canada and the United States adopting common and identical policy on all matters relating to defence and foreign affairs?" Twenty-four percent strongly opposed this notion; 36 percent opposed it; 33 percent supported it; and 5 percent strongly supported it.

*International Affairs*

In November 1988, Gallup polled 1041 Canadians on how peaceful they foresaw 1989. Thirty percent thought 1989 would be peaceful; 47 percent felt it would be the same as 1988; 19 percent foresaw a troubled year; and 4 percent did not know. The same question was asked by Gallup in thirty-three other countries around the world. More people in Brazil were anticipating a troubled year (44 percent) than in any other nation, and the highest percentage of most people anticipating a peaceful year were in the Soviet Union (52 percent).

A February Gallup poll asked 1042 Canadians their views on the Soviet Union's position in the world. Thirty-seven percent of respondents felt the USSR was more or less content with its power, while 49 percent thought it was trying to increase its area of influence. Fifteen percent did not know.

The May 1989 Angus Reid survey (mentioned above) found 59 percent of respondents felt Gorbachev's reforms would bring about positive change in the Soviet Union, while 25 percent disagreed. Thirteen percent thought the risk of nuclear war had increased, while

50 percent believed it had decreased and 35 percent felt it had stayed the same. The Soviet Union was thought slightly more likely than the United States to begin a nuclear war deliberately--with 22 percent support versus 21 percent. However, the United States was thought more likely to begin an accidental nuclear war--30 percent versus 17 percent. By a margin of 61 percent to 32 percent, respondents believed a nuclear war was more likely to begin accidentally, than deliberately. Fifty percent of respondents felt Soviet leader Gorbachev had done the most for peace over the past few years, while 24 percent believed President Reagan had done the most, (16 percent felt that both had worked toward peace). Finally, the United States was thought by 43 percent of respondents, and the Soviet Union by 36 percent, to contribute more to political instability.

The CIIPS poll asked many questions pertaining to international affairs in general, some of which are summarized below. Asked which situation posed the greatest threat to world peace, 5 percent of respondents identified Soviet actions on the international scene; 11 percent, US actions; 23 percent, the superpower arms race; 32 percent, the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries; 24 percent, the Middle East situation; and 4 percent, conflicts elsewhere in the world.

Five percent of those polled believed that a nuclear war was very likely within the next twenty-five years; 25 percent believed it likely; 56 percent, unlikely; and 14 percent, very unlikely. Asked whether the chances of nuclear war breaking out were greater, less, or the same, as ten years ago, 27 percent felt that they were greater, 47 percent that they were less, and 26 percent that they were the same.

Fifty-nine percent believed that a nuclear attack would be initiated by accident, 41 percent believed such an attack would be deliberate. Asked who they believed would be responsible for either an accidental or deliberate attack, 10 percent identified the United States; 13 percent, the Soviet Union; 32 percent, both superpowers; and 45 percent, some other country. Finally, 32 percent believed a substantial reduction in present nuclear arms levels would slow down the arms race, while 68 percent believed nations would continue to develop and produce more destructive weapons after a reduction, thereby continuing the arms race.

***APPENDIX 5***

**Strategic Nuclear Balance**

**UNITED STATES**

| | Launchers | Warheads | yield (Mt) | total warheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ICBMs** | | | | |
| Minuteman II | 450 | 1 | 1.20 | 450 |
| Minuteman III | 200 | 3 | 0.17 | 600 |
| Minuteman III 12A | 300 | 3 | 0.33 | 900 |
| MX | 50 | 10 | 0.30 | 500 |
| **SLBMs** | | | | |
| Poseidon C3 | 224 | 10 | 0.05 | 2240 |
| Trident C4 | 384 | 8 | 0.10 | 3072 |
| **Bombers** | | | | |
| B-52 G | 90 | | | |
| B-52 H | 90 | | | |
| B-1B | 90 | | | |
| FB-IIIA | 48 | | | |

**Source:** Natural Resources Defense Council, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: US Forces and Capabilities* (Revised edition) (forthcoming, Spring 1989).

## Strategic Nuclear Balance

### SOVIET UNION

| | launchers | Warheads | Yield (Mt) | total Warheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ICBMs** | | | | |
| SS-11 | | | | |
| M2 | 160 | 1 | 1.1 | 160 |
| M3 | 210 | 3x350 (MRV) | | 630 |
| SS-13 | 60 | 1 | 0.75 | 60 |
| SS-17 | 120 | 4 | 0.75 | 480 |
| SS-18 | 308 | 10 | 0.55 | 3080 |
| SS-19 | 350 | 6 | 0.55 | 2100 |
| SS-24 | 20 | 10 | 0.55 | 200 |
| SS-25 | 150 | 1 | 0.55 | 150 |
| **SLBMs** | | | | |
| SS-N-6 | 240 | 1 | 1.00 | 240 |
| SS-N-8 | 286 | 1 | 0.80 | 286 |
| SS-N-17 | 12 | 1 | 1.00 | 12 |
| SS-N-18 | 224 | 7 | 0.20 | 1568 |
| SS-N-20 | 100 | 10 | 0.50 | 1000 |
| SS-N-23 | 64 | 4 | 0.25 | 256 |
| **Bombers** | | | | |
| Bear A | 15 | | | |
| Bear B/C | 25 | | | |
| Bear G | 45 | | | |
| Bear H | 75 | | | |
| Blackjack | 10 | | | |

**Source:** Natural Resources Defense Council, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. IV: Soviet Nuclear Forces* (forthcoming, Winter 1989).

***APPENDIX 6***

## Canada and Security at the United Nations

The United Nations deals with arms control, disarmament, and regional conflict issues in a number of different forums, including:

a) The Plenary of the General Assembly
b) The Security Council
c) The First (Political and Security) Committee
d) The Special Political Committee
e) The United Nations Disarmament Commission
f) Various *Ad Hoc* Committees and bodies
g) Various study groups
h) The Conference on Disarmament (CD)

### a) The Plenary of the General Assembly

In general, the General Assembly may discuss any issues or matters within the scope of the United Nations Charter. One of its main purposes, however, is to refer agenda items to the seven Main Committees, including the First and Special Political Committees. All UN members have the right to representation on the Main Committees. Following deliberation on these items by the Committees, draft resolutions are voted upon and, in turn, referred back to the General Assembly. Resolutions are then finalized by votes taken in the Plenary.

### b) The Security Council

The Security Council has the primary responsibility within the UN system for maintenance of international peace and security. Its main functions include peaceful settlement of disputes and action taken to ensure and encourage peace. The Council reacts to international events as they arise and, as in the case of the establishment of peacekeeping operations, implements measures to prevent or reduce conflict. The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and ten members elected on a regional basis by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Decisions on procedural matters require the support of nine members. All other decisions require an affirmative vote by nine members including the five permanent members, who each hold a veto. In October 1988, Canada was elected to the Security Council for a two-year term for the fifth time since 1946. The remaining members of the Security Council are: Algeria, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Colombia, and Finland.

### c) The First Committee

The First Committee deals with arms control, disarmament, and international security matters. It is a deliberative, as opposed to a negotiating, body. In recent years, it has dealt with as many as eighty resolutions per year. During the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1988, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, was Chairman of the First Committee. Some of the main issues of special interest to Canada considered by the First Committee include: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; Comprehensive Test Ban; Chemical Weapons; Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons purposes; and streamlining of the Committee's work. Participants in the Committee try to work toward consensus on all resolutions but many are put to an actual vote.

### d) The Special Political Committee

This Committee considers a wide range of issues not considered by any of the other six Main Committees. At the Forty-third Session these included: the effects of atomic radiation; international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories; peacekeeping; information; the Malagasy Islands; science and peace; and Apartheid.

### e) The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UNDC is another deliberative body whose work on arms control and disarmament is limited to certain issues. In 1989, the UNDC dealt with the following: reduction of military budgets; nuclear disarmament; naval armaments and disarmament; South Africa's nuclear capability; the role of the UN in disarmament; conventional disarmament; and consideration of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade. At the Forty-second Session in 1988, the UNDC reached consensus on two items, verification and confidence-building measures, thus removing them from the agenda. The Commission meets each year in May for about a month, with all member states entitled to participate. Unlike the First Committee, its work is conducted solely by consensus.

### f) Various *Ad Hoc* Committees and Bodies

These are generally bodies which function under mandate from the General Assembly. They are of both long and short duration, depending upon the nature of their considerations and the purpose of their work. They include such bodies as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUS), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Con-

ference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT PrepCom), the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and the Conference on Disarmament (see below).

**g) Various Study Groups**

Occasionally the General Assembly calls for special studies to be conducted on various issues relating to arms control, disarmament, and international conflict. Five Study Groups were mandated in 1988, covering the topics of verification, nuclear weapons, effective and verifiable measures to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security, and promoting transparency in the international transfers of conventional arms. Canadian External Affairs Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs Fred Bild, is chairman of the Verification study group. Canada is not involved in the other four studies.

**h) Conference on Disarmament (CD)**

The CD is a forty-nation Committee separate from but mandated by the UN. Canada has been a member from its earliest beginnings. It is the world's only global multilateral forum for negotiation in the field of disarmament. It meets twice yearly in Geneva to negotiate on the following issues: nuclear test-ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; chemical weapons; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; and comprehensive programme of disarmament. The CD also creates *ad hoc* working groups and committees to consider various issues. Decisions at the CD are made by consensus.

**Security Council Voting Record (1 January - 31 July 1989)**

Canada voted YES to each of the following Resolutions passed by the Council:

S/RES/627(1989) - Re: Date of election to fill vacancy in the International Court of Justice.

S/RES/628(1989) - Re: Support and implementation of tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba.

S/RES/629(1989) - Re: Namibia, UNTAG, and financial assistance to Namibia.

S/RES/630(1989) - Re: Extending mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

S/RES/631(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.

S/RES/632(1989) - Re: Implementation of UN plan for Namibia.

S/RES/633(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force.

S/RES/634(1989) - Re: Extending Resolution 186(1964) for stationing of UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus.

S/RES/635(1989) - Re: International Civil Aviation Organization and cooperation of all States in research of plastic or sheet explosives.

S/RES/636(1989) - Re: Reaffirming Geneva Convention as being applicable to Palestinian territories.

S/RES/637(1989) - Re: Central America and efforts toward peace.

S/RES/638(1989) - Re: Hostage-taking and abduction.

S/RES/639(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

Three draft resolutions were defeated. The first, which Canada voted against, deplored the downing of two Libyan aircraft by the United States and called on the US to suspend its military manoeuvres off the Libyan coast. This was opposed by all three Western members of the Security Council. Canada supported the other two draft resolutions, vetoed by the US alone. The first of these strongly deplored Israeli practices against the Palestinian people and called upon Israel to desist from its violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The second again strongly deplored Israeli practices and called for Israel to stop deporting Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and allow safe return for those already deported.

Canada abstained on four non-resolution (procedural) votes taken during the January-July 1989 period. Three of these votes involved requests by the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the debate in the Security Council on items regarding the situation in the Occupied Territories. The other vote concerned a request by the Alternate Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the debate on the shooting down of two Libyan aircraft. Each of these requests was allowed, with the United States casting the only negative vote.

**Source** for Security Council Voting Record: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

**Resolutions on Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UNGA 43 Resulting from First Committee Deliberations**

| Resolution and Lead Sponsor (*Canada co-sponsor) | Resolution (supported by Canada) | Vote (Yes/No/Abstain) |
|---|---|---|
| 43/23 (Brazil) | Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic | 144-1-7 |
| 43/62 (Mexico) | Treaty of Tlatelolco | 149-0-5 |
| 43/64 (Australia)* | Urgent Need for a CTB | 146-2-6 |
| 43/65 (Egypt) | NWFZ in the Middle East | Consensus |
| 43/66 (Pakistan) | NWFZ in South Asia | 116-3-34 |
| 43/67 (Sweden) | Conventional Weapons Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects | Consensus |
| 43/69 (Pakistan) | Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons | 152-0-3 |
| 43/70 (Sri Lanka) | Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space | 154-1-0 |
| 43/71 (Tanzania) | Denuclearization of Africa<br>a) Implementation of the Declaration | 151-0-4 |
| 43/72 (Bylelorussia) | Prohibition of Development of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction | 152-0-2 |
| 43/73 (Romania) | Reduction of Military Budgets | Consensus |
| 43/74A (Australia)* | 1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention | Consensus |
| 43/74B (Austria)* | Second Review Conference of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons | Consensus |
| 43/74C (Poland)* | Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons | Consensus |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43/75A (Zimbabwe) | Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations | 141-0-12 |
| 43/75B (Zimbabwe) | Relationship Between Disarmament and Development | Consensus |
| 43/75C (UK) | Stockpiling of Radiological Weapons | Consensus |
| 43/75D (Denmark) | Conventional Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/75E (China) | Nuclear Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/75F (China) | Conventional Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/75G (UK)* | Objective Information on Military Terms | 130-0-10 |
| 43/75I (Colombia)* | International Arms Transfers | 110-1-38 |
| 43/75K (Canada)* | Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes | 144-1-7 |
| 43/75L (Sweden) | Naval Armaments | 152-1-1 |
| 43/75M (Norway)* | Seabed Treaty | Consensus |
| 43/75N (Sweden) | Comprehensive UN Study on Nuclear Weapons | 141-1-9 |
| 43/75O (UK)* | Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations | 103-0-46 |
| 43/75P (France)* | Confidence- and Security-Building and Conventional Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/75Q (Nigeria) | Dumping of Radioactive Wastes for Hostile Purposes | 129-1-10 |
| 43/75R (Cameroon)* | Review of the Role of the UN in the Field of Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/75S (Peru) | Conventional Disarmament on a Regional Scale | 125-0-23 |
| 43/76D (Tanzania) | UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa | Consensus |
| 43/76F (Nigeria) | UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/76G (Nepal) | UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia | Consensus |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43/76H (Peru) | UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America | Consensus |
| 43/77B (Yugoslavia) | Third UN Special session on Disarmament | 152-0-2 |
| 43/78A (Bahamas)* | Report on Disarmament Commission | Consensus |
| 43/78D (Mexico) | Climatic Effects of Nuclear War | 145-0-4 |
| 43/78G (Mongolia) | Disarmament Week | Consensus |
| 43/78H (FRG)* | Guidelines for Confidence-Building Measures | Consensus |
| 43/78I (Netherlands)* | Report of the Conference on Disarmament | 96-0-53 |
| 43/78J (Romania) | Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race | 143-1-9 |
| 43/78K (Mexico) | Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament | Consensus |
| 43/78L (Nigeria) | 1990s as Third Disarmament Decade | Consensus |
| 43/79 (Sri Lanka) | Indian Ocean Zone of Peace | Consensus |
| 43/81A (USA)* | Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements | Consensus |
| 43/81B (Sweden)* | Study of Role of UN in Verification | 150-1-0 |
| 43/82 (UK)* | Non-Proliferation Treaty IV | 137-0-11 |
| 43/83 (Trinidad) | Liability for Illegal Transfer of Weapons | Consensus |
| 43/85 (Malta) | Strengthening of Security/ Cooperation in Mediterranean | Consensus |
| 43/86 (Cameroon) | Strengthening of Regional and International Peace and Security | Consensus |
| 43/90 (USSR) | Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security | 97-3-45 |
| 43/422 (Czech.) | Contribution of the UN Specialized Agencies | Consensus |

**Opposed by Canada**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43/68 (Bulgaria) | Strengthening of Security of Non-nuclear Weapon States Against Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons | 117-17-16 |
| 43/76B (Mexico) | Freeze on Nuclear Weapons | 135-12-3 |
| 43/76E (India) | Convention on Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons | 133-17-4 |
| 43/78B (GDR) | Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War | 126-17-6 |
| 43/78E (Argentina) | Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament | 135-13-5 |

**Abstained by Canada**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43/22 (Costa Rica) | Right of Peoples to Peace | 118-0-29 |
| 43/63A (Mexico) | Cessation of All Nuclear Test Explosions | 136-4-13 |
| 43/63B (Mexico) | Cessation of All Nuclear Test Explosions | 127-3-21 |
| 43/71 (Tanzania) | Denuclearization of Africa<br>b) Nuclear Capability of South Africa | 138-4-12 |
| 43/75H (Ukraine) | Implementation of UNGA Resolutions on Disarmament | 131-2-20 |
| 43/75J (Iraq) | Stockpiling of Radiological Weapons | 116-2-29 |
| 43/75T (Tanzania) | Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa | 141-0-13 |
| 43/76A (Cyprus) | Disarmament and International Security | 129-1-21 |
| 43/76C (Mexico) | World Disarmament Campaign | 144-0-10 |
| 43/77A (India) | Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments | 129-7-14 |
| 43/78C (Czech.) | International Cooperation for Disarmament | 136-1-13 |
| 43/78F (Argentina) | Prevention of nuclear War | 136-3-14 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43/78M (Yugoslavia) | Report of the Conference on Disarmament | 136-3-14 |
| 43/80 (Jordan) | Israeli Nuclear Disarmament | 99-2-51 |
| 43/87 (GDR) | Need for Results-oriented Political Dialogue | 127-1-24 |
| 43/88 (Poland) | Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace | 128-0-24 |
| 43/89 (Yugoslavia) | Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of Security | 128-1-22 |

**Totals:** Canada in favour 53 (29 consensus)
Canada opposed 5
Canada Abstained 17

**Source** for Resolutions on Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security: Department of External Affairs, *The Disarmament Bulletin*. Vol. 9 (Fall/Winter 1988), pp. 13-14.

***APPENDIX 7***

**Recent Political Disturbances in China**
**(April-July 1989)**

*BACKGROUND*

In April 1989, demonstrations by students and workers demanding greater democratic freedoms, and an end to Government corruption, began in Beijing's Tian'anmen Square. On 18 April 1989, several thousand students marched through the capital chanting democratic slogans and singing revolutionary songs as they mourned the death of Hu Yaobang, the Communist Party leader who was forced to resign in 1987 after "hardliners" criticized him for failing to suppress student demonstrations in late 1986 and 1987. Defying a Government ban on public protests, on 22 April 1989, more than 100,000 people gathered in Tian'anmen Square and marched through the streets of Beijing demanding greater press freedoms, and freedom of speech. A march held on 20 April followed a Government rejection of student conditions for talks.

On 13 May, about 2000 students began a hunger strike at Tian'anmen Square. On 4 May, an unannounced Politburo meeting had reportedly endorsed the views of Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang, which included calls for discussions with the students and limited steps toward greater democracy. On 15 May, with the arrival of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing, hunger strikers camping out in Tian'anmen Square refused to end their vigil. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng issued a warning to protesters on 19 May, but agreed to a key student demand by arranging a nationally televised meeting with leaders of the students' pro-democracy movement. Li and Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang visited the 3000 hunger strikers at the Square.

On 20 May, the Government called on army troops to move into Beijing, imposing martial law in parts of the city. With one million people in the streets defying martial law, troops were prevented from reaching the Central Square. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all power, retaining only his title of Communist Party General Secretary. On 25 May, upon orders from Prime Minister Li Peng, Chinese troops encircled Beijing. Chinese student leaders were ready to end their two-week occupation of Tian'anmen Square, but reiterated their demands for greater democratic freedoms and the resignation of Li Peng.

On 2 June, thousands of students and workers turned back more than 2000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tian'anmen Square. On 3 June, violent confrontations began as troops beat dozens of protesters before retreating. On 4 June, tens of thousands of Chinese troops took back Tian'anmen Square from the pro-democracy protesters. Chinese witnesses and Western intelligence reports stated that up to 3000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Western diplomatic sources in Beijing said the number of deaths was "in the thousands". The area around Tian'anmen Square was completely sealed off by troops. Accounts of extreme brutality by soldiers, against persons in the Square, began to surface.

After the Tian'anmen Square massacre, Chinese troops fanned out in Beijing in a search for the pro-democracy protest leaders. On 9 June 1989, Deng Xiaoping, China's senior leader, appeared on Chinese television with a group of nine other top Government officials and commended the army for its role in the crushing of the protest movement. On 10 June, the Government announced that it had arrested more than 400 participants in the movement, including leaders of unofficial student and labour organizations. China's national news service showed scenes of protest leaders being arrested throughout China. The following day, a Government spokesman stated that Zhao Ziyang would become the

subject of an investigation, culminating in possible criminal proceedings against him for his actions in previous months. Also, the Government issued a warrant for the arrest of Fang Lizhi, China's best known dissident who, along with his wife Li Shuxian, had taken refuge in the US Embassy in Beijing.

On 13 June, Chinese authorities began a manhunt for twenty-one student leaders by flashing pictures of the activists on national television. By 20 June more than 1300 persons had been arrested, including five of twenty-one student leaders identified in the national campaign. On 21 June, Chinese authorities staged a public execution of three men accused of taking part in a violent protest in Shanghai earlier in the month. Beijing radio reported that forty-five others had been sentenced to death or imprisonment. On 22 June, it was reported that twenty-four executions had been carried out. On 24 June, Jiang Zemin, a former mayor of Shanghai, was appointed Communist Party General Secretary. The next day, the Chinese Communist Party publicly called for a purge of members who were active in the pro-democracy movement.

Immediately following the violent crackdown of 3 and 4 June 1989, world leaders voiced grief and outrage at Chinese Government actions. In addition to individual diplomatic protest actions and economic measures, on 28 June 1989, the European Community leaders announced a series of reprisals against Beijing, including a suspension of military cooperation and arms sales, suspension of high-level contacts, postponement of new cooperation projects, and an extension of visas for Chinese students studying in Europe. Leaders of the seven Western industrialized nations, attending their fifteenth annual economic summit in Paris, issued a statement on 14 July 1989 condemning the "violent repression" of the pro-democracy movement "in defence of human rights.: The statement--by the US, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan--also took note of diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed by the individual states and called on the World Bank to postpone reviews of new loans to China. However, in a joint press conference with the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, the US Ambassador to the UN agreed that the UN Security Council should not consider the issue of the Chinese Government's actions in Beijing on 3 and 4 June 1989.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 4 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark summoned the Chinese Ambassador to Canada, Xhang Wenpu, who was read a statement calling on the Chinese Government "to urgently and immediately take steps to stop the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces.: Clark asked the Ambassador to ensure that he passed on to his authorities the degree of Canada's outrage.[1] On the same day, Western nations and Chinese communities throughout the world condemned the military crackdown with pleas for restraint and calls for political and economic sanctions against China. Also, Chinese Canadians across Canada marched on Chinese consulates and held vigils for the civilians killed in Beijing.[2]

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1 "Clark Condemns China Crackdown." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 June 1989, p. A6; and Department of External Affairs, *Statement* 89/16, p. 3.

2 Eric Skelton, "20, 000 Demonstrators March on Consulate." *Globe and Mail*, 5 June 1989, p. A4; and Robert Sibley, "Chinese Canadians Urge Government to Act." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 June 1989.

On 5 June 1989 in the House of Commons, the External Affairs Minister announced Canadian actions in response to events in China. These included:

- advising the 600 Canadians resident in China, half of whom were in Beijing, to leave immediately, with Canadian Government assistance if required;

- postponing the signing of a series of memoranda of understanding on development assistance projects in China;

- suspending nuclear cooperation consultations;

- suspending relations between the Canadian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army, including suspension of sales of non-lethal military equipment to China;

- allowing some 4,500 Chinese students in Canada to remain by issuing them one-year visa extensions; and

- working at the UN to support calls for moderation and restraint in China.[3]

On 12 June 1989, Mr. Clark announced that Canada would be withdrawing its Ambassador to China, Earl Drake, for consultations.[4] On 15 June, the Chinese Ambassador to Canada was called in again and presented with allegations that his diplomats were harassing Chinese students in Canada. The Ambassador told reporters afterwards that Canada should not be meddling in China's internal affairs. It was confirmed on 16 June that at least two Chinese diplomats stationed in Canada had defected and were seeking political asylum in Canada.[5]

On 20 June 1989, Ambassador Drake appeared before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade.[6] The Government also convened a "National Round Table" made up of businesspersons, academics, non-governmental organizations and representatives of the Chinese Canadian community, to develop Canada's broad strategy toward China. New measures to protest China's behaviour, while at the same time encouraging Canadians to maintain "people-to-people" exchanges with China, were announced on 30 June 1989. The measures included:

- Canadian withdrawal from development-assistance projects involving a state auditor training programme, a lube oil centre, and urban traffic management programme;

- indefinite suspension of consulting activity associated with the Three Gorges hydro-electric project;

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3 Department of External Affairs, *supra* note 1, pp. 3-5.

4 Tim Harper, "Canada Calls Home China Envoy." *Toronto Star*, 13 June 1989, p. A4.

5 Richard Cleroux, "Clark Says Chinese Spying on Their Students in Canada. *Globe and Mail*, 17 June 1989, p. A1; Robert Lee and Charles Rusnell, "Chinese Diplomats Defect." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June 1989, p. A1; and Iain Hunter, "Clark Confronts Chinese Envoy." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June 1989, p. A1.

6 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence*, Issue No. 8 (20 June 1989), pp. 8:3-25.

- cancellation of a television transmission facility project which External Affairs Minister Clark described as "clearly supportive of China's state propaganda apparatus", and discussion with the CBC to bolster the broadcasting of Mandarin-language news into China;

- suspension of federal funding for participation in Chinese-hosted trade shows for the remainder of 1989;

- increased capacity in Shanghai and Beijing to handle potential immigrants to Canada;[7]

- provision of $1.5 million to Chinese students in Canada to be used to establish a National Coordination Office, to provide Chinese students with information, counselling and referral services as well as emergency financial assistance; and

- assurances that all immigration measures to remove Chinese nationals to China had been indefinitely extended.[8]

The Government did not invoke trade sanctions against China. Mr. Clark stated, after a meeting with business leaders, that "it would be in nobody's interest to absolutely cut off commercial and other connections between Canada and China.: Canada ran a $1.6 billion surplus with China in 1988 on total two-way trade of $3.5 billion, up fifty-eight percent from the year before.[9]

On 11 July 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, after meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London before leaving for the Paris economic Summit, urged the Chinese Government to respect its international treaties and instil a "climate of confidence" in Hong Kong. Despite repeated pleas from Hong Kong, Britain had refused to issue any guarantees that it would welcome the more than three million Hong Kong residents with British passports before 1997, when control of the colony is to be handed over to China in accordance with a 1984 British-Chinese Treaty. Mr. Mulroney stated further that Canada, having taken in half of the 45,000 persons who emigrated from Hong Kong in 1988, "know[s] a little bit about some of the difficulties....
We also know the difficulties the United Kingdom has and we think that the onus is on China--not on the United Kingdom--to respect...its undertakings given to the United Kingdom in respect to the treaty."[10] It has been reported that the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China has fuelled the demand for visa applications at the offices of the Commission for Canada in Hong Kong.[11]

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7 Department of External Affairs, *Statement* 89/18 (30 June 1989), pp. 4-5.

8 Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 160 (30 June 1989).

9 Jonathan Manthorpe, "Clark Rules Out 'Dramatic' Sanctions." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 June 1989, p. A6; and Tim Harper, "Canada Backing Off Trade Sanctions After Clark, Business Leaders Meet." *Toronto Star*, 23 June 1989, p. A14.

10 Linda Diebal, "Pressure China on Human Rights in Hong Kong Mulroney Urges." *Toronto Star*, 12 July 1989. p. A1.

11 Michael Bociurkiw, "Troubles in China Send Hong Kong into Wild Scramble for Canadian Visas." *Globe and Mail*, 26 June 1989, p. A1.

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Beginning on 5 June 1989, the House of Commons debated the events taking place in China and Canada's response to them. During Question Period and in an emergency debate called on 5 June, some forty Members of Parliament addressed the issue. Many spoke of the history of Canada-China relations; expressed shock, grief and outrage at the Chinese Government's 3 and 4 June 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and killing of civilians; and pressed for various diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Chinese Government. (For the complete text of the all-Party Resolution passed by the House condemning the Chinese Government, refer to Parliamentary Comment in Chapter 27 of *The Guide*, Human Rights.)

At various times on subsequent days in the House, Opposition Members questioned and suggested measures that could be taken by the Canadian Government. Issues raised included the recall of the Canadian Ambassador to China[12]; reported defections of Chinese embassy staff in Canada[13]; the evacuation of Canadians in China[14]; sponsorship of Chinese families wishing to join their relatives in Canada[15]; requests from Chinese refugees for Canadian visas[16]; the relaxation of Canadian immigration rules for Chinese nationals[17]; and consultations with other nations and multilateral organizations on this matter.[18] Mr. Clark announced many of the Government's positions and measures (described in the previous section) during these debates.

In addition to the above-mentioned matters, several MPs called on the Government to press for UN Security Council debate on the events in China.[19] Liberal MP Jesse Flis asked Mr. Clark about this possibility:

> ...On Monday [5 June 1989], the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that Canada was considering as a member of the United Nations Security Council an initiative to put pressure on the Chinese leadership to stop the bloodshed.... On Tuesday [6 June 1989], he said that the United Nations had no mandate in a country's internal affairs.... The conflict may well be within the walls of China. However, considering China's nuclear capability the general instability poses an imminent threat to global security.... In light of this, will the...[Minister] tell us what steps he has taken to convince the Assembly that the situation does pose a potential global threat and therefore does indeed fall within the United Nations mandate of ensuring global peace and security?

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12 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3012.

13 *Commons Debates*, 16 June 1989, p. 3134.

14 *Commons Debates*, 6 June 1989, p. 2661.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 2662-2663.

16 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3009.

17 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, p. 2551; and 16 June 1989, p. 3137.

18 *Commons Debates*, 6 June 1989, pp. 2661-2662.

19 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, pp. 2552, 2595 and 2612; and 16 June 1989, p. 3134.

Mr. Clark replied:

> ...[T]he House will recall that I made the point yesterday [6 June 1989] that in a country of the power and size of China the disorder that is occurring cannot long remain an internal matter. However, I know that all Members of the House of Commons would want the United Nations to respect the letter of its charter.... Today [7 June 1989], the Prime Minister has signed a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations.... First, it conveys to the Secretary General the resolution adopted unanimously by the House of Commons on Monday night and the record of debate. It also indicates to the Secretary General that Canada would support very strongly both his leadership and action that might be taken through ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and action that might be taken through the Human Rights Commission. It indicates that in our view that in these circumstances the United Nations and the Secretary General should act in a way to have the fullest impact possible within the terms of the charter.[20]

On 14 June 1989, Liberal Leader John Turner asked Mr. Clark whether the Government was planning to table a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the actions of the Chinese Government. He also asked the Minister to consider speaking to Soviet President Gorbachev to press him into a stronger position against the Chinese Government and to press the Soviet Union into confronting China openly at the United Nations. Mr. Clark replied that he was interested in the Opposition Leader's suggestion.[21]

On 26 June 1989, Mr. Turner asked Mr. Clark:

> ...I have not heard Canada yet call for strong international action from the International Monetary Fund or from the World Bank. I have not heard Canada talk about cutting off economic aid. In the Minister's own words, we cannot have business as usual.... My constituents, in particular, and members of the Chinese Canadian community across Canada are very concerned about the future of Hong Kong.... Will the Government, through the Minister, place on the next agenda of the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government the issue of Hong Kong which is destined to fall under Chinese jurisdiction in 1997?

The External Affairs Minister responded as follows:

> ...[T]hat is a very interesting suggestion.... As the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition knows, that meeting will in fact be in Asia [Kuala Lumpur] this year [October 1989], so it may well be a particularly appropriate venue for that kind of discussion.[22]

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20 *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2709-710.

21 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3013.

22 *Commons Debates*, 26 June 1989, p. 3591.